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INTRODUCTION
In a famous article, Thomas Grey posits a dichotomy between the
intuitive image of property as absolute power over things and the more
sophisticated legal view of property as defining relationships among
people.' In this Article, I argue that the intuitive image is the "common
sense" of layfolk and experts alike. This is not to say it "presents reality
neat":2 "Common sense is not what the mind cleared of cant spontaneous-
ly apprehends; it is what the mind filled with suppositions ... concludes."
3
This Article seeks to identify those suppositions and to defamiliarize
them, so that we can recognize them as embedding one distinct image of
property that coexists with others in American property law. Section I
argues that the intuitive image combines a constitutional tradition of
absolutist rhetoric with the political theory of possessive individualism. 4 It
1. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property (citing Bruce Ackerman, Private Property
and the Constitution 97-100, 113-67 (1977)), in 22 Nomos: Property 69 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1980). Grey's dichotomy is between laypeople and experts, whom he
identifies as lawyers and economists. Id.
2. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge 76 (1983).
3. Id. at 84.
4. Today, intellectual historians commonly use the term "possessive individualism" to
refer to the "market liberalism" that Locke's thought was eventually interpreted to support,
although this is not what Locke himself believed. Locke fi-amed liberal imagery in a religious
outlook and assumed that self-interest would be bound by virtue. SeeJames T. Kloppenberg,
The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Reublicanism & Ethics in Early American Political Discourse,
74 . Am. Hist. 9, 16 (1987) (quoting Locke's April, 1687 letter to Edward Clarke: "He that
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also contests Thomas Grey's assertion that lawyers do not hold the intuitive
image; an examination of property casebooks shows lawyers firmly in its
grip.
Section II examines recent property theory, focusing on the work of
the two theorists who have been most influential in articulating alternatives
to the intuitive image: Joseph William Singer and Margaret Jane Radin. It
then articulates a pragmatic approach to property theory, designed to
redescribe our traditions in a way that creates a new conversation in which
the intuitive image becomes nothing more than one strain of property
rhetoric among others.
The focus here is not on law as a set of policy choices, but on law as
"constitutive rhetoric" dedicated to the "art of constituting culture and
community."5 Rhetoric in this expanded sense refers not to manipulative
persuasion, but to the process "by which community and culture are
established, maintained, and transformed." 6 This approach is pragmatic in
the sense that "the task of future philosophy is to clarify men's minds as to
the social and moral strifes of their own day."7 This Article seeks to sketch
out the "external, empirically discoverable set of cultural resources"8
available to those whose goal is to challenge the intuitive image of property
and to create a conversation that examines what kind of community we
want, both within first-year property courses and within society at large.9
To quote historian Daniel Rodgers, "The stock of arguments and
assertions with life in them has limits; the cupboard is a product of culture
and history."'0 Sections HI and IV examine this cupboard. Section IH
examines three strains of republican rhetoric about property, a topic that
requires a reassessment of the republican revival in constitutional law.
Section IV attempts to recover the complexity of the liberal tradition by
examining another theme I call the "liberal dignity strain," which proposes
to limit rights when they threaten human dignity. Because the liberal
dignity strain exists in both religious and secular formulations, this analysis
has not a mastery over his inclinations, he that knows not how to resist the importunity of
present pleasure, or pain, for the sake of what, reason tells him, is fit to be donne, wants the
true principle of Vertue, and industry . .. ."). In other words, contemporary intellectual
historians have uncovered another interpretation of Locke so they call "possessive individual-
ism" what used to be called "liberalism," i.e., that strain of liberal thought that eventually
married Locke with market logic.
5. James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal
Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 688, 692 (1985) [hereinafter White, Law as Rhetoric]; see alsoJames
Boyd White, Heracles' Bow at ix-xvi, 28-59 (1985) [hereinafter White, Heracles' Bow].
6. White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 5, at 684.
7. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy 26 (Beacon Press 1948) (1920)
[hereinafter Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy], reprinted in 12 John Dewey. The Middle
Works, 1899-1924, at 94 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988).
8. White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 5, at 689.
9. Id. at 690; see also Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (1991)
(discussing empirical philosophy and its role in society).
10. Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since
Independence 10 (1987).
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leads to a reassessment of the relationship of lawyers to religious language.
As I explore the different rhetorics of property, I will-for obvious
didactic purposes-often highlight the differences between them. This is
not to say that each is a coherent tradition consciously transmitted. In fact,
judges, commentators, and the general public often mix intuitive imagery
with imagery that conflicts with it, or combine two rhetorics to form new
mixtures, or, occasionally, new compounds that achieve a stable presence
in the rhetoric of property. This pragmatic, and often unreflective,
intermixture is a key element of American property rhetoric both inside
and outside the law.
If these themes transmute in Protean fashion, why tease out a number
of discrete "rhetorics"? My goal in this Article, as in my property course,
stems from my pragmatic understanding of truth as an expression of
identity." The traditional assumption was that one set of truths would
hold for everyone. Instead, I view one's "truths" about property-like all
truths-to be expressions of personal and political identity. Accompanying
these truths will be characteristic images of "the facts," which in turn lead
to predictable legal and political conclusions.
Teasing out the complexity of our beliefs about property plays two
important roles. It allows us to be more effective lawyers, by enabling us to
frame arguments to persuade not only someone who shares our vision of
property, but someone who does not. It also allows us fuller development
as human beings in a democratic society. By holding up a mirror to our-
selves and our students, we can start a democratic conversation about
whether we like the reflection we see in our "truths" about property.
I. THE INTUITIVE IMAGE OF PROPERTY
A. The Intuitive Image of Absoluteness
This land is my land
And it ain't your land
I got a shotgun
And you don't got one
If you don't get off
I'll blow your head off
This land is private property.'2
Schoolyard ditty, 1997
Many commentators have noted the gap between the political rhetoric
of absolute property rights and the practice of limited property rights.' s
11. This theme is explored in Joan Williams, Truth as Identity, Paper Given at the Annual
Conference of the Organization of American Historians (Apr. 1994) (on file with the author).
12. This take-off on Woody Guthrie, This Land is Your Land, on 1 The Asch Recordings
(Smithsonian/Folkwayi Recordings), is from the movie Bob Roberts (Working Title Films
1992). Guthrie wrote the original song as a leftist response to God Bless America. The fact that
schoolchildren have picked up the parody suggests the power of the intuitive image.
13. See Robert P. Bums, Blackstone's Theory of the Absolute Rights of Property, 54 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 67 (1985) (discussing Blackstone's theory of property as an absolute right and how it has
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"What can we conclude about property when we compare its treatment in
the law and in political rhetoric?'04 asks David Schultz. He notes a "gap
between political rhetoric and institutional practice." 5
Schultz proposes to distinguish between absolutist political rhetoric
and "the law." This is a good first cut. But absolutist rhetoric also shows up
inside the law. In fact, one of the most often cited sources for the intuitive
image of absoluteness is Blackstone's Commentaries to the effect that
property entails "the sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of
the right of any other individual in the universe."1
6
Blackstone is a legal source, and this is a clear statement of
absolutism. Thus Schultz's proposed distinction between political rhetoric
and "the law" does not fully capture what is happening, in the sense that
the political rhetoric of absolutism has sometimes been embedded into
legal texts. But Schultz is correct that an important distinction exists
between the (political and legal) rhetoric of absolute property rights and the prac-
tice of limited ones. As historian Forrest McDonald wryly notes: "Blackstone's
sweeping definition overstated the case; indeed, he devoted the succeeding
518 pages of Book 2 of his Commentaries... to qualifying and specifying
the exceptions to his definition." 7 McDonald points out that the
government in Blackstone's period exercised extensive regulatory power;
historian William Novak has shown that extensive regulatory power per-
sisted throughout much of the nineteenth century. McDonald also
points out that English landowners' traditional dominion was far from
absolute: not only did the Crown own all swans, whales, many minerals,
and tall timbers suitable for ship masts, it had extensive powers to take
property without compensation through forfeiture and eminent domain.' 9
been interpreted through history); David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting
Depictions of Property in the American Political Founding; 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 464, 466 (1993)
("[O]n the rhetorical level property rights were described in 'absolutist' terms (circa 1776-
1800) while during this time the legal treatment of property in case law and legislation
suggested much less than an absolutist treatment of property."). Forrest McDonald also has a
useful description of the gap between actual practices concerning property and the intuitive
image. See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Consti-
tution 61-66 (1985) (contrasting absolutist rhetoric with the practice of limited property
rights). However, he categorizes the limitations on absolute ownership in the fifteenth century
as property "regulation." This use of the late nineteenth century concept of "regulation" is
ahistorical and misleading. See also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce
Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 Geo. Lj. 2303, 2340 (1994) (discussing the "mythology of
property").
14. Schultz, supra note 13, at 491.
15. Id.
16. McDonald, supra note 13, at 11.
17. Id. at 13.
18. William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century
America 9-17 (1996) [hereinafter Novak, People's Welfare] (discussing government regulation
of society's rights during the nineteenth century).
19. See McDonald, supra note 13, at 14-22 (discussing the English Crown's powers over a
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An owner's neighbors also had substantial rights over his land-including
the right to hunt, gather wood, graze animals, pass over, and use water
from his land-many of which were carried over to the colonies and
persisted well into the nineteenth century.0
If property rights have never been absolute, why is the rhetoric of
absolutism such a hardy perennial? Many have dismissed the rhetoric of
absolutism as "the mythology of property."2 1 An alternative interpretation
is that the rhetoric of absolutism is one distinct strain of rhetoric whose
purpose has never been to define actual practice.
Instead, absolutism reflects a strain of rhetoric crystallized by John
Locke. "The history of Locke's theory of property.., is primarily political,
with the language of property used to defend the political liberty of
Englishmen (including the colonies) against the Crown."2 Two Treatises on
Government was written in opposition to the abuses of the Crown, to
explain why the English Revolution did not destabilize the property rights
of the aristocracy. "The difficulty.., which first emerged in 1688 and is
best expressed in the work of John Locke, was to destroy the monarchy
without destroying... the right to property everywhere in the society."24
This problem emerged in sharp profile because the Crown was a
hereditary property right. "If this most significant of all property rights
could be abolished, ' 'ss whose property was safe?
Absolutist rhetoric arose as part of a conversation about the scope of
central power and the need for limited government. The English
Revolution was an early, important context, but absolutist rhetoric re-
emerged whenever the scope of government power was at issue: it was
adopted by the colonists in their fight with Parliament;26 in the debates
over the Constitution (as Jennifer Nedelsky documents in elegant de-
tail) ;27 by the federalists in their fights with redistributive legislatures; and,
landowner's property rights).
20. See id. at 29-36 (discussing the limitations on an owner's individual property rights
caused by property rights held by the public).
21. See Regan, supra note 13, at 2339 ("[P]roperty rhetoric is comprised of diverse strands
that co-exist in some tension, rather than forming a unified and harmonious whole.
Nonetheless, certain strands have had particularly powerful influence on the cultural
imagination, and together consitute what we might describe as the mythology of property.");
Schultz, supra note 13, at 466 ("[T]he rhetoric of property was so loud during colonial and
early America (and now so colored by 20th century prejudices and myths) that scholars of the
American Founding often miss the more subtle, institutional, legalistic, and paradoxical
meaning and context of the term during this era.").
22. Schultz, supra note 13, at 472.
23. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1967) (1690).
24. Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19J.L
& Econ. 467, 468-69 (1976) (summing up Lucas's arguments in Paul Lucas, Essays in the
Margin of Blackstone's Commentaries 230-31 (1962) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University) (microform available through University Microfilms)).
25. Katz, supra note 24, at 469.
26. John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution (1986-93).
27. Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism:
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on occasion, by the U.S. Supreme Court, as described by James Ely in The
Guardian of Every Other Right.
28
This strain of constitutional rhetoric fuels the self-righteous fury
reflected in the schoolyard distortion of This Land is My Land (the song)
with which this Section begins. But, if this rhetoric is not mere mythology,
neither is it an actual description of Americans' conflicting intuitions about
property. Some commentators, notably Jennifer Nedelsky, in her influential
Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, at times overlook
this.2 So do many of us much of the time. The "This land is my land"
strain of constitutional rhetoric tends to dominate Americans' self-
description of their beliefs about property. The challenge is to create a
conversation that allows us to see that our beliefs about property are, in
fact, far more complex.
B. Who Holds the Intuitive Image of Property?
In the English-speaking countries today, the conception of
property held by the specialist (the lawyer or economist) is quite
different from that held by the ordinary person. Most people,
including most specialists in their unprofessional moments,
conceive of property as things that are owned by persons. To own
property is to have exclusive control of something-to be able to
use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy
it. Legal restraints on the free use of one's property are conceived
as departures from an ideal conception of full ownership.
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property
Grey accurately depicts the image of property held by nonexperts.
When I begin the property course by asking "What does it mean to own
property?," the answers track Grey's description: you can sell it, you can
pass it on to your heirs, destroy it, leave it idle, and so forth. Invariably
someone says, "If it's my property, I can do what I want with it."
This intuitive image of absoluteness does not match social practice.
Nuisance precludes an owner from using his land in a way that
unreasonably interferes with the rights of his neighbors; implied
The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (1990). A limitation of Nedelsky's treatment is her
tendency to assume that the constitutional rhetoric of property was the only relevant rhetoric
in the American tradition, ignoring republican rhetorics and other traditions of limited rights.
See William W. Fisher III, Making Sense of Madison: Nedelsky on Private Property, 18 L & Soc.
Inquiry 547, 552-58 (1993) (disputing Nedelsky's claim that there never were two competing
ideologies of property).
28. James W. Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right 57, 63-81 (1992) (demonstrating
the Supreme Court's use of the doctrine of vested rights and the Contract, Commerce,
Takings and Due Process Clauses to protect private property rights).
29. For similar assessments of Nedelsky's book, see Fisher, supra note 27, at 552-58
(disputing Nedelsky's claim that courts have not questioned the Madisonian vision of
property); Schultz, supra note 13, at 477-81.
30. Grey, supra note 1, at 69.
31. See William L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 591-602 (4th ed. 1971)
(discussing the law of private nuisance in the area of property jurisprudence).
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easements and covenants may preclude him from using part, 2 or all,33 of
the land as he wishes; and adverse possession limits his right to leave it
idle. 4 Legislative limits on land use are pervasive as well. Mary Ann
Glendon tartly notes that a defender of flag burning who claimed that
since "'it's my property... I have a right to do anything I want with it'...
probably does not even have the right to burn dead leaves in his own back
yard."
3 5
If Grey provides an accurate description of the intuitive image of
absoluteness, his distinction between the specialists and layfolk is less
convincing. He is correct in stating that the rarified domain of official
property theory rejects the intuitive image in favor of the Hohfeldian view
of property as a bundle of rights 6 and has done so since the 1936
Restatement.37 But this does not prove that the general run of lawyers has
rejected the intuitive image. To judge from property casebooks, they have
not. The remainder of this Section tracks the intuitive image in property
casebooks, identifies it as a meld of absolutist constitutional rhetoric with
the political theory of possessive individualism, and contests the claim that
it "presents reality neat."38
C. Of Foxes, Chimney Sweeps, and Other Pressing Legal Issues: How
Contemporary Casebooks Meld Absolutist Rhetoric with the Political Theory
of Possessive Individualism
Remarkable unanimity exists about how to start the first-year property
course. Most casebooks start out with cases involving wild animals and/or
lost property -- one famous finders case involves a chimney sweep who
32. For examples of implied easements cases, see Estate of Waggoner v. Gleghorn, 378
S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1964) (finding an implied easement precluding the landowner from using
part of his property); Berkeley Dev. Corp. v. Hutzler, 229 S.E.2d 732 (W. Va. 1976) (holding
that evidence warranted a finding on an implied easement by necessity over another person's
adjacent land).
33. For a case involving an implied covenant that severely restricts the uses an owner can
make of his property, see Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925) (finding an implied
reciprocal servitude).
34. See Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990) (allowing adverse
possession of a piece of land used by the possessor as a seasonal recreation site).
35. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 8-9
(1991).
36. See Grey, supra note 1, at 81-82 (predicting that the adoption of a bundle-of-rights
conception of property will cause the decline of property as a control).
37. See Restatement of Property §§ 1-4 (1936).
38. See Geertz, supra note 2, at 76.
39. Of 11 casebooks surveyed, 7 start with wild animal or finders cases. See Olin L.
Browder et al., Basic Property Law (5th ed. 1989) (beginning with a chapter entitled
"Property, Possession and Ownership," in which the first case is a wild animal case and the
second is a finders case); A. James Casner & W. Barton Leach, Cases and Text on Property
(3d ed. 1984) (considering in chapter one the qualities needed to be a good lawyer in the
field of property while entitling chapter two "Acquiring Title to Wild Animals"); Charles
Donahue, Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Property: An Introduction to the Concept and the
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finds a gem in eighteenth century England.40 Since no one practices wild
animal law, and finders law is now largely superseded by statute,41 the
message sought to be conveyed by this material must be primarily
theoretical or ideological.
The wild animal cases play the most central ideological role, as is
indicated by the fact that nearly all property casebooks still include the
1805 case of Pierson v. Post.2 On its face, the case does not seem
indispensable to an introduction to modem property law. It involves one
Mr. Post, who initially pursued a fox, and Mr. Pierson, who intercepted
and killed it.
The starting point for an analysis of Pierson is John Locke, who sought
to establish the bona fides of property rights through a narrative of acorns
in the wild:
He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or
the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly
appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the
nourishment is his. I ask, then, When did they begin to be his?
when he digested? or when he ate? or when he boiled? or when
he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and 'tis
Institution (3d ed. 1993) (beginning chapter one with a wild animal case); Jesse Dukeminier
&James E. Krier, Property (2d ed. 1988) (focusing on the right of conquest in case one and
wild animals in case two); Charles M. Haar & Lance Liebman, Property and Law (2d ed.
1985) (addressing sovereignty in chapter one and property rights in animals in chapter two);
Sheldon F. Kurtz & Herbert Hovenkamp, Cases and Materials on American Property Law
(1987) (discussing in chapters one and two various theories of property rights, while including
a wild animal case as the first case of chapter two); James L. Winokur, American Property
Law: Cases, History, Policy, and Practice (1982) (beginning chapter one with a finder of lost
property case); see also Barlow Burke, Jr., Personal Property in a Nutshell 1 (1983) (stating that
study of property law "often commences with cases involving the hunting of wild animals").
Two others use the wild animal cases as an example of one theory of property. See Curtis J.
Berger &Joan C. Williams, Property: Land Ownership'and Use 85 (4th ed. 1997) (referring to
wild animal cases as an example of a liberal vision of property); Joseph William Singer, Prop-
erty Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices 56 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter Singer, Property Law]
(including wild animal cases in a section entitled "Labor, Investment, and Possession"). The
other two casebooks begin with a variety of approaches. See Richard H. Chused, Cases,
Material and Problems in Property (1988) (beginning with "property as a cultural institution"
and a case on the "right to publicity"); Edward H. Rabin, Fundamentals of Modem Property
Law (1974) (beginning with a case dealing with migrant workers and the "right to exclude"
and moving into landlord-tenant law).
40. See Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
41. See Burke, supra note 39, at 120 (stating that at least one-third of states have statutes
on finders law).
42. 3 Cal. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805). By my count, 10 of the 12 current casebooks contain
Pierson. See Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 85; Browder, supra note 39, at 24;Jon Bruce &
James W. Ely, Jr., Cases and Materials on Modem Property Law 173 (3d ed. 1994); Casner &
Leach, supra note 39, at 10; Donahue, supra note 39, at 1; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 39,
at 15; Haar & Liebman, supra note 39, at 23; Kurtz & Hovenkamp, supra note 39, at 45;
Singer, Property Law, supra note 39, at 56; Winokur, supra note 39, at 30. The two casebooks
that do not include Pierson self-consciously present nontraditional approaches to property.
Chused, supra note 39 (historical approach); Rabin, supra note 39 (problem method).
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plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else
could. That labour put a distinction between them and
common ... . And will any one say he had no right to those
acorns or apples he thus appropriated, because he had not the
consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus
to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a
consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding
the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain
so by compact, that 'tis the taking any part of what is common,
and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins
the property; without which the common is of no use.43
Pierson authenticates Locke by placing his mythic story in early nineteenth
century New York, where it shows the hunter wresting his property from
the common by injecting his labor into it.
Locke's nature narrative is a powerful rhetorical tool that establishes
two important assumptions about property law.4 The first is that property
rights stem from human biology, specifically from human hunger.4 5 The
second is that property rights are "naturally" of the on-off (I eat it or you
eat it) variety: in other words, that property rights grant exclusive use (and
presumably have since men were savages in the wild).4 This is an
important nexus between the strain of Locke that developed into the
constitutional rhetoric of absolutism and the somewhat different strain that
developed into possessive individualism.
Locke's image of individuals wresting food from a wild terrain also
sends messages about the moral status of ownership. 47 Pierson intimates
that ownership is tied to the sweat of the hunter's brow, thereby implying
(without ever being so crass as to state it) that property is open to all and
reflects the owner's hard work. Pierson intimates that to reconsider the
allocation of property rights today would be like tearing the fox from the
sweaty hands of the still-panting hunter.
The finders cases reinforce these messages. They inject a note of "why
not give property to the person who takes it out of the common?" Since we
have to give the lost property to someone, they intimate, we might as well
give it to the first finder-although finders cases simultaneously reinforce
the intuitive image of eternal ownership through their careful insistence
43. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 28 (J.W. Gough ed., 1976) (1679-
1683).
44. This discussion to some extent follows, and to some extent differs from, Carol Rose's
discussion. Carol M. Rose, Property as Stoytelling. Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Feminist Theoy, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 37 (1990) [hereinafter Rose, Property as Stoytellingl.
45. For a recent restatement of this assertion, see id. at 41 ("[Locke] pointed out that life
depends on property, in a primitive sense; if one cannot literally appropriate those berries and
fruits, one will simply die.").
46. This claim ignores all of feudal history.
47. See Katz, supra note 24, at 468-69 (arguing that Locke's goal was to justify destruction
of the monarchy--traditionally seen as the King's hereditary property right-while preserving
the legitimacy of property rights).
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that the true owner can always reclaim the lost item if he shows up.4"
The finders and wild animal cases also endorse the Lockean
assumption that ownership is naturally focused on an individual acting
alone. The labor of the woman who cooks the hunter's dinner and cares
for his children is (for reasons not explained) not of the type that creates
property rights. In fact, in both finders and wild animal cases, the entire
social system is read off the map: the implicit message is that the hunter's
dependence on the network of human relationships that created and
sustains his life is irrelevant to the design of "his" property rights. 9 In an
era supposedly dominated by Hohfeld's analysis of property in terms of
social relationships, this is a remarkable achievement.0
When finders cases are linked with Pierson in the traditional
introduction to the property course, they serve to deny that the intuitive
image embeds one particular theory about property, with a particular
intellectual history. Instead, they endorse the view that this theory is mere
.common sense," derived from human hunger and human sweat.
This approach has important consequences for the students' reading
of the law that follows. In various contexts-landlord/tenant law and
exclusionary zoning cases spring to mind-the unequal distribution of
property rights in this country has played a direct and explicit role in the
law.5' The traditional introduction subtly sets all this off limits. Indeed,
48. Unless, of course, it has been abandoned or adversely possessed. See Burke, supra note
39, at 58, 162 (noting but not stressing these possibilities).
49. For a contrary argument, see Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J. 2227 (1994) (proposing an alternative formulation of the issues
underlying post-divorce impoverishment).
50. Note that finders law can be taught as an illustration of the Hohfeldian idea that
property rights define the relationships among people, instead of giving absolute rights: for
example, Finder #1 "owns" an item as against Finder #2, but not against the true owner.
Although some casebooks do teach finders law as an illustration of relativity of title, in my
experience, that is not the way finders cases are usually taught.
51. See e.g., Hills Dev. Co. v. Barnards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) (stating that
municipalities have a constitutional obligation to provide a fair share of lower income
housing); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983)
(defining and reinforcing the "Mt. Laurel" doctrine in the context of practical litigation);
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (creating the
"Mt. Laurel" doctrine, which requires municipalities' land use regulations to provide realistic
opportunity for low and moderate income housing). In the context of landlord/tenant law,
the concern for tenants' lack of access to property in a fit condition typically is expressed as
concern over their lack of bargaining power. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and
tenant has been well documented. Tenants have very little leverage to enforce demands for
better housing."); Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Cal. 1974) ("[T]he severe
shortage of low and moderate income housing has left tenants with little bargaining power
through which they might gain express warranties of habitability from landlords, and thus the
mechanism of the 'free market' no longer serves as a viable means for fairly allocating the
duty to repair leased premises between landlord and tenant."); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d
436, 442 (N.J. 1980) ("There is no doubt that New Jersey has been faced with a chronic,
desperate need for rental housing. Increasing urbanization, population growth and inflated
construction costs have contributed to this shortage, thereby creating an inequality of
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the convention of focusing on the creation of property rights-a message
reinforced when Pierson is taught along with cases involving finders law, or,
in more updated introductions, with Moore52 or Vanna White5-- suggests
that the current distribution of property rights is not relevant to the design
of the institution of property. When stated explicitly, this assertion is a
controversial one. In fact, an alternative theory that places the need for
equal distribution of property at center stage4 is totally ignored.
Pierson v. Post proves so indispensable not only because it embeds the
Lockean nature narrative but also the strain of utilitarianism with which the
nature narrative ultimately was wedded to create a theory of property
Locke himself did not hold.55 In Pierson, both the majority and the
dissenting opinions 7 use utilitarian arguments to support their positions,
eloquently establishing the point that utilitarian considerations are an
inevitable element in cases involving property. When Pierson is juxtaposed
with Harold Demsetz's modern retelling of the nature narrative, s it
creates a seamless bond between Locke's nature narrative and the notions
that property rights are inevitably economic and that their design is tied to
wealth creation. Demsetz examines the linkage of property rights with the
fur trade and argues that private property replaced common ownership
because the latter "naturally" leads to waste. Demsetz's modern rewrite of
the nature narrative mistakes ideology for history in a way that has been
bargaining power between the landlord and tenant.") (citations omitted); Hilder v. St. Peter,
478 A.2d 202, 207 (Vt. 1984) ("[T]he common law courts assumed that an equal bargaining
position existed between landlord and tenant. ... In sharp contrast... [c]onfronted with a
recognized shortage of safe, decent housing, today's tenant is in an inferior bargaining
position compared to that of the landlord.") (citations omitted). Are the courts really con-
cerned with tenants' lack of bargaining power or with the results of that lack of power? I would
argue that their real concern is the unequal distribution of property, not with the lack of
bargaining power that (they posit) produced it.
52. See Moore v. Regents of UCLA, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (discussing creation of
property rights in cell line developed from plaintiff's T-lymphocytes).
53. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing
creation of property rights in intellectual property context).
54. See infra Section III.C. (discussing the republican egalitarian theory of property).
55. See John Dunn, Rethinking Modern Political Theory. Essays, 1979-83, at 25 (1985)
(describing Locke's repressed religious upbringing and how it affected his concept of self-
limitation); McDonald, supra note 13, at 60-66 (citing Locke's requirement that for a civil law
to be valid, it must not violate the laws of nature); Kloppenberg, supra note 4, at 16 (noting
that Locke himself was a deeply religious man who assumed that self-interest would be limited
by the bounds of virtue). Compare Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale LJ. 1533, 1562 (1993) (dis-
cussing Locke's proviso that labor gives rise to property rights only to the extent that "as
much and as good" are left for others), with C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of
Possessive Individualism 97-99 (1962) (interpreting Locke in terms of the market liberalism
that eventually grew out of his work).
56. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 39, at 22 (arguing that awarding ownership of a
wild beast on first sight would lead to "quarrels and litigation").
57. See id. at 18 (maintaining that allowing the fruits of a hunt to be taken from a hunter
will discourage hunters from working to tame wild beasts).
58. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967).
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attacked both as bad history and bad economics. s9 Yet Demsetz continues
to be included, even in casebooks now aware of the need for a long note
on the discrediting literature,6° for the same reason we still teach an 1805
case about wild animals in 1998: it perpetuates and naturalizes a particular
vision of property.
6 1
In summary, an analysis of contemporary casebooks shows experts
firmly in the grasp of the intuitive image and fleshes out the contours of
that image, which combines the constitutional rhetoric of absolutism with
(one version of)62 Locke's nature narrative and (one version of)s
Bentham's utilitarianism. 64 I will call this gel of Locke and Bentham
"possessive individualism": the notion that free-standing individuals with
(property) rights making choices will create the best society if they are left
to pursue their own self-interest.65 The intuitive image today typically
combines the tradition of absolutist rhetoric with the political theory of
possessive individualism.
This examination of the standard introduction to property casebooks
suggests that specialists as well as laypeople adopt the intuitive image of
59. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 39, at 46-49 (noting logical, economic, and
anthropological arguments criticizing Demsetz).
60. See id. (citing articles critical of Demsetz).
61. My understanding is that Demsetz's study embeds one particular type of law and
economics in which economic self-interest is treated as the only relevant human motivation
and wealth creation as the only relevant value in the utilitarian calculus. Cf. Letter from Glen
0. Robinson, Professor of Law, University of Virginia to the author (May 13, 1992). Other
authors writing in an economic vein argue that self-interest is not the only relevant human
motivation; see, e.g., Rose, Property as Storytelling, supra note 44, at 53 ("Cooperation, then, is a
preference ordering that the classical property theorists weren't counting on in theory, but
that they can't do without."), or that wealth creation is not the only factor to be taken into
account in social decisionmaking, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics is Moral, 24
Val. U. L. Rev. 163 (1990). My project attempts to discern some values other than wealth cre-
ation .that economists, among others, might find suitable to include in a utilitarian calculus or
other decisionmaking process.
62. An alternative interpretation of Locke stresses his religious outlook and his "proviso."
See Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 67-68 (noting that "Locke's nature narrative
establishes a moral mandate for the current distribution of property").
63. Utilitarianism can be used to undercut absolute property rights. See, e.g., Singer,
Property Law, supra note 39, at 166-171; Gregory S. Alexander, History as Ideology in the Basic
Property Course, 36 J. Legal Educ. 381, 386 (1986) [hereinafter Alexander, Histor as Ideology].
Both authors explore how an owner's property rights can be limited, as well as defended, in
the name of economic efficiency.
64. Note that the elements of the intuitive image-the image of property as absolute,
Locke's nature narrative, and utilitarianism-are logically independent. Their connections are
historical and contingent: one can readily believe in one of these elements, without believing
in the other two.
65. I use the term "possessive individualism" in a way that is close, but not identical, to
the way C.B. Macpherson uses it. Macpherson, supra note 55. Note that Macpherson, writing
before the republican revival, finds elements of what he calls "possessive individualism" both
in authors commonly classified as republican (notably Harrington) and in authors commonly
classified as liberal (notably Locke). The closest analogue to my use of "possessive individ-
ualism" is in Kloppenberg, supra note 4, at 16.
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property. The following discussion of one casebook's analysis of feudal
society supports this finding.
D. Reading Feudal History as Support for the Intuitive Image
Discussion of feudal society is unavoidable in any casebook that
teaches estates in land, the traditional core of the property course.r In
this Subsection, I will examine the discussion of feudalism in the leading
property casebook, written by Jesse Dukeminier and James Krier, to
explore how the authors use the text of feudal history to affirm the
intuitive image.
To highlight the contingent quality of their analysis, I will begin by
showing how feudal history could be interpreted to undermine the intuitive
image of property. I begin with a capsule description of feudal society and
of property's role within it. Modem historians stress the internal logic and
incommensurability of feudal society with the present. 67 The central orga-
nizing principle of feudal society was the Great Chain of Being.?
Hierarchical and (in theory) unchanging social roles were designed
around interdependent and mutual responsibilities between unequal social
actors: from vassal to lord, to intermediate lord, to higher lords, to the
king, and ultimately, to God. Each inferior was entitled to protection or
other benefits from his superiors; in return, he owed them services as well
as deference.
These social relationships were expressed through property. A limited
number of approved estates in land cemented a limited number of
Sestates," i.e., social positions. The formalism of the system of estates
represented feudal society's resistance to social change, its vision of virtue
as fulfilling one's place in the Chain. Because these relationships were
envisioned as permanent interdependencies,69 the key estates in land
awarded simultaneous rights in a tenant, his lord, and on up the Chain.
Exclusive ownership was virtually unknown; instead, the estates carved up
property rights into various interlocking bundles of sticks. To quote
historian Marc Bloch:
[T]he word "ownership," as applied to landed property, would
have been almost meaningless [in feudal society], for nearly all
land and a great many human beings were burdened at this time
66. Feudal influences are also apparent in the doctrine of waste and in landlord/tenant
law. But see Michael Wienberg, From Contract to Conveyance: The Law of Landlord and Tenant,
1800-1920 (pt. I), 1980 S. Ill. U. Lj. 29 (arguing that landlord/tenant law had adopted a
contract model by the eighteenth century, only to revert to a conveyance model in order to
avoid contractual implied warranties of habitability).
67. Truly contemporary historical literature contests the coherence of the concept of
feudalism. For purposes of drawing broad-brush comparisons between the past and the
present, "feudal society" is a workable concept.
68. The classic text is E.M.W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture 25 (1960).
69. I am not trying to romanticize feudal society, which contained many elements that do
not appeal to us today. For feudal interdependence was based on a formal and permanent
hierarchy, which is not a concept most Americans aspire to.
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with a multiplicity of obligations differing in their nature, but all
apparently of equal importance. None implied that fixed
proprietary exclusiveness which belonged to the conception of
ownership in Roman law. The tenant who-from father to son, as
a rule-ploughs the land and gathers the crop; his immediate
lord, to whom he pays dues and who, in certain circumstances,
can resume possession of the land; the lord of the lord, and so
on, right up the feudal scale-how many persons there are who
can say, each with as much justification as the other, "That is my
field!".... This hierarchical complex of bonds between the man
and the soil ... blossomed out as never before [in feudal
society] ... [P]erhaps this attitude to legal rights could not be
better defined than by borrowing a familiar formula from
sociology and calling it the mentality of legal "participation."7 °
This description of feudal society undermines the intuitive image of
property as "naturally" involving absolute dominion; it reinforces instead
the Hohfeldian notion that property describes relationships among people.
Moreover, the intuitive image that property has one "natural" set of
characteristics is undermined by the wide array of estates recognized at
feudal law, an array that seems to confirm the Hohfeldian view of property
as a "bundle of rights."7 Finally, central developments in feudal property
law-the rise and fall of the fee tail, the continuing fights over uses, the
Rule Against Perpetuities7-can also be interpreted to support the view
that property rights do not have one "natural" set of characteristics, but
instead are configured and reconfigured over time to achieve ever-varying
sets of political goals.
My description of feudal society also undermines the history implicit
in the nature narrative, which posits a period of common ownership,
followed by a one-step transition to fully commodified property held in
exclusive ownership.n In fact, commodification of property developed
over a period of at least five hundred years: in the era directly after the
Norman Conquest of 1066, land was not freely inheritable; it was not
salable until 1290; nor devisable by will until the mid-sixteenth century.7 4
70. 1 Marc Bloch, Feudal Society 113-16 (LA. Manyon trans., 1970).
71. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial
Reasoning 23 Yale LJ. 16, 22-23 (1913) (arguing that the divergence among scholars
regarding the rules and definitions of trusts and equitable estates requires that the area be
studied more intensely than other areas of the law).
72. For a good, concise description of each of these episodes, see Dukeminier & Krier,
supra note 39, at 211-16 (the fee tail); id. at 269-82 (the Rule Against Perpetuities); id at 299-
318 (uses).
73. See Demsetz, supra note 58, at 354-59.
74. See Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 114-15. Indeed, land may not have been fully
commodified in Britain even much later. In a nineteenth century novel by Anthony Trollope,
a squire opines that his neighbor was wrong to end an agricultural lease "so long as [the
tenant] had paid the rent." See Anthony Trollope, Orley Farm 39 (Henry S. Drinker ed.,
Knopf 1950) (1862). The flourishing of secure tenancies in the modem period can be viewed
as evidence that land still was not fully commodified as late as 1980. See Trevor Aldridge, Rent
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Given the ease with which feudal history can be interpreted to
undermine the intuitive image, the absence of this interpretation is
striking. Instead, Dukeminier and Krier-like many others75 -interpret
feudal history as confirming the desirability and inevitability of exclusive
property rights and market structures.7 6
"Up from Feudalism" reads the heading of Dukeminier and Krier's
discussion of feudal history in the first edition of the casebook.7 Why
"up"? This word signals the underlying message of the history that follows:
feudalism held certain backward views from which "we modems" have
progressed.78 This is the standard Enlightenment story of the "Dark
Ages"-when ignorance reigned supreme-a characterization stressed to
students as they struggle through the arcane arithmetic of future interests.
The subtext is often that any Ages that produced this headache must have
been Dark Indeed.
The rhetorical goals served by this characterization emerge only
gradually. Virtually the only theme consistently developed is the march
towards the full commodification of property7 as property becomes first
inheritable," then freely salable," then fully devisable,2 along with the
emergence of rules furthering marketability, notably the rule against
restraints on alienation,8s the Rule in Shelley's Case, 4 the Doctrine of
Worthier Title,8s the destructibility of contingent remainders, 6 and the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Although a number of these doctrines have been
abolished, 7 the casebook editors do not discuss what this means for the
"march to commodifiction" thesis. Instead, they assume a natural and
inevitable evolution to full commodification of land and a legal system that
Control and Leasehold Enfranchisement (1980).
75. See supra note 39.
76. According to Gregory Alexander, this "Whig history" interpretation originated in the
nineteenth century. See Alexander, Histoiy as Ideology, supra note 63, at 383.
77. SeeJesse Dukeminier &James E. Krier, Property 350 (1st ed. 1981). Another casebook
continues to use this phrase. See Casner & Leach, supra note 39, at 185. Although the
Dukeminier and Krier casebook has dropped it, the casebook continues to express this
outlook in its description of feudal society.
78. This interpretation is reinforced in the Dukeminier and Krier casebook by the
excerpt in which Henry Maine sketches the progress from status to contract. See Dukeminier
& Krier, supra note 39, at 203.
79. This point is noted in the informative and insightful Histoy as Ideology. Alexander,
Histloy as Ideology, supra note 63, at 384.
80. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 39, at 157.
81. Id. at 206.
82. Id. at 185.
83. Id. at 140.
84. Id. at 242-44.
85. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 39, at 244-46.
86. Id. at 246-50.
87. Id. at 250. Doctrines that have been abolished in many jurisdictions include the Rule
in Shelley's Case, the Doctrine of Worthier Title, and the destructibility of contingent
remainders. See id. at 244-45, 248-50. In many jurisdictions, the Rule Against Perpetuities has
been sharply constricted as well. Id. at 276.
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discourages dead hand control8s
Dukeminier and Krier consider the nature narrative only to interpret
historical change as evidence of a scientific process (evolution) that follows
natural laws to reach a society where individuals with (fully commodified
property) rights make choices free of dead hand control. This version of
feudal history is used to reinforce the intuitive image of property and the
political theory of possessive individualism and to define both as part of
the inherent structure of the universe as determined by objective scientific
laws of nature.
E. Why the Intuitive Image Retains Its Power
The discussion so far shows that professionals as well as laypeople
hold the intuitive image of property. We are now in a better position to
seek reasons why Hohfeld's alternative imagery has made so little headway
into "common sense" despite its status as the official view of the legal
establishment since Hohfeld's view was incorporated into The Restatement of
Property in 1936.89
Historian Dorothy Ross notes a tendency in American social thought
to erase history in favor of explanations that link nature with "the classical
ideology of liberal individualism." 9 Such explanations typically work, she
notes, to avoid confronting the possibility that American society has failed
to live up to its republican ideals. "IT]he main body of social scientists
tried to carve out within or beneath history a realm of nature that would
ward off the lingering fears of decline and insure the realization of a
harmonious liberal society... ."9' Ross links this approach with the
ideology of American exceptionalism, which she defines as "the idea that
America occupies an exceptional place in history, based on her republican
government and economic opportunity,"92 and therefore will avoid en-
trenched poverty and class differentials. 93
The intuitive image of property is an integral part of this pattern of
social thought: it links possessive individualism with the laws of nature. If
the intuitive image of property is an integral part of American
exceptionalism, its persistence is understandable. If the alternative
88. The law of covenants and easements is not generally interpreted as a counter-theme,
although in that context American courts have upheld dead hand control to a much greater
degree than English courts have been willing to do. See infra Section III.D.3 (discussing the
law of covenants).
89. This is whatJoseph Singer refers to as "the question of why the legal realist revolution
never took hold in property." Conversation with Joseph Singer (Spring 1994).
90. Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science at xiii (1991). Ross's focus is
on social science; I generalize her conclusions to include social thought.
91. Id. at xv. Ross posits this harmonious society "in the future;" in my view, most
property casebooks, with their complete lack of any information about the actual distribution
of wealth in the contemporary United States, carry the subtext that a "harmonious liberal
society" exists in the present day.
92. Id. at xiv.
93. Id.
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Hohfeldian theory (of property as defining relationships among people)
were to prevail, Americans would be brought face to face with data about
social relationships that undermine American exceptionalism: statistics
showing that many people remain poor despite persistent hard worko and
that property is distributed more unequally in the United States than in
other industrialized countries.
9
The most profound effect of the intuitive image is to blur the
differences between the diverse social institutions which are lumped
together within our concept of property.96 Few Americans would disagree
that the hard-earned house of a working class family deserves significant
levels of constitutional protection. But this does not necessarily mean that
property landbanked by a huge developer speculating on the inflation of
land values deserves identical protection.
The assumption that these two situations are indistinguishable makes
sense if you believe that what is good for General Motors is good for the
country. But if that happy confluence is not taken as self-evident, it
remains to be proven that the need for a high level of protection for the
working class homeowner justifies an 'equally high level of protection for
the fondest dreams of GM.97
A key function of the intuitive image is to support demands for the
same level of protection in both contexts, a strategy that has been used
with stunning success by property rights advocates in recent takings cases.
In those cases, "public interest" organizations representing landowners,
notably the Pacific Legal Foundation," have used vivid absolutist rhetoric
to paint a picture of innocent landowners faced with "extortionist"
government demands." In doing so, they have used the intuitive image to
94. Cf. Sylvia Nasar, Rich and Poor Likely to Remain So, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1992, at D1
(reporting results of studies that show both rich and poor children have approximately 40%
chance of staying at income level of their parents and 60% chance of ending up somewhere
closer to middle; child whose father is in bottom 5% of earners has only 1-in-20 chance of
making it into top 20% of families, 1-in-4 chance of rising above median wealth, and a 2-in-5
chance of staying poor or near poor).
95. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. Pa. L Rev.
1277, 1324 (1993) (stating that the United States tolerates more income inequality than other
advanced industrialized nations).
96. See Karl Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyon, 15 N.Y.U. L Rev. 159, 169
(1938) (arguing that legal concepts commonly blur important distinctions).
97. This argument has been around since the legal realists. See, e.g., Morris Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L Rev. 8, 18 (1927) (explaining different things grouped
within the concept of property); see also Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 814-17 (1935) [hereinafter Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense]
(noting the conflation of trademarks and real property). For a similar argument, see Joseph
W. Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in Property on the Threshold of
the 21st Century 69, 79-88 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. Van der Walt eds., 1995) [hereinafter
Singer, Property and Social Relations].
98. Oliver A. Houck, With CharityforAll 93 Yale I.J. 1415, 1460 (1984).
99. See, e.g., Daniel J. Popeo & Paul D. Kamenar, In Lucas s Wake, Whither the Law of
Takings? The Tide Has Finally Turned in Favor of Property Rights, N.J. LJ., Aug. 3, 1992, at 15
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bleach out the difference between the claims of developers like David
Lucas in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councit°0 or the dentist with the
money investment in Agins v. City of Tiburon,'O' and those of small
landholders like Bernadine Suitum. (Suitum's lawyerjoked at a bar associa-
tion meeting, that he had the "perfect client... an 82-year-old woman in a
wheelchair.") 1
02
The following Section will introduce various ways of challenging the
intuitive image of property. In some individual cases involving the property
rights of large corporations or developers, the best strategy may well be to
question whether our intuitive solicitude for Mrs. Suitum necessarily
establishes David Lucas' right to earn a $600,000 return on his investment
in Lucas.13 The answer to this question seems far from clear.
II. CHALLENGING THE INTUrriVE IMAGE THROUGH A PRAGMATIC APPROACH
In recent decades, American legal theory has been dominated by law-
and-economics, a tradition that reflects key tenets of the intuitive
image.10 4 Assumptions adopted by law-and-economics scholars that reflect
the intuitive image include the notion that property rights are by their
nature economic not political, that they flow naturally from human hunger
and scarcity, that they naturally grant exclusive use, and that any attempt
by the public to exercise simultaneous rights in privately owned property
constitutes "regulation."' Probably the two most influential alternatives
to law-and-economics in recent legal theory are Margaret Jane Radin's
work on property and personhood' 0 and Joseph William Singer's social
relations approach to property, which are discussed below. Both are
important contributions, but neither has yet realized the potential of a
pragmatic approach to property theory.
(arguing that the Lucas decision was commendable for its protection of private property
rights).
100. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
101. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
102. Richard Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the United
States Supreme Court, 12 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 179, 197 n.110 (1997) (quoting Suitum's
lawyer).
103. See Bob Dart, Rating the Republican Agenda: Are Southerners Giving Thumbs Up or Thumbs
Down to the Contract with America?, Atlanta Const., Apr. 5, 1995, at 10A (providing a
commentary on the Lucas case).
104. See Perspectives on Property Law (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995)
[hereinafter Perspectives] (reprinting a collection of articles written by various authors as a
means of reviewing the canon of recent legal theory from the perspective of three prominent
law-and-economics scholars).
105. The "property rights versus regulation" dichotomy was invented in the late nineteenth
century as part of the consolidation of the intuitive image of property as absolute. See Ross,
supra note 90, at 154 (discussing the response of theorists on both sides of the property rights
versus regulation dichotomy). The alternative is the Hohfeldian (or feudal) mentality of legal
participation.
106. See infra Section II.B. (discussing Radin's personhood and property theory of
property).
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A. Singer's "Social Relations" Approach
Joseph William Singer has written a casebook and long series of
articles offering a sustained analysis of property law designed to challenge,
both directly and indirectly, the intuitive image of property.10 7 His
analysis begins by recovering the legal realist assault on conceptualism.
Felix Cohen articulated this critique in 1935: "Legal arguments couched in
[terms of 'magic solving words' like property] are necessarily circular, since
these terms are themselves creations of law, and such arguments add
precisely as much to our knowledge as Moliere's physician's discovery that
107. See Singer, Property Law, supra note 39 (stating in a guide to the book the author's
wish for students to "focus on controversial topics that usefully illustrate the competing
policies and principles underlying the field"); Joseph William Singer, Property Law. Rules,
Policies, and Practices Teacher's Manual (2d ed. 1997);Jack M. Beermann &Joseph William
Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 911,
995 (1989) [hereinafter Beermann & Singer, Baseline Questions] (discussing the relationship
between property, contract, and morals); Joseph William Singer, Case Four: Choice of Law
Theory, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 669, 692 (1995) (responding to a hypothetical based on Cooney v.
Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1995)); Joseph W. Singer, Jobs andJustice: Rethinking
the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. Toronto UJ. 475, 510 (1993) [hereinafter Singer, Jobs andJusticel
(arguing that "[a]s radical as stakeholder laws appear to their critics, they are not radical
enough to achieve their intended goals");Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L.
Rev. 465 (1988) (reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960 (1986)); Joseph
William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982
Wis. L. Rev. 975, 978-79 [hereinafter Singer, Legal Rights Debate] (analyzing an article written
by Wesley Hohfeld on the fundamental distinctions in legal rights);Joseph William Singer, No
Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283, 1477 (1996)
[hereinafter Singer, No Right to Exclude] (stating that property is a social system "designed to
disaggregate power and to promote equal access to the conditions necessary for a full human
life"); Joseph William Singer, Persuasion, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2442 (1989) [hereinafter Singer,
Persuasion] (discussing the role of persuasion in law);Joseph W. Singer, Property and Coercion in
Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. Cal. L Rev.
1821, 1841 (1990) [hereinafter Singer, Property and Coercion] (arguing that if "pragmatism is to
work, it must help the persons and goods rumbling in the background to break free");Joseph
W. Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 97, at 79-80, 88 (arguing that property law
helps structure social relationships); Joseph W. Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws:
Tribunal Court Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1996) (discussing how
the use of one's name involves property rights); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in
Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 751 (1988) [hereinafter Singer, Reliance Interest in Property]
(arguing that "the relation between power and vulnerability should beat the heart of our
analysis of property rights"); Joseph W. Singer, Re-ReadingProperty, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 711,
729 (1992) [hereinafter Singer, Re-ReadingProperty (arguing that "[piroperty rights must be
defined contextually to prevent concentration of wealth"); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty
and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (arguing that property law should protect the
vulnerable and control the powerful); Joseph W. Singer, Well Settled? The Increasing Weight of
History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 481, 532 (1994) [hereinafter Singer,
Increasing Weight of Histy] (arguing that "courts must take seriously the claim that Indian title
is 'as sacred as the fee simple of whites'"); Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The
Social Origins of Property, 6 Canadian J.L. & Jurisprudence 217, 219-20 (1993) [hereinafter
Singer & Beermann, Social Origins] (discussing the role of social relationships in the social
origins of property).
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opium puts men to sleep because it contains a dormative principle."""
Labeling something as property does not predetermine what rights an
owner does or does not have in it.
If Felix Cohen established what property is not, Wesley Hohfeld's
analysis suggested a new approach to understanding what property is. 09
Hohfeld argued that property rights do not define absolute dominion of
people over things, but instead define shifting relationships among people
This analysis suggests that the relationships defined by property rights are
more complex and varied than the intuitive image implies. For example, a
landlord may own the building, but the tenant still has substantial rights in
it; a fee owner's rights coexist with those of an easement holder. The
property rights of the landlord and the servient tenement owner do not
have the kind of on-off, you-own-everything-or-nothing quality implied by
the intuitive image. Hohfeld's analysis also undermines the intuitive image
of property rights as perpetual and unchanging; for if property rights
reflect human relationships, presumably they should reflect the fact that
those relationships change over time.
Singer's most brilliant work is his rigorous exploration of Hohfeld's
imagery in contemporary legal doctrine. Both in his casebook and in law
review articles, Singer points out the wide divergence between property law
doctrines and the intuitive image.110
The classical view not only assumes that most rights associated
with property are ordinarily consolidated in the same manner but
that it is possible to determine in a relatively nondiscretionary
manner who that owner is by reference to formal indicia of title.
In other words, the classical view presumes that it is easy to tell
who the title holder is."'
Yet it is often not possible to determine who owns property by reference to
formal title, Singer argues. He points to mortgages, where a shift in title to
the mortgaged home may result; to divorce, where the courts often shift
tide to the marital home; and to adverse possession, where once again tide
shifts from the original owner to the adverse possessor. Moreover, Singer
points out, shareholders in a corporation have title but limited control
over its day-to-day management
112
Singer also focuses on doctrinal contexts that do not involve title. In a
108. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 97, at 820.
109. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 Yale LJ. 710 (1917) (attempting to analyze and compare the fundamental
concepts of the modem legal system and how these basic concepts are actually applied in
judicial reasoning); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 Mich.
L. Rev. 537 (1913). This analysis, as mentioned above, is reflected in the Restatement of
Property §§ 1-4 (1936).
110. See, e.g., Beermann & Singer, Baseline Questions, supra note 107, at 948-56; Singer,
Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 107, at 637; Singer & Beermann, Social Origins, supra
note 107, at 242-48.
111. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 107, at 1454.
112. Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 97, at 69.
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wide variety of situations, Singer notes:
most property rights are shared or divided among several
persons[, ...between landlords and tenants, mortgagors and
mortgagees, homeowners and lien holders, servitude or easement
owners and servient estates, present and future estate owners,
parents and children, husbands and wives, testators and heirs,
homeowners associations and unit owners, shareholders and
managers, trustees of charitable foundations and their
beneficiaries, employers and employees, creditors and debtors,
buyers and sellers, bailors and bailees." 3
Singer uses these and other examples to undermine the intuitive image's
self-description of absoluteness.
Singer's rereading of property is remarkable both for the depth of his
command of property doctrine and for his wide-ranging exploration of the
implications of the deconstructive strain of the realist analysis. Less strong
is his proposed reconstruction.
The realists assumed, and Singer follows them, that if property
ownership is not as absolute as is suggested by the intuitive image, then it
has "distintegrated."4 4 The assumption is that, once the intuitive image is
slain, the definition of property is up for grabs; lawyers need to use policy
arguments to delineate what owning property should mean. Yale realists in
the 1930s and 1940s used this language with the self-confidence that
rigorous analysis would yield the "right" policy answer and that they
themselves were the right men for the job.15 For example, when Myers
McDougal pronounced the "truths" derived from policy science, he firmly
expected the world to listen.
Singer adopts the realists' "policy" language: his casebook is called
Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices. In an article on takings, Singer
and coauthor Jack Beermann criticized the Supreme Court's perspective
on property as one with "the potential to both frustrate public policy goals
and subvert democracy."" 6 That article defends "the legal realist notion
that property rights can and should be defined through consideration of
policies or values, and that property rights are instituted through the social
and political construction of human relationships.""
7
Note the linkage of "policies" with "values." In sharp contrast to some
legal realists, Singer does not believe that rigorous policy analysis by a few
good men will reveal the "right" policy prescription. Instead, he assumes
that policy disagreements as often reflect different values as mistakes in
logic.
113. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 107, at 1455-56.
114. See Grey, supra note 1, at 69 (discussing the distinction between a layperson's and a
professional's conception of property ownership).
115. SeeJoan C. Williams, At the Fusion of Horizons: Incommensurability and the Public lnteres4
20 Vt. L. Rev. 625 (1996) (discussing legal realism).
116. Singer & Beermann, Social Origins, supra note 107, at 219.
117. Id. at 218.
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One of the most attractive elements of Singer as a theorist is his open
acknowledgment that our property system reflects moral choices. Thus, in
his most recent article, he notes that "individuals should not have to face
invidious discrimination.""" Singer refers frequently to some rules as
being "normatively flawed,"1 9 having advantages "from a moral point of
view,"120 or as "having a strong moral claim."12 ' His open use of the
language of morality signals his sense, drawn from critical legal studies as
well as other forms of legal postmodernism, that "law is politics," not mere
logic.'2 It is refreshing to hear a legal commentator use terms like
"disgracefully unjust " 23 to ask "the central question of whether a
regulation imposes an unfair distribution of social obligations"24 and to
argue that "we must consider the form of social life we support and to
which we are committed as a matter of principle.
" '2a
Yet this kind of language raises troubling questions. So long as policy
analysis was viewed as a "science," best entrusted to the best and the
brightest, it left intact the realists' authority to pronounce on the best
policy. Once "policy science" is replaced with an understanding of policy as
an expression of values, we are left asking why we should care about the
values of a particular legal commentator.
Singer makes his social vision very clear:
[T]he social relations approach "assumes that there is a basic
connectedness between people, instead of assuming that
autonomy is the prior and essential dimension of personhood." If
we see people as situated in relation to others, rather than as
isolated and autonomous, our understanding of social life
changes, and with it, our understanding of the source of legal
obligations.
26
The central focus of Singer's social relations approach is "on the role that
race, class, and gender play in shaping the concepts with which we
understand human relations." 7 Consequently, for him, freedom from
the intuitive image signals the chance to redefine property rights in ways
that empower the powerless: factory workers as against corporate
118. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 107, at 1448.
119. Id. at 1453.
120. Id. at 1456.
121. Id. at 1459.
122. See The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990)
(revised edition of a classic collection of articles from critical legal studies).
123. Beermann & Singer, Baseline Questions, supra note 107, at 980.
124. Singer & Beermann, Social Origins, supra note 107, at 218.
125. Singer, Jobs andJustice, supra note 107, at 481.
126. Singer, Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 107, at 653 (quoting Martha Minow,
Wen Difference Has its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal
Treatment of Differenc4 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 11, 127 (1987)).
127. See Singer, Property Law, supra note 39, at 21 (discussing the work of Elizabeth V.
Spelman). Singer also discusses the relationship of race and gender to property rights in
Singer, Re-Reading Property, supra note 107, at 129.
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owners; 2  African Americans as against apartheid;2t and women as
against male privilege. 30 But these values do not necessarily follow from
the assertion that property rights reflect human relationships. The most
sophisticated proponents of strong property rights today typically articulate
their defense of property on the grounds that strong property rights
structure social relations in the best way possible; they not only protect the
liberty and autonomy of owners, they also best serve redistributive goals by
strengthening a market whose rising tide will raise all ships (unlike more
direct redistributive measures, which will impede the functioning of the
market, and by so doing will ultimately hurt their intended beneficia-
ries). 3
In short, Singer's insistence that property rights define social relations
does not answer the question of what those social relations should be. 3 2
Perhaps the social relations of inequality that result from possessive
individualism as currently practiced represent a society as good as can
reasonably be expected. Having deconstructed his own authority to make
pronouncements as to policy, Singer can no longer rely on logic; he must
turn to persuasion.3 Merely asserting his own social vision will not
persuade those who do not already agree with him.M
B. Radin's Property and Personhood Approach
Influential summaries of property theory by legal commentators often
list Margaret Jane Radin's "property and personhood" approach as the
chief (and often the only) alternative to possessive individualism.'
35
Radin introduced her approach in an influential article in the Stanford
Law Review in 1982.136 She posited two distinct kinds of property:
personhood property,37 which is tied up with the identity of its owner,
and fungible property, which is not. Citing Hegel, she argued that person-
128. See Singer, Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 107, at 662 (arguing that property
rights can arise out of a relationship between parties or entities due to a reliance interest
created in the relationship).
129. Singer, No Right to Exclud supra note 107, at 1471 (finding property law as a source
of possible change in the economic position of black Americans).
130. Id. at 1361.
131. See Singer, Increasing Weight of History, supra note 107, at 528-529.
132. Singer borrows the name "social relations theory" from his wife Martha Minow, a
noted feminist legal theorist.
133. See Singer, Persuasion, supra note 107, at 2442 (describing the process of persuading
law students and society of the value of the author's proposed land reforms).
134. Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 97, at 82.
135. See Perspectives, supra note 104; MargaretJ. Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64
Wash. U. L.Q. 739, 739-42 (1986) (examining the role of the temporal dimension in different
theories of property).
136. Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982) [hereinafter
Radin, Property and Personhood].
137. Radin calls this "personal property," but that terminology creates confusion between
her notion and the common-law usage of the term "personal property" as that which is
opposed to "real property." See id. at 957.
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hood property deserves more protection than fungible property: "I am
interested in developing a non-utilitarian, moral theory which would
provide an alternative explanation for the observed hierarchy of pro-
tection .... It should be possible to give moral reasons why some claims
are or should be subject to greater protection... than others ..... "3
One of Radin's goals in her initial article was to generate a new
rationale for tenants' rights which was more convincing than the welfare
rights rationale that predominated in the early 1980s. "If the personhood
dichotomy in property is taken as the source of a distributive mandate as
part of such a general theory," Radin argued, "it would suggest that
government should make it possible for all citizens to have whatever prop-
erty is necessary for personhood."439 According to Radin, "government
should rearrange property rights so that the fungible property of some
people does not overwhelm the opportunities of the rest to constitute
themselves in property.""4 Radin's property and personhood rationale
has not proved particularly successful, however, as a way ofjustifying limits
on traditional property rights. I have found only two cases where a court
has cited Radin's work to justify such limitations: in Dawson v. Higgins,4'
the New York Supreme Court cited Radin in an opinion upholding
eviction prohibitions under the New York Rent Control Law. A second
case, Silverman v. Bany,1 42 involved condominium conversion in the
District of Columbia. With a few exceptions,'4 this strain of Radin's
analysis did not take hold in the law reviews either.
Radin's project to limit traditional property rights relies primarily on
imagery of the home: "The 'home'-usually conceived of as an owner-
occupied single-family residence-seems to be a paradigm case of personal
property in our social context."044  Most of Radin's examples of
personhood property concern is people's homes.'4 In her elaborate
attempt to identify which personhood relationships are "normatively
appropriate"14' rather than inappropriately "fetishistic," 47 her key exam-
138. Id. at 985-86.
139. Id. at 990.
140. Id.
141. 588 N.Y.S.2d 93, 97 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (citing Radin as support for the statement that
"rent control/stabilization is fundamentally aimed at preserving stability of tenure").
142. 727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
143. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, Response: Home Is Where the Heart Is: A Brief Reply to Professor
Epstein, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1239, 1240 n.8 (1989) (noting Radin's contention that "personal"
property-property which is bound to one's personality in a philosophical sense-is "more
deserving of social protection").
144. Margaret J. Radin, Residential Rent Contro4 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 350, 364 (1986)
[hereinafter Radin, Residential Rent Control].
145. See, e.g., Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 136, at 1005-06 ("[O]ne might
expect to find that a special class of property like a family home is protected against
government by a 'property rule' and not just a 'liability rule.'").
146. Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1689 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, Cross Currents].
147. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 136, at 987.
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ples of normatively appropriate identification with property involve
people's relationship with their homes.148  The other key source of
examples comes from takings law; much of her discussion of takings law
also concerns people's relationship with their homes.4 9
Radin's linkage between social welfare and rights in one's home rang
true in the early 1980s. The "revolution in landlord/tenant law" was still
underway; 50 tenants' rights commanded the attention of many people
concerned with poverty and social welfare.'5' Radin's theory offered what
many commentators were looking for: a rationale that would allow tenants'
(personhood) interest to trump the landlord's (merely fungible) property
interest in a wide variety of factual contexts. 2 "Resident owners have
security of tenure," Radin argued, "as long as they can maintain the level
of payment they planned for."'53 Radin's essay on residential rent control
"made the case for treating similarly situated resident tenants similarly."'54
Radin is correct in sensing that our values surrounding
homeownership provide an important challenge to the "I own it, so I can
do what I want with it" attitude. But what kind of a challenge, with what
level of potential? Radin's linkage of property and personhood with Hegel
does not help us to judge the potential strengths and weakness of our
148. See, e.g., id. at 987 ("There is both a positive sense that people are bound up with
their homes and a normative sense that this is not fetishistic."); id. at 991-1002 (containing a
long section on "The Sanctity of the Home"); see also Margaret J. Radin, Reinterpreting
Property 19 (1993) [hereinafter Radin, Reinterpreting Property] (referring to the distinction
between personal and fungible property rights in various fields of legal doctrine, including
privacy in the home); Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 146, at 1694-95 ("In the landlord
tenant situation, the systematic problem we face is not one in which the personhood interests
of individual landlords are pitted against individual tenants, but rather, one in which a class of
residents is unable to count on the continuity of residence.").
149. See, e.g., Radin, Cross Currents, supra note 146, at 1689 (applying the concept of posses-
sion to the relationship of persons and their homes); Radin, Property and Personhood, supra
note 136, at 1005-06 (recognizing the expectation that certain property, such as the family
home, is protected against government by a "property rule" and not just a "liability rule").
150. See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution on Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 517, 520 (1976) (describing the revolution that has
occurred in landlord-tenant law which resulted in "changes that favor the tenant as against the
landlord").
151. See Samuel Bassett Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An
Integration, 56 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1976) (noting that, within the decade prior to 1976, "courts
and legislators ha[d] radically altered the distribution of rights between residential tenants
and their landlords," resulting in a concern over the effects of such action upon "low income
housing"); Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied Statutory Warranties of Habitability in
Residential Leases, 16 Urb. L. Ann. 3 (1979); CharlesJ. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and
the American Law Institute, 27 Stan. L Rev. 879, 902-03 (1975) (elaborating on the effect that
the Restatement of Property would have on the social welfare of both tenants and landlords).
152. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 136, at 987, 992-96 (discussing the
preeminence of "personhood" in residential tenancy); Radin, Residential Rent Contro supra
note 144, passim (emphasizing that a tenant's interest in continuing to reside in an apartment
is stronger than that of the commercial landlord).
153. Radin, Reinterpreting Property, supra note 148, at 20.
154. Id.
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intuitive sense that rights in our homes are different from other types of
property ownership.
In particular, Radin's focus on Hegel leads her to overlook the dark
underside of America's romance with homeownership, as Stephen
Schnably has pointed out.5 5 Both the bright and the dark sides of this
romance will be examined below. For now, the important point is that
uncovering the complex potential of cultural intuitions requires a detailed
analysis of the culture that gives rise to them.
The intuitions Radin explores in the redistributive strain of
personhood analysis are quite different from those she explores in her
analysis of commodification. In the latter, rather than talking about the
ways the ideology of homeownership can be used for redistributive
purposes, Radin discusses how various proposals to extend market logic to
human bodies or body parts violate cultural intuitions about the inherent
dignity of human beings.156 Radin examines, for example, whether mar-
ket logic should be used in the contexts of surrogacy, adoption, rape, and
prostitution 57 and argues that unrestricted use of market logic in these
contexts would constitute an affront to personhood.
Radin's sense that "I... should perhaps have said more about Kant; I
should perhaps have said less about Hegel"' s' brings us back to
methodological issues. What is the import of her citations to Hegel?
Originally they served to support claims of an "objective moral consensus"
in favor of personhood; today, however, Radin has demoted Hegel to the
status of a "suggestive text."' 59 "In my writings I found Hegel's text on
property suggestive for exposing my view, and several times returned to it,
but in the end... [m]y project is a cultural description/critique of
American institutions of property and the legal discourse in which they are
couched."'60 If Radin's project is a cultural description of Americans, she
needs to focus on American society to examine both the intellectual history
and the contemporary status of our general intuitions about property.
This raises the question of how either Kant or Hegel can offer what
she needs. Radin's goal, as she states it, is to examine our "intuitions." If
her goal is to uncover "shared cultural understandings," 6 "our cultural
155. See Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theoy of Property
and Personhood, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 347, 364 (1993) ("Once we look beneath virtually any
consensual or objective ideal [regarding property), tensions immediately become apparent.").
156. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L Rev. 1849, 1880 (1987)
[hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability] (stating that "market rhetoric seems intuitively out of
place here, so inappropriate that it is either silly or somehow insulting to the value being
discussed"); see Radin, Residential Rent Control supra note 144, at 360 (making reference to
"[tihe intuitive general rule"); i& at 361 (referring to "general intuition").
157. Radin introduced her analysis in Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 156.
158. Radin, Reinterpreting Property, supra note 148, at 7.
159. Id. at 8.
160. Id. at 9.
161. Id. at 2, 7, 11.
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commitments surrounding property and personhood", 62 the best way to
access those commitments is to focus not on Hegel, but on American intel-
lectual history.
C. Property, Pragmatism, and the Moral Imagination
There has been much talk about pragmatism in property theory,
indeed, both Radin and Singer think of themselves as pragmatic.' 6s When
I refer to pragmatism, I use it in many of the senses in which they use the
term, but also in some more specific ones derived from John Dewey.
Dewey saw pragmatism as involving a new role for philosophy that did
not involve merely thinking in terms of real world, nonideal conditions'64
or impatience with "rigid rules and frozen concepts"'6s Nor did Dewey
(at his best) assume that the role formerly played by truth claims could,
under pragmatism, be played by consensus. Pragmatism to Dewey signaled
a shift in the role of the philosopher:
When it is acknowledged that under disguise of dealing with
ultimate reality, philosophy has been occupied with the precious
values embedded in social traditions .... it will be seen that the
task of future philosophy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social
and moral strifes of their own day.1
The goal of philosophy, according to Dewey, is to focus attention on the
"precious values embedded in our social traditions" in works of "moral
imagination," not "scientific intelligence.' 67 Our traditions offer not
consensus or "proved knowledge of fact or truth, but a conviction about
moral values, a sense for the better kind of life to be led.' lss
[Philosophies] start[] not from science, not from ascertained
knowledge, but from moral convictions, and then resort[] to the
best knowledge and the best intellectual methods available in
their day to give the form of demonstration to what [is] essentially
an attitude of will, or a moral resolution to prize one mode of life
more highly than another, and the wish to persuade other men
162. Id. at 18.
163. Radin, Reinterpreting Property, supra note 148, at 4-5 (stating that the author wished
to express the "pragmatic understanding of objectivity"); MargaretJ. Radin, The Pragmatist and
the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1699 (1990) (offering four short essays describing the
connection between pragmatism and feminism); Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman,
Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. Pa. L Rev. 1019 (1991) (suggesting
more reflection on current social, cultural, and political conditions is need in legal writing);
Singer, Property and Coercion, supra note 107, at 1821 (assessing pragmatism by asking how it
affects the interests of those who are oppressed).
164. See Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, supra note 7, at 94.
165. See Singer, Property and Coerdcon, supra note 107, at 1822 (describing how pragmatists
are concerned primarily with discerning the facts and achieving results instead of developing
legal rules).
166. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, supra note 7, at 94.
167. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 145 (describing the distinction between philosophy
and science).
168. Id.
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that this [is] the wise way of living. 69
Pragmatism, thus defined, promises not insight into preexisting truths that
offer guarantees of agreement (metaphysical or cultural); instead, it starts
from an acknowledgment that, if truths are to be had, they will have to be
constructed as social phenomena, by persuading others to "prize one mode
of life more highly than another." Our culture becomes, not a guarantee
of preexisting agreements, but a reservoir from which to draw persuasive
arguments to convince others of the wisest ways of living. Thus, the aim of
a pragmatic approach to property theory is to create a conversation that
will shift the institution of property in ways that will protect legitimate
property claims without endorsing the inherited, highly unequal distri-
bution of property rights in one of the world's most unequal industrialized
societies.
This pragmatic approach suggests that the best way to undermine the
intuitive image is not by presenting logical arguments against it, but by
highlighting redistributive strains in our complex and conflicting beliefs
about property that are resonant enough to challenge the intuitive image's
status as "common sense." To accomplish this, the logical focus is not on
the canon of philosophy but on intellectual history, on how ideas inherited
from the Europeans have been used in particularly American contexts. Of
particular interest is the approach delineated by Daniel T. Rodgers, whose
focus is on the "keywords"7 ' of the American tradition. Those
"keywords," he notes, are the words speech writers still use, "counting on
something in us to nod in assent .... ,1 7' Rodgers offers important in-
sight into political persuasion:1 " "Words come to us in clusters, trailing
associations and meanings we may not intend. Born into political
languages we did not invent, we are never able to talk any which way we
might want." 73
A critical examination of our contested truths does not assume we will
find one clear path, long forgotten, to which we can readily return.
Instead, a critical intellectual history and sociology of knowledge can
uncover weapons that already exist, which probably need to be
transformed in ways that diminish the associations we do not want and
enhance the persuasive potential of those we do want. As James Boyd
169. John Dewey, Philosophy and Democracy, in 2 Characters and Events 841, 844 (Joseph
Ratner ed., 1929), reprinted in 11 John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924, at 44 (Jo Ann
Boydston ed., 1988); see Westbrook, supra note 9, at 145.
170. See Rodgers, supra note 10, at 6 (citing Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of
Culture and Society (1976)).
171. Rodgers, supra note 10, at 16.
172. Note that not every challenge to the intuitive image will draw primarily on the
historical rhetorics described here. Rhetorics without a deep historical foundation in Anglo-
American law have also proved extremely influential in the twentieth century. Most notable is
the ecological view of intergenerational equity, which draws as much or more on Native
American as on Anglo traditions.
173. Rodgers, supra note 10, at 10.
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White has noted, "both the lawyer and the lawyer's audience live in a world
in which their language and community are not fixed and certain but
fluid, constantly remade, as their possibilities and limits are tested."'7 4
If we want to escape all of a word's traditional associations, we simply
will not use it. Typically, we want to keep some associations but not others;
to eliminate a given association, we must work at it, which means that any
association we leave alone remains unquestioned and intact. Indeed, if this
were not so, keywords would be useless, for their persuasive value lies
precisely in their ability to "trail associations" without defending them.'ss
As we turn to a study of keywords and rhetorics that persuade, we find
alternative strains of property rhetoric that can help dislodge the intuitive
image's status as "common sense."
As noted in the introduction, I use the term "rhetoric" not in the
traditional sense of "the ignoble art of persuasion."'7 6 Rhetoric does not
merely dress up preexisting truths. It is, instead, "the central art by which
community and culture are established, maintained, and transformed. So
regarded, rhetoric is continuous with law, and like it, has justice as its
ultimate subject.'07 7 A view of law as rhetoric can help us "attend to the
spiritual or meaningful side of our collective life.
"'1ss
A final note is necessary before beginning the process of creative
excavation. As other commentators have noted,'9 lawyers and profession-
al historians use historical texts for quite different purposes. Historians
typically seek to paint a "contextualized, complexified, multivalent, ironic,
contradictory, historicized"'80 picture of a horizontal slice of the past.
Their chief goal is to capture the pastness of the past, "the irretrievability
and differentness"'' of prior eras. A history that stresses continuities
threatens to violate contemporary historiographical norms by riding
roughshod over incommensurability.8 2 The emphasis on contextual-
ization causes historians to highlight the fact that, even where themes
persist over time, shifts in social and intellectual contexts mean that even
174. White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 5, at 691.
175. A dramatic recent example is George Bush's famous evocation of domesticity in his
acceptance speech of the Republican Presidential nomination in 1988. George Bush: Our Work
Is Not Done; OurForce Is Not Spent, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1988, at A28 (quoting Bush's evocation
of "a kinder, gentler America").
176. White, Law as Rhetori; supra note 5, at 684.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 698.
179. Perhaps the most sustained and interesting discussion of this issue is Laura Kalman,
The Strange Career of Liberal Legalism 167-246 (1996) (containing a chapter entitled
"Lawyers v. Historians").
180. Robert W. Gordon, Sixty-lrst Cleveland Marshall Fund Lecture: The Struggle over the Past,
44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123, 143 (1996) [hereinafter Gordon, Struggle over the Past].
181. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 at viii (1969).
182. See Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historiism, 49 Stan. L. Rev.
1023, 1025 (1997) [hereinafter Gordon, Critical Historicism] (stating that contemporary
historians seek out "plural, contested, or ambiguous meanings").
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the same phrase can mean something quite different when used in texts
written a century apart.
Lawyers, on the other hand, typically cite history as authority for a
proposed legal conclusion. Conservatives use history in narratives of a fall
from the True Way, as in the arguments about original intent or in a
narrative of progress, as in Dukeminier and Krier's discussion of feudal
history. Liberal lawyers often use history to justify legal change on the
grounds that the original reasons for a legal rule have disappeared, so that
the rule now needs updating. In each case, "lawyers want to recover a
single authoritative meaning from a past act or practice "" in order to
use history as authority or precedent.'8
A pragmatic approach to history borrows some elements from each
type of historical practice. Like the traditional legal orientation, the
pragmatist seeks to recover a usable past; thus the stress is on continuities
rather than on "a dead past .. . unlike the present."'85 But a pragmatist
seeks to recover not a single authoritative meaning to cite as precedent,
but the complexity of American traditions: the roads less traveled by, the
interpretations of our tradition that lost as well as those that won. Exactly a
decade ago, the noted historian Joyce Appleby called for a new American
constitutional history:
The idea of looking at the history of the Constitution as a fight
between the heirs and the disinherited opens up some interesting
perspectives. First of all because there was an American
heritage-a national trust fund of political ideals-there were the
roles of heirs and disinherited to be played out. That explains the
loyalty of the disinherited to the Constitution and answers ithe]
question of why it is that the same Constitution that has been a
bastion for the elite has also been a vehicle for reform.
The goal of a pragmatic history of property is "to turn inherited legal
doctrine to practical advantage,'8 7 to rewrite the history of our traditions
to include the image of property as forty acres and a mule as well as the
intuitive image of absoluteness.
The difference between this project and "real" history is often
misdescribed. The difference is not one of presentism: all history involves a
fusion of horizons in which historical materials are interrogated to ask
contemporary questions about contemporary life.lss Yet the fundamental
183. Id.
184. Although the focus is on continuities, the pragmatic approach differs in important
ways from genetic history as traditionally practiced (e.g., of "our Anglo-Saxon liberties"), which
stresses only continuities. Classic genetic history misses completely the way keywords and
rhetorics transmute over time as different elements blur out, pop forward, or combine into
fleeting mixtures or relatively stable compounds (e.g., possessive individualism).
185. See Gordon, Critical Historicism, supra note 182, at 1025.
186. Joyce Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74J. Am. Hist. 798,
807 (1987).
187. Id. at 810.
188. Williams, supra note 115, at 643.
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focus is different. Professional historians' chief goal is to understand the
past. Mine is to change the future.
III. REPUBLICAN VISIONS OF PROPERTY: PROPERTY AS A STABLE STAKE IN
SOCIETY
Anyone who talks about republicanism today fights the pervasive sense
that it is out of fashion. Historians fell in love with republicanism in the
1970s and early 1980s;89 legal scholars did so slightly later.'90 Historian
Daniel Rodgers's 1992 assault on both legal and historical scholars' use of
republicanism' 9' leaves those who use it on the defensive. I will first dis-
cuss how the lessons gleaned from the republican revival of the 1980s can
inform our approach to republicanism today. I will then explore three
major variations on the theme of republicanism that have played important
roles in American property law.
A. The Career of a Concept Revisited 92
The sense among legal academics that republicanism is passe stems
from the 1980s. During that period, republicanism was used in three ways
that ultimately led to widespread dissatisfaction. First, influential
constitutional law scholars used republicanism to promise privileged access
to an objectively ascertainable "common good" in ways that ultimately
proved indefensible. Other authors set up an artificial and unconvincing
dichotomy between republicanism and liberalism that was sharply criticized
by historians. Finally, republicanism came under attack because it did not
fit the received model of a "tradition."
The most prominent use of republicanism in the republican revival in
the law was by constitutional theorists Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein.
Both sought to challenge interest group pluralism, which used the imagery
of possessive individualism to describe politics as the process of interest
groups pursuing their own self-interest' 9 The traditional Progressive
alternative-of regulation in the public interest-had come to seem
outdated and discredited. Republicanism offered an alternative vision of
citizens who eschewed their selfish interests in favor of the common good.
In a very early formulation, published before the republican revival got
189. The most influential recent essay reviewing republicanism is Daniel T. Rodgers,
Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. Am. Hist. 11 (1992). Rodgers cites to earlier
reviews, most of which are more receptive to republicanism.
190. See id. at 33 (stating that law journals were reporting a "republican revival" in legal
theory by the late 1980s).
191. See id. at 34 (stating that as republicanism "was catching up the imagination of more
and more historians, explaining so much, it was quietly coming apart at its core").
192. See id. at 11.
193, See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L Rev. 29, 32
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups] (discussing various methods by which corruption
leads into the elimination of civic virtue and the idea of pluralism which allows politics to
mediate the struggle among self-interested groups for scarce political resources).
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underway, Michelman already articulated the promise of republicanism in
Progressive and objectivist language: the "public-interest model depends at
bottom on a belief in the reality-or at least the possibility-of public or
objective values and ends for human action." 94 By the later 1980s,
Michelman's objectivism had been shaken by a shift in philosophical
commitments away from the foundationalist belief in an objective common
good. 95 Yet Michelman-and Cass Sunstein, who joined Michelman in
embracing republicanism in the mid-1980s-still found themselves
powerfully attracted to it.
In his initial article on republicanism and in the constitutional law
casebook that followed it, Sunstein defined "the prerequisite of sound
government [as] the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private
interests to the general good."'9 5  This article included repeated
references to "a more or less objective public interest "l 97 and "a public
good that is distinct from the struggle of private interests,"9 and, finally,
the statement that: "There is, in short, something like a 'common good' or
'public interest' that may be distinct from the aggregation of private
preferences or utilities."' Note that Sunstein, in this article, used the
republican "common good" formulation as interchangeable with the
Progressive "public interest" formulation.2 '0  Both Sunstein and
Michelman used republicanism in the search for objective foundations of
justice,2 1 so the need remained acute for an objective common good for
the judiciary or legislature to enforce.
Michelman and Sunstein worried from the beginning about their
claim of an objective common good. In his initial article, Sunstein noted
that it was hard "to argue for the existence of a unitary public good,
especially in a society consisting of disparate groups with competing
194. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. LJ. 145, 149 (1977-78) [hereinafter
Michelman, Political Markets].
195. Richard H. Fallon, What Is Republicanism and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1695, 1725-27 (1989).
196. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 193, at 31.
197. Id. at 64.
198. Id. at 68.
199. Id. at 82.
200. Sunstein at times identifies republicanism explicitly with Kant. See Cass R. Sunstein,
The Republican Civic Tradition, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539, 1548-49 n.202
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revivall. "The republican belief in
deliberation counsels political actors to achieve a measure of critical distance from prevailing
desire and practices, subjecting these desires and practices to scrutiny and review." Id. "Here
there is a connection between republicanism and conceptions of politics associated with
Kant," he continues in a footnote. Id. at 1549 nA6. Sunstein also cites extensively from Rawls
for an image of deliberation that "embodies substantive limitations that in some settings lead
to uniquely correct outcomes." Id. at 1550. Michelman also at times linked his republicanism
to Kant. See Fallon, supra note 195, at 1725 (discussing Michelman's brand of republicanism
and its relation to Kant).
201. Kalman, supra note 179, at 67.
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interests. 20 2 Michelman was even more apprehensive. While he had felt
comfortable openly asserting a unitary common good in 1978, ten years
later Michelman had gone (with Rawls, whose theory he initially em-
braced) through Rawls's well-publicized shift from a foundationalist-
sounding A Theory of Justice to a nonfoundationalist theory of overlapping
consensus.213 Though Michelman occasionally still referred to the
common good as an objective value,2° or as an "objectivist moment,"2 5
most often he stated his goal as achieving "a process of normative
justification without ultimate objectivist foundations."
20 6
Michelman and Sunstein's problems compounded when their critics
began to point out the strong strain of elitism in classical republicanism.
Historians such as Linda Kerber °7 and Hendrik Hartog,2 s as well as law
professors such as Kathleen Sullivan, 209 Derrick Bell and Preeta
Bansal,210 and Stephen Feldman, pointed to the exclusionary strain of
republicanism, which ensured agreement on what constituted the common
good by limiting citizenship to relatively affluent white men. Michelman
and Sunstein, chastened, acknowledged this in the Yale Law Journal
symposium 2 12 that simultaneously signaled republicanism's arrival and the
202. Sunstein, Interest Groups supra note 193, at 84.
203. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 118-92 (1971);John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 9-25 (1987) (analyzing objections to an idea of an
overlapping consensus).
204. See Michelman, Political Markets, supra note 194, at 149 (stating that the political
interest model depends upon public or objective values).
205. Id.
206. Frank 1. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 23 (1986).
For similar critiques, see Kalman, supra note 179; Christopher F. Edley, The Governance Cisis,
Legal Themy, and Political Ideology, 1991 Duke LJ. 561, 593 (claiming that civic republicanism is
characterized by proceduralism, normative emptiness, and an unrealistic idea of political
discourse); Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 923 (1990)
(arguing that modem constitutional republicanism has incorporated Rawls's imperative of
equal and independent persons who respect fair competition).
207. See Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Usefu4 97 Yale LJ. 1663, 1664 (1988)
(noting how classic republicanism favored only the small minority of individuals who owned
property).
208. See Hendrik Hartog, Imposing Constitutional Traditions, 29 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 75, 76
(1987) (stressing the classical republican view that a small and exclusive group is a necessary
prerequisite for a participatory citizenship).
209. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 Yale LJ. 1713, 1713-14 (1988)
(discussing the republican view of having small heterogeneous groups working for the
common good).
210. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 Yale LJ.
1609, 1610-11 (1988) (discussing the historical practice of whites suppressing blacks for the
purported "common good" of whites).
211. See Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80
Geo. LJ. 1835, 1836 (1992) ("Politics according to republicans.., should provide an
opportunity for citizens to participate in a communal dialogue that identifies the common
good.").
212. See Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Law's Republic] (noting classic republicanism's exclusion from the political
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beginning of its downfall.
Both Michelman and Sunstein began to distance themselves from
republicanism in this symposium. Sunstein stressed that his was a "liberal
republicanism" that melded republican virtues with a liberal insistence on
equality;2 3 he also shifted his central focus from republicanism to
"deliberative democracy."2 14 Michelman also distanced himself from
republicanism, shifting from the old-fashioned transcendence of the
"public interest" to Habermas' neo-transcendence and pragmatism.215 In
short, both Michelman and Sunstein ultimately shifted their primary focus
from classical republicanism to the work of modem theorists (of
deliberative democracy or the ideal speech situation) in search of a
language in which to posit that all sensible people would (often, if not
always) agree.
The lesson of the Michelman/Sunstein strand of the republican
revival is that republicanism cannot serve, in a nonfoundationalist age, to
establish the existence of a substantive common good as the basis for
judicial review or for other purposes. The question of how to defend
substantive judicial decisionmaking in a nonfoundational age is one that
republicanism is ill-suited to answer. If one's approach is to shift from a
focus on substance to a focus on what procedures will assure one of good
substantive decisions-not my instinct but a common one-surely
Habermas is more on point than Harrington. And if one's goal is to
protect sexual privacy, as Michelman sought to do in Law's Republic,
21 6
then surely liberalism's insistence on individual rights in general and
sexual freedom in particular is more suitable than a proceduralized and
Habermas-ed republicanism. 7
A second use of republicanism at the height of the revival was to set
up an abiding dichotomy between republicanism and liberalism at the
community of all those voices which disagree with the majority's moral ideology); Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival supra note 200, at 1539 (1988) ("Various strategies of
exclusion-of the nonpropertied, blacks, and women-were built into the republican
tradition.").
213. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva4 supra note 200, at 1541 (arguing for a form of
republicanism which is not "antiliberal").
214. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 134, 353-54 (1993) (including sections
entitled "Deliberative Democracy" and "Toward Deliberative Democracy").
215. See Frank I. Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 Cornell
L. Rev. 256, 257-58 (1989) (stressing that politics is comprised of pragmatic decisions
concerning questions of value); Michelnan, Law's Republic, supra note 212, at 1495
(distinguishing classical republicanism from a new form which extends political participation
to previously unrepresented groups). For an astute study of this topic upon which I have
relied, see Feldman, supra note 211.
216. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 212, at 1494 (discussing the Supreme
Court's consitutional analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick).
217. See Sager, supra note 206, at 920 ("[A] reformulated republicanism which seems bent
on justifying items on the traditional liberal agenda in terms that invoke aspects of the
republican sensibility seems in the end to be a rather awkward competitor with liberalism
itself.").
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heart of American constitutional law. The most dramatic example was
Morton Horwitz's Republicanism and Liberalism in American Thought, which
used republicanism to critique a liberalism that promised a "neutral night-
watchman state.,"2  Legal historian Hendrik Hartog responded skeptically
to the notion "that liberalism and republicanism are useful categories to
define the primary continuing traditions of conflict in two centuries of
American constitutional history." 9 Hartog pointed out that republic and
liberal themes typically are mixed: "Much of the impressive recent work
has suggested the continuing availability of republican categories of
thought for a variety of groups in constitutional opposition to mainstream
liberal doctrines."20  Hartog was unconvinced, however, that "the
vocabulary used by these groups was necessarily antiliberal simply because
it played on republican themes."2' Hartog also pointed out that a tight
focus on the republican themes often causes people to overlook the liberal
ones.2
More importantly, I fear that the fashion of investing
republicanism with the colors of our official opposition discourse
carries definite political costs. Such an assumption may blind us
to the political and moral ambiguities that republicanism
traditionally has borne. It may hide alternative voices and
alternative traditions. It may keep us from recognizing the
transformative and destabilizing visions that are a part of liberal-
ism.2
Mark Tushnet offered another version of the republicanism versus
liberalism story in Red, White and Blue.224 Despite careful disclaimers that
the republican and liberal traditions are often combined and that
republicanism is too distant and elitist to be a viable candidate for
adoption,m Tushnet nonetheless consistently turns to republicanism for
alternatives to a liberal tradition purged of many of the "virtues" recent
historians have found in it2 6 Tushnet ultimately falls into many of the
traps Hartog warns against. Although Tushnet himself warns that liberalism
218. See Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Cmstitutional Thought,
29 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 57, 58 (1987) (suggesting that a method to understanding the debate
between republicanism and liberalism is to consider times when American political thought
was dominated by the idea of a "neutral, night watchman" state).
219. Hartog, supra note 208, at 77.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 78 (warning against blindly focusing on republicanism and, in so doing,
ignoring ideas of liberalism).
223. Id.
224. Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (1988)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Red, White and Blue].
225. Id. at 13.
226. Id. at 6-7, 10-15, 40-41, 106-07, 148, 186-87, 274-76, 281-82, 290-91; see also
Kloppenberg, supra note 4, at 9 (stating that the principles of autonomy and popular
sovereignty have been enshrined in American imagination and have secured liberty and
democracy throughout the nation's history).
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and republicanism are often mixed, he does not explore any specific
mixtures; instead, he consistently treats them as alternatives.27 And,
although Tushnet does not shy away from republicanism's exclusionary
potential, neither does he explore the potentially transformative elements
within liberalism. Finally, Tushnet's virtually exclusive focus on republi-
canism and liberalism deflects his vision from alternative voices in
American history that have been used to challenge liberal individual-
ism. 8 Most notably, Tushnet ignores the long history of demands for
equality in religious language which had the effect of reigning in liberal
materialismYm (Instead, he discusses religion only in reference to repub-
licanism.)20
A third major message of the revival was that republicanism did not fit
into the received definition of a tradition. Mark Tushnet articulated this
position most explicitly. He noted that complexes of ideas may start out as
a coherent whole but then,
the coherence of the whole may dissolve. Successors orient
themselves to the tradition by identifying some elements in their
predecessors' thought to which they continue to adhere and
disregarding or explaining away other elements in that thought
which they feel compelled to reject. Viewed in this light,
republicanism as a tradition would consist of the orientation that
successive generations had toward the historical complex of ideas
now characterized as the republicanism of the late eighteenth
century.21l
In other words, Tushnet proposed to abandon the conventional
requirement that a tradition be a coherent whole, but he continued to
insist that a tradition can only be defined by people consciously orienting
themselves towards a complex of ideas. Under this test, republicanism does
not qualify as a tradition because "few people in any generation after the
founding conceived of themselves as having the requisite relation to
[it]. " 212 "Whatever linkages today's historians can find between elements
of late-eighteenth-century republican theory and the concerns of artisans,
peasants, and the like," to Tushnet it seems "indisputable that those people
did not orient themselves to the republican tradition."z5
Do people have to consciously orient themselves towards the classical
227. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, supra note 224, at 5-7, 167, 186-87, 248, 274-75.
228. HistorianJohn Diggins proposes religion as a candidate. SeeJohn P. Diggins, The Lost
Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism 247, 271,
277-346 (1984). Another important source is Peter N. Miller, Defining the Common Good:
Empire, Religion, and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain (1994).
229. See Kloppenberg, supra note 4, 12-14 (noting that religion contributed greatly to the
shaping of American culture).
230. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, supra note 224, at 274-75.
231. Mark Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition in Constitutional Historiography, 29 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 93, 94 (1987).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 95.
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version of republicanism in order to be influenced by it? They do not. To
cite Daniel Rodgers once again, the strength of our tradition lies in their
ability to "trail associations" and to mean different things to different
people.234 Rodgers's astute assessment of political rhetoric in Contested
Truths shows the need to shift away from a search for "pure" traditions.
Indeed, as historian Gordon Wood has pointed out, republicanism never
existed as a pure tradition in America2 5 By the time of the Revolution,
the manly, militaristic virtue of classical republicanism had transmuted into
"the new social virtue" that is often associated with the Scottish Enlighten-
ment, but which drew from religious rhetoric as well.
Once the focus shifts from whether people are consciously oriented
towards a tradition to a focus on keywords and rhetorics that often
function unconsciously, the notion of a tradition changes. Replacing a
canon-based study of "pure" traditions is a focus on language in context,
on Protean traditions that transmute from one form to the next, often
melding keywords from distinct traditions in the process.
The confusion over whether republicanism is a tradition reflects, in
part, confusion over whether the different uses of republicanism need to
share a common elementL 6 The notion that categories need to share
one or more common elements in order to make sense is an old
philosophical mistake. As the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out
long ago, this is not the way language works. Categories often cohere
through family relationships rather than by sharing a central core.
The debate over whether republicanism is a tradition also reflects an
erroneous assumption that only clear constructs with a stable essence are
useful. As Wittgenstein pointed out, vague concepts are often serviceable.
To highlight the usefulness of vague concepts, Wittgenstein discusses the
vagueness of the concept of a game.
One might say that the concept "game" is a concept with blurred
edges.-"But is a blurred concept a concept at all?"... "If I tell
someone, "Stand roughly here"--may not this explanation work
perfectly? And cannot every other one fall too?2s7
If concepts are fuzzy, sometimes this signals their uselessness; but at
other times the fuzziness provides a key to how they are used. Republican-
ism is one such fuzzy but evocative concept. "There is not a more unin-
telligible word in the English language than republicanism," John Adams
declared in 1807.2 "Republicanism," as Rodgers has asserted, "had its
gravity sometimes in virtue, sometimes in independence, sometimes in con-
234. Rodgers, supra note 10, at 6-7.
235. See Gordon S. Wood, Thonas Jefferson, Equality, and the Creation of a Civil Society, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 2133 (1996) (discussing themes from Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of
the American Revolution (1992)).
236. Hartog, supra note 208, at 75.
237. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 34e (G.E.M. Anscombe, trans.,
Macmillan 1958).
238. Rodgers, supra note 189, at 38 (quotingJohn Adams).
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sensus, sometimes in opposition to capitalism or to patriarchy."219 But this
does not prove its incoherence; instead, it shows that ambiguity has always
been integral to the grammar of the republicanism.240
Ironically, Rodgers, a leader of the assault on republicanism, provides
one of the best templates for an alternative approach to a study of the
keywords and rhetorics "by which community and culture are estab-
lished."2 14 1 Rodgers concludes an essay attacking republicanism with the
conclusion that it was not a "tradition .... Without a name except a name
of art applied long after the fact, without lasting institutions and the ability
to command explicit loyalty, without, in short, a consciousness of itself, it
hardly fits the term."24 2 Like Tushnet, Rodgers sets up an overly rigorous
notion of tradition in order to announce that republicanism has failed the
test. But if the goal is a pragmatic assessment of "stock of arguments and
assertions with life in them" (to quote Rodgers himself), then republican-
ism remains an important resource for studying the rhetoric of property.
In the treatment of republican rhetorics of property that follows, I
incorporate the lessons of the republican revival in four basic ways. First, I
do not look to republicanism to justify contemporary judges' ability to
perceive an objective common good, as did Sunstein and Michelman in
their early articles on republicanism. Second, I do not set up republican-
ism in opposition to liberalism. Third, in contrast to earlier revivalists who
often treated liberalism as if it were synonymous with possessive
individualism, I clearly identify possessive individualism as one theme
among others in liberalism. Finally, I do not attempt to capture a "pure"
republicanism, but instead I stress the Protean quality of republicanism
and focus on how three different strains of republican rhetoric meld with
keywords of another tradition (liberalism, domesticity, and religion and
Scottish moral philosophy) into a compound with the potential to
challenge the intuitive image of property.
239. Id. at 32-33.
240. Id at 38.
241. White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 5, at 684.
242. Rodgers, supra note 189, at 37.
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B. Republican Rhetorics of Propere
43
As many commentators have noted, republicanism is not one
thing. " "With only a little loss of accuracy, [republicanism] could be
said to have embraced all those thinkers who thought that political power
should be exercised by the people or their representatives, and not by a
single individual with royal prerogative power."245 So long as the key
political question was whether the body politic should be ruled by kings or
not, the differences among republicans mattered very little. Once that
threshold issue was resolved, however, the differences among republicans
took on greater importance. In this Subsection, my goal is to introduce the
novice to the keywords of republicanism and to schematize republicanism
into two strains, egalitarian and elitist, which use the same basic vocabulary
to send very different political messages.246
The key theme in both strains is the need to foster a virtuous citizenry
capable of pursuing the common good to prevent the republic from fAlling
into tyranny. My focus is not on republicanism as a theory of government,
but on republicanism as a theory of property. According to republican
theory, property gave men (masculine gender intended) 2 7 the indepen-
243. For other informative discussions of republicanism, see Novak, People's Welfare, supra
note 18; William J. Novak, Public Economy and the Well-Ordered Market: Law and Economic
Regulation in 19th Centuty America 18 J.L. & Soc. Inquiry 1 (1993) [hereinafter Novak, Well-
Ordered Market]; William W. Fisher III, The Law of the Land: An Intellectual History of
American Property Doctrine, 1776-1880 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University), cited in Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 506; William J. Novak, Salus Populi:
The Roots of Regulation in America, 1787-1873 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Brandeis University) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Novak, Salus Populi]; William E.
Forbath, Race, Class, and Equal Citizenship: A Constitutional Narrative (manuscript on file
with the author). For a different interpretation of republicanism, designed to achieve
different purposes, see Gregory S. Alexander's magisterial, Commodity and Property. The
Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought 1776-1970 (1997) [hereinafter
Alexander, Commodity and Property].
244. See Gregory S. Alexander, Fragmented Survivak Republicanism as Rhetoric CLS:
Newsletter of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, Nov. 1989, at 76 [hereinafter
Alexander, Fragmented Survival] (on file with the author); Alexander, History as Ideology, supra
note 63; Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 273 (1991) [hereinafter Alexander, Time and Property].
245. Richard Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight from Substance, 97 Yale L.J. 1633,
1634 (1988).
246. See Alexander, Fragmented Survival, supra note 244, at 76; Alexander, Time and Property,
supra note 244, at 273-76. Notably lacking in my ideal type is eighteenth century historians'
focus on republicanism as representing the pre-modern quality of eighteenth century thought.
See White, Heracles' Bow, supra note 5, at 10. Also lacking is the emphasis on public
deliberation that lay at the core of what constitutional scholars, notably Michelman and
Sunstein, sought from republicanism. Obviously, my selectivity reflects my sense of what is use-
ful to glean from republicanism to focus a discussion of the rhetoric of property.
247. See Kerber, supra note 207, at 1668-70 (describing republicanism as patriarchal).
Classic studies of republicanism and gender include Hanna Fenichel Pitken, Fortune Is a
Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli (1984); Ruth H. Bloch,
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dence to pursue the common good of the "commonwealth;" without
property, men fell into venality and subservience. "Dependence begets
subservience," asserted Thomas Jefferson: note the linkage of property and
power.28 This theme is important because today the accepted languages
for talking about the linkage of property and power-Marxism and postm-
odernism-too often consign their speakers to a marginalized fringe. In
this context, tying the notion that property gives power over people to
Thomas Jefferson seems an attractive alternative.249
Republican rhetorics can be schematized into two strains: elitist and
egalitarian. The elitist version proposed to create a republic run by
virtuous citizens by eliminating from the franchise all those whose lack of
property made them virtueless, i.e., subject to venality and subservience.
(These included women, slaves, and unpropertied white males.)2s In the
egalitarian version, a virtuous citizenry is fostered through widespread
distribution of property in relatively small parcels, so that every citizen
gains self-sufficiency and therefore virtue.25' A central tension in the
egalitarian version is an ambivalence about redistribution: widespread
property ownership seems clearly desirable, but redistribution appears to
threaten the stability that creates the independence vital for the republic's
survival252
Of the strains of republican rhetoric described below, the first two tap
the egalitarian republican insistence on the widespread distribution of
property. The third taps the republican conviction that property rights
should be designed to achieve the common good.
American Feminine Ideals in Transition: The Rise of the Moral Mother, 1785-1815, 4 Feminist Stud.
101 (1978) (discussing the development of the ideal of the Victorian mother and the cor-
responding rise in status for women); Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolu-
tionary America, 13 Signs 37 (1987).
248. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 161 (William Peden ed., Univ. of
North Carolina Press, 1954) (1787), quoted in Katz, supra note 24, at 473.
249. For a more nuanced description of the republican egalitarian strain during the
Revolutionary era, see William W. Fisher III, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of
Private Property: 1760-1860, 39 Emory LJ. 65, 74 (1990). What I refer to as "egalitarian
republicanism" encompasses Fisher's "Artisan Radicalism" and his "Radical Whigs" as well.
250. For an insightful description of the elitist version, see Kerber, supra note 207, at 1664
(discussing the early American political ideology which favored the recognition of a few
people in control of the political world at the cost of disenfrancisment to the many).
251. See Alexander, Time and Property, supra note 244, at 283-84; Katz, supra note 24, at 475.
252. For a discussion of how Jefferson dealt with this tension, see Katz, supra note 24, at
476-81.
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C. Republicanism and Social Dissent: Melds of Liberalism and
RepublicanismnP
Property is so important that everybody should have some of it.
Jim Hightower, Former Texas Commissioner
of Agriculture, now talk show host
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and
independence. "Necessitous men are not free men."
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944 State of the Union Address
Linda Kerber, who notes "the continuous presence throughout the
history of American dissent of the rhetoric of a commonwealth of
cooperation and civic virtue," 4 contrasts classical republicanism with the
egalitarian strain. While "classical republicanism emphatically favors the
propertied Few," m republicanism also has been used by the Many. In this
tradition of social dissent, republican language is married to a liberal insis-
tence on equality.
Historian Stanley Katz finds this strain of egalitarian rhetoric in the
thought of Thomas Jefferson.2 6 Jefferson, of course, was a slaveholder
and a man of property. But he also believed that property was so important
that everyone should have some of it. In the constitution Jefferson drafted
for Virginia, he showed his concern for the broad distribution of property:
"Every person of full age neither owning nor having owned [fifty] acres of
land, shall be entitled to an appropriation of [fifty] acres or to so much as
shall make up what he owns or has owned [fifty] acres in full and absolute
dominion .... ,, " Jefferson also proposed the abolition of the two
253. For astute studies of republicanism's elitist elements, see Alexander, Commodity and
Property, supra note 243 (arguing that republicanism is part of a broader tradition of
proprietary thought); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-35, in
III-IV The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States
(1988).
254. See Kerber, supra note 207, at 1672. Greg Alexander argues that the various
expressions of what I call "egalitarian republicanism" do not form a "continuous" or "coherent
tradition." Alexander, Fragmented Surviva supra note 245. This is probably true, but (as the
text makes clear) I think the question of whether or not a "coherent tradition" is at work is
the wrong question to ask. For me, the important question is whether an analysis of
republicanism can shed light on the "trails of association" that follow the words speech writers
(and lawyers) "still zing through the air, counting on something in us to nod in assent."
Rodgers, supra note 189, at 16.
255. Kerber, supra note 207, at 1664.
256. See Katz, supra note 24, at 273. Let me stress again that my argument is not that
eighteenth century republicanism in general conformed to the picture I will paint of
egalitarian republicanism. As G. Edward White and Gregory Alexander have shown, it did not.
See supra note 253. My goal instead is to gather together some strains of republican thought
that gelled in the nineteenth century into the tradition of social dissent. The Katz article
implies this may have some validity from the viewpoint of the historical conventions. Even if it
does not, it is an important project from the viewpoint of a pragmatic theorist.
257. Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Constitution: Third Draft of Jefferson, in 1 The
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estates that had formed the basic legal infrastructure of aristocracy in Eng-
land: the fee tail and primogeniture. Jefferson also believed that "'every
emigrant to the West must be able to take up and hold securely the lands
he needed,"'28 a view expressed in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the
Louisiana Purchase of 1803, and in his argument that the Virginia
legislature, rather than the Crown or land speculators, should hold title to
land west of the mountains and should sell it in small parcels for minimal
fees.2
9
Jefferson did not, Katz is careful to point out, advocate open
redistribution of existing property. As Jefferson wrote in a 1785 letter from
France: "I am conscious that an equal division of property is impracticable.
But the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much
subdividing property, only taking care to let their subdivisions go hand in
hand with the natural affections of the human mind."26, In most situa-
tions, and certainly in his own country, Jefferson felt that land could be
redistributed by progressive taxation, by broadly distributing land on the
frontier, and by redesigning inheritance laws to prevent large concentra-
tions of land. But Jefferson also expressed a very tentative sense that in
some situations, redistribution might be required:
Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and
unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been
so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as
the common stock for man to labour and live on. If, for the
encouragement of industry we allow it to be appropriated, we
must take care that other employment be furnished to those
excluded from the appropriation. If we do not, the fundamental
right to labor the earth returns to the unemployed. It is too soon
yet in our country to say that every man who cannot find
employment but who can find uncultivated land, shall be at
liberty to cultivate it. But it is not too soon to provide by every
possible means that as few as possible shall be without a little
portion of land. The small landowners are the most precious part
of the state.
26'
If Thomas Jefferson opposed redistribution, the same was not true of
these Americans (and sympathizers) who subscribed to the egalitarian
tradition of social dissent. Thomas Paine, for example, proposed a direct
redistribution of wealth through an inheritance tax levied on land. The
funds collected would be distributed as a patrimony to people reaching the
Papers of ThomasJefferson 356, 362 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) [hereinafterJefferson Papers],
quoted in Katz, supra note 24, at 470.
258. Katz, supra note 24, at 472 (quotingJefferson).
259. See id. at 472-73; see also Allan David Heskin, Tenants and the American Dream:
Ideology and the Tenant Movement 5 (1983) (describingJefferson's fear that, without reform,
land monopoly would increase).
260. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 Jefferson
Papers, supra note 257, at 681-83, quoted in Katz, supra note 24, at 480.
261. Id.
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age of majority, ensuring independence and therefore virtue, as well as to
people who reached fifty and were presumed to be unable to continue
working. 62 Sean Wilentz has documented the way "middling" merchants
and artisans in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century New York
created a discourse that "rested largely on four interlocking concepts" of
republicanism:
[F]irst, that the ultimate goal of any political society should be
the preservation of the public good, or commonwealth; second, that
in order to maintain the commonwealth, the citizens of a republic
has to be able and willing to exercise virtue, to subordinate private
ends [the public good]; third, that in order to be virtuous,
citizens had to be independent of the .political will of other men,
lest they lose cite of the common good; fourth, that in order to
guard against the encroachments of would-be tyrants, citizens had
to be active in politics, to exercise their Citizenship.
26
To these elements drawn from republicanism, New York merchants and
artisans added elements drawn from liberalism and religious sources. One
striking example is Thomas Skidmore, who argued around 1830 for open
redistribution of property. Skidmore began with the premise that each
person has an equal claim to the Creator's endowment and that all existing
property holdings were illegitimate:
Is the work of creation to be let out to hire? And are the great
mass of mankind to be hirelings to those who undertake to set up
a claim, as government is now constructed, that the world was
made for them? Why not sell the winds of heaven, that man may
not breathe without price? Why not sell the light of the sun, that
a man should not see without making another rich?
26
Skidmore was immoderate, not only in his insistence on immediate
redistribution, but in his aggressive extension of equality to include blacks
and women.a
Few in the tradition of social dissent have taken the egalitarian vision
as far as Skidmore. Most were content to insist on a widespread
distribution of property rights, rather than on equal portions for all.
Nineteenth century federal land policy became the key institutional
expression of the egalitarian strain.2
That policy showed that the farther the idea of classical republicanism
"receded from the dynamic reality of the 19th century [market] economy,
the more Americans liked to think of themselves in its terms."267 Two of
262. Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 35.
263. Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic 14 (1984) (citingJ.GA Pocock, Virtue and Commerce
in the Eighteenth Century, 3J. Interdisc. Hist. 119 (1972)).
264. Thomas Skidmore, The Rights of Man to Property 239 (New York, Thomas Skidmore
1829), quoted in Wilentz, supra note 263, at 185.
265. Wilentz, supra note 263, at 186.
266. Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 35.
267. Rowland Berthoff, Independence and Attachment, Virtue and Interest: From Republican
Citien to Free Entetpriser, 1787-1837, in Uprooted Americans 97, 106 (Richard L. Bushman et al.
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the purer expressions of the classical republican vision were the
Homestead Act of 1867, which distributed federal lands to individual
settlers in small hundred-acre parcels, and the homestead exemptions,
which typically exempted the family home and other assets from the claims
of creditors. These policies were driven by the sense that Americans have a
natural right "'to live and to be upon this earth... to share the products
of the earth, and hence a right to a portion of the earth,'" to quote one
advocate for homestead exemptions in 1846.
2
The most poignant expression of the egalitarian strain was the
freedmen's cry of "forty acres and a mule." After the Civil War, the
freedmen carried on the earlier assumption that citizenship entailed not
only political rights but also economic independence. Eric Foner has
portrayed in poignant terms the freedmen's disillusionment, as it became
apparent that the federal government had no intention of defining the
freedmen's citizenship in relation to property ownership. 69 "De slaves
spected a heap of freedom dey didn't git," said one freedman.2 0 The
Freedmen's Bureau began itself making land grants to former slaves; by the
end of 1865, some 40,000 freedmen had been settled in abandoned or
confiscated lands. But President Andrew Johnson reversed this policy and
ordered virtually all Confederate lands restored to their former owners.
Other expressions of the republican egalitarian vision include the
Republicans' vision at the time of the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment?7 and "free labor's" vision in the Gilded Age.27 No doubt
there are many more as well. 4
In some of its manifestations, the tradition of social dissent I have
called "egalitarian republicanism" links the need for the widespread
distribution of property with attacks on the concentration of wealth and
power. From Jeffersonian and Jacksonian social critics, to the Populists,2
5
eds., 1979).
268. Paul Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead Exemption in the United States: Accommodation
and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840-1880, 80J. Am. Hist. 470, 486 (1993) (quoting the
Milwaukee Courier).
269. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 159-60 (1988)
(describing the reaction of the freedmen to the news that the federal government would not
transfer confiscated or abandoned southern land to former slaves).
270. Id. at 164.
271. See id. at 159 (discussing President Johnson's use of the pardon to restore
Confederate lands to their pre-Civil War owners).
272. See Lea S. Vander Velde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. Pa. L
Rev. 437, 441 (1989) (discussing the ambitious goals sought to be achieved by the Thirteenth
Amendment as revealed by records of the congressional debates).
273. See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,
1985 Wis. L. Rev. 767 (1985) (discussing the origins of the "free labor" movement's
conception of republicanism); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1121-22 (1989) (arguing that the broad base of support enjoyed by
labor groups during the Gilded Age indicates that American workers viewed themselves as a
class).
274. For a fascinating explanation of some of them, see Forbath, supra note 243, passim.
275. For a discussion of recent treatment of populism that ties it explicitly to republican-
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and up to the present, this strain of rhetoric attacks corporate power, using
language originally designed to attack the luxury and corruption of eigh-
teenth century aristocrats.276
The point is not to trace an unvarying tradition consciously
transmitted, but to point out the family resemblances and keywords that
emerge and reemerge time and time again in this tradition of social
dissent. Recent contributions to this tradition include Frank Michelman's
proposal to incorporate the egalitarian tradition into constitutional law,
277
a project distinct from, and much more convincing, than his original use
of republicanism described above s.2 7  Lea Vander Velde's proposal to
interpret the Thirteenth Amendment as giving a floor of minimum rights
as well as an unobstructed sky of opportunities is another contribution to
the social dissent tradition.7
The most influential modem property theorist to carry on this
tradition is Charles Reich, whose The New Property-one of the most-often
cited law review articles ever written 2 0-- spawned a line of Supreme Court
cases 2  and was perhaps the most influential redistributive argument of
the past half century. It is fashionable today to say that Reich's "new
property" had little impact. In my view, however, the fact that Reich's
sweeping claims ultimately were rejected as the Supreme Court swung to
the right, is less significant than the fact that they ever were embraced at
ism, see Robert C. McMath, Jr., American Populism: A Social History 1877-1898, at 51-55, 168
(1993) (discussing the Populist uprising between 1867 and 1886 and the party's platform
adopted at the 1892 national convention in Omaha). Earlier work often referred to the
Jeffersonian orJacksonian heritage. See, e.g., Bruce Palmer, Man over Money: The Southern
Populist Critique of American Capitalism 13-14 (1980) (arguing that Southern Populists
inherited the Jeffersonian concept of an ideal society comprised of independent farmers from
Jacksonian labor movements); see also Norman Pollack, The Humane Economy: Populism,
Capitalism & Democracy (1990); Norman Pollack, TheJust Policy: Populism, Law and Human
Welfare (1987).
276. The language of corruption is closely related to the republican language of virtue. See
William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 13 (1991)
(discussing the goal of the Knights of Labor to prevent the "tyranny" of corporate power by
helping make the worker independent and virtuous).
277. See Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72
Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1330-31 (1987) (arguing that we have inherited a Constitution comprised
of both republican and democratic principles).
278. See supra Section INA
279. Vander Velde, supra note 272, at 494. See also Akil Amar's proposal to give all
Americans "forty acres and a mule" in Akil Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theoy of
Minimum Entitlement, 13 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 37 (1990), and William Simon's proposal for
social-republican property, which sketches out a third way between liberalism and socialism, in
William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1335 (1991).
280. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale LJ. 733 (1964); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-
Cited Law Review Articles, 73 Cal. L Rev. 1540, 1549 (1985) (stating that The New Property is
fourth most cited law review article). Note that I do not discuss the work of the two most
prominent legal scholars to carry on the tradition of republicanism as a language of social
dissent, Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein, because their focus is not on property.
281. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 10-10 (2d ed. 1988).
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all. Reich did what few others have accomplished: he held the intuitive
image at bay (albeit briefly) and made sweeping redistributive arguments
plausible for those who wished to embrace them. Why did Reich's inno-
vative theory achieve such resonance and plausibility?
In the tradition of egalitarian republicanism, Reich used a meld of
liberal and republican language. Once the two strands are separated, the
article can be seen to work on two different levels. Reich begins with the
liberal language of free-standing individuals with rights threatened by
government power: "The institution of property guards the troubled
boundary between the individual and the state."282 This theme predomi-
nates throughout Reich's article: "Ahead there stretches-to the farthest
horizon-the joyless landscape of the public interest state. The life it
promises will be comfortable and comforting. It will be well planned-with
suitable areas for work and play. But there will be no precincts sacred to
the spirit of individual man."283 Reich's conclusion is framed in the
rhetoric of privacy: "[T]here must be a zone of privacy for each individual
beyond which neither government nor private power can push-a hiding
place from the all-pervasive system of regulation and control."2&I
Note the Foucauldian overtones of "the all-pervasive system of
regulation and control." Note, too, that the standard liberal theme with
which Reich began ("the troubled boundary between the individual and
the state") has transmuted into "a zone of privacy" threatened not only by
state, but also by private power. This subtle transformation of standard
liberal themes suggests that the imaginative center of The New Property is
Reich's sexuality, which (particularly in 1964) may have given him insight
into the need for "a precinct[] sacred to the spirit of individual man" that
was protected not only from public, but also from private power.2s
If this desire to create a private space predominates Reich's work, it is
melded with language very different in focus. Reich argues that a central
purpose of the institution of property is to make citizens self-sufficient. He
recommends that welfare and other governmental benefits be considered
property rights intended "to preserve the self-sufficiency of the individu-
al. 2 88 This language reflects a republican focus on preserving a citizen's
independence in order to "allow him to be a valuable member of a family
and a community; in theory they represent part of the individual's rightful
share in the commonwealth."2 7 Reich not only uses a keyword of the
republican tradition ("commonwealth"), but he also expresses the republi-
can conviction that the purpose of property is to ensure self-sufficiency.
When Reich describes why this is important, he quotes framers' republican
282. Reich, supra note 280, at 734.
283. Id. at 778.
284. Id. at 785.
285. Reich "came out" as a homosexual in Charles Reich, The Sorcerer of Bolinas Reef 81
(1976).
286. See Reich, supra note 280, at 785.
287. Id.
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language: "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will." 's In his conclusion, Reich advocates "a Homestead Act for rootless
twentieth century man. " 9
In the court opinions inspired by Reich's analysis, the theme of
property as providing a stable stake in society and a basis for claims to
government benefits, government jobs,2
0 and government housing,21
emerges repeatedly. One theme that emerges loud and clear from the
"New Property" cases is the need for property to provide a stable stake in
society.
Other than Reich's The New Property and its progeny, the republican
egalitarian strain has not had much of an influence on American law.
Legal historian William W. Fisher IlI's analysis of pre-Civil War adverse
possession law suggests why. Fisher points out that, despite the prevalence
of republican egalitarian rhetoric in pre-Civil War political debates over
federal land distribution, courts did not utilize republican imagery of
man's natural right to land in contemporary adverse possession cases.
Fisher concludes that judges apparently felt such arguments "were too
dangerous, too threatening to the existing distribution of wealth and
power to be incorporated in their deliberations."2 2 Instead, courts
constructed a model that intimated that adverse possession enforced the
preexisting intent of the true owner and the adverse possessor.293 This
transparent fiction avoided the charge that courts in adverse possession
cases were redistributing property from A to B, by arguing that any change
in (or disappearance of) the true owner's bundle of sticks reflected only
his own intent.24
Fisher's analysis helps explain the success of "The New Property."
Note that Reich's proposal did not deprive any private party of preexisting
property rights; in fact, it was framed as a defense of property rights rather
than as a challenge to them. The "new property" cases picked up this
approach. In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Supreme Court asserted: "[I] t is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined."4s Note that the explicit focus is on the stability of property
rights, although the rationale justifies redistribution of rights from employer
288. Id. at 787.
289. Id.
290. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (discussing a state teacher's
challenge of his without-cause dismissal on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
291. SeeJoy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973) (discussing a tenant challenging her
eviction on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
292. Fisher, supra note 243, at 179, cited in Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 510.
293. See infra text accompanying notes 475-76.
294. This example provides an initial suggestion that property law's characteristic "crystals"
may reflect a mutual nonaggression pact between the intuitive image of property as absolute
and the social practice of malleable property rights. See Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 608 (1983).
295. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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to employee. 6 Thus, even the most explicit adoption of egalitarian
republicanism in contemporary case law simultaneously reassures us that
republicanism is not "too dangerous, too threatening to the existing
distribution of wealth and power." 29' Moreover, in the procedural due
process cases, the Supreme Court ultimately took away much of the
"property" it had previously bestowed in the "new property" cases.s
In summary, the strain of egalitarian republicanism that constitutes
the most explicit and comprehensive alternative to the intuitive image of
property has had relatively little influence on American law. The tradition
of social dissent represented by social critics of the Jacksonian,
Jeffersonian, Populist, and other eras has had significant influence,
however, in American politics outside of the law. The challenge is how to
incorporate this strain into the law without awakening judges' anxiety over
redistribution.299
Another strain of republican rhetoric has had a profound influence
both on American law and on American politics outside the law: the
romance of the single-family house.
296. See Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, in which a court overrode the relevant lease provision to
hold that landlords cannot evict without good cause. The court used the right-to-a-stable-stake-
in-the-society rationale to protect the stability-not of the landlord's "old property" but-of
the tenant's "new property," arguing that Congress intended to grant not only "adequate, safe
and sanitary quarters," but also "an atmosphere of stability, security, neighborliness, and social
justice." Id. at 1240. Note that even in the absence of explicit republican rhetoric, the court's
language is reminiscent of core republican themes, notably, that stable relationships to
property are the key to "neighborliness" (and virtue?) and "social justice" (and the common
good?).
297. See Fisher, supra note 243, at 179, cited in Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 510.
298. See Tribe, supra note 281, § 10-9, at 685 (showing expansion of procedural due
process); id. § 10-10, at 694 (showing narrowing of procedural due process).
299. This is a complex question, which I will address in a future article on takings law. An
important distinction exists between my use of republicanism and that of another strain of the
republican revival best represented in the law by Suzanna Sherry. Sherry taps the egalitarian
strain of republicanism to argue in favor of a right to education, but she embeds in her
discussion a communitarian critique. Sherry argues that contemporary Americans often refuse
to link rights with responsibilities and gives as examples welfare policies that do not require
recipients to limit fertility and a "woman who starved her 13-week-old baby to death by
deliberately falling to feed him [and) claim [ing] that she should be absolved of responsibility
because she herself was a victim of abuse." Suzanna Sherry, Without Virtue There Can Be No
Liberty, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 61, 72 (1993). These exhortations to virtue appear to lose touch with
the central message of the republican egalitarian strain, namely that in cases where material
deprivation has eroded social and personal responsibility, the solution is to eliminate the
material deprivation, rather than to scold the person whose virtue has been eroded by
poverty. Thus, if the young women who are now becoming pregnant felt they were throwing
away a future, they would take greater pains to avoid pregnancy; the effective solution is not
to scold their current behavior but to give them a future. (This, of course, also assumes they
are in control of their sexual encounters, which at times they are not.) Another article by
Sherry on republicanism is Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543 (1986) (arguing that feminine jurisprudence could accept the
command values ofJeffersonian republicanism).
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D. The Romance of the Single-Family House: Republicanism Transmuted
into Domesticity
[T]he sanctity of the home .. . has been embedded in our
traditions since the origins of the Republic. Payton v. New York ®
Republican egalitarian rhetoric has lived on in the tradition of social
dissent, but it also transmuted, in Protean fashion, into America's romance
with the single-family house. This Subsection will first examine that
romance, and then will examine its links to republican egalitarian rhetoric
and the ideology of domesticity, a gender ideology that arose after
1780."0 Unlike the pure form of republican egalitarianism, this hybrid
strain of republicanism has had a significant influence on American law.
Pinpointing it helps explain two questions that have long troubled property
scholars: why the U.S. Supreme Court upheld zoning laws during a period
when it was striking down most other regulatory legislation; and why the
American law of covenants is such an "unspeakable quagmire." This
Subsection ends by revisiting Radin's property and personhood analysis in
order to argue that the redistributive strain of personhood analysis is in
significant part an expression of Americans' intuition that owning a single-
family house is different from owning most other kinds of property.
1. The trance
A key contemporary expression of republican themes emerges in the
American obsession with homeownership. A recent Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) study found that most Americans are
willing to make dramatic sacrifices in order to own a home 0 2 Many are
willing to take a second job, place young children in child care, live farther
away from work,03 and spend up to half of their monthly income on
mortgage payments." 4  In part, this stems from the fact that
homeownership is the only effective form of wealth accumulation for
Americans with modest incomes.305 Yet the survey stressed that nonfinan-
300. 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
301. See Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood 63-99 (1977) (discussing the rise of the
metaphor of the home as a safe place).
302. See Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae National Housing Survey (June 1992) [hereinafter FNMA
Survey] (listing some sacrifices Americans will make to own a home).
303. Id. at 9.
304. Critical Perspectives on Housing at xiv (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986) (noting that
6.3 million Americans paid more than 50% of their disposable family income to cover housing
costs).
305. Frank S. Levy & Richard C. Michel, The Economic Future of American Families
Income and Wealth Trends 63 (1991) (discussing statistics which show the owner-occupied
house to be the single most important component of net wealth for the baby boom
generation). This obsession is, of course, part of what Radin picks up on in her discussion of
property and personhood, as is most evident in her use of the cult of domesticity language
when she refers to the "Sanctity of the Home." See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note
136, at 991.
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cial reasons play a significant role as well. Thirty-nine percent of Americans
answered an open-ended question by saying that homeownership gave
them a sense of "security, a sense of permanence." The report aptly notes
that homeownership "is a metaphor for personal and family security. The
sum total of the findings in this survey suggest that owning one's home is,
in essence, an empowering act, giving people a stake in society and a sense
of control over their lives. Put differently, homeownership strengthens the
social fabric."306
The continuing linkage between ownership, citizenship, and the
strength of the republic, reflected in statistics that show markedly higher
117
rates of political participation among homeowners than among renters,
is a remarkable resonance of the republican vision. But if the obsession
with home ownership carries on themes from the egalitarian republican
strain, it also melds them with themes from the ideology of domesticity.
The ideology of domesticity divides the world into separate spheres of
home and work.03 It depicts men as properly occupied in the public
worlds of commerce and politics, and women as properly occupied with
providing a refuge for men in the "home sweet home." A full study of
domesticity is beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, the
important theme is the way themes originally expressed in terms of egali-
tarian republicanism eventually transmuted into themes organized around
domesticity." '0
Both egalitarian republicanism and domesticity link the distribution of
property rights with the health of the political system. As we have seen,
egalitarian republicanism calls for the widespread distribution of property,
in order to give citizens the independence to pursue the common good,
rather than their own selfish interests.310 Domesticity retained the linkage
between property and good citizens, but shifted the focus away from the
political arena, onto the family. Domesticity intimated that the key to
creating good citizens lay in the creation of stable families in which
mothers* (or, later, parents) trained children in the virtues required for a
stable society.
"The family and the good citizenship that homeownership is believed
to instill are equally idealized and, therefore, equated," concludes
anthropologist Connie Perin. She quotes Calvin Coolidge: "No greater
contribution could be made to the stability of the Nation, and the
306. FNMA Survey, supra note 302, at 10.
307. Id. at 3.
308. Jeanne Boydston, Home & Work: Housework, Wages, and the Ideology of Labor in
the Early Republic (1990).
309. For an influential review of the enormous body of literature on domesticity, see Linda
K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Wolds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J.
Am. Hist. 9 (1988) (discussing the historian's view of the woman's distinct and separate
societal role during that time period).
310. See supra Section III.C.
311. Constance Perin, Everything in Its Place 64 (1977).
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advancement of its ideals, than to make it a Nation of homeowning
families.
1 2
The central imagery is that of a middle-class two-parent family in a
single-family house. This is, of course, a class-based, gendered vision that
assumes heterosexuality. Americans are quite explicit about the middle-
class element of this vision: the love affair with homeownership focuses not
on property ownership in general, but on the single-family home
specifically. Fully eighty percent of all Americans identify the single-family
house with a yard as the ideal place to live.
313
This love affair with single-family housing has shaped the American
landscape. During the post-World War II building boom, European
countries generally built apartments,3 14 while the U.S. was transformed
from a nation of renters to a nation of homeowners3 s15 by massive tax
subsidies to homeowners1 6 as well as the restructuring of home financing
by FHA and VA mortgages.1 The result is geography dominated by
suburbs and a housing market dominated by owners.1 8
The American obsession with ownership of the single-family house is
politically ambiguous. On the one hand, it has resulted in the widespread
distribution of property rights-the dream of the republican egalitarian
strain. But the dark underside of America's romance with home ownership
is the history of the exclusion of blacks3 9 and of the poor from middle-
class suburban neighborhoods and entire towns. 29 The suburbs also
represent a physical expression of the cult of domesticity's separate spheres
of home and work. Suburbs physically separate homes and workplaces,
leaving women and children in suburbs that, during the day, are largely
312. Id at 72 (quoting Calvin Coolidge).
313. FNMA Survey, supra note 302, at 8.
314. Michael Harloe, Private Rented Housing in the United States and Europe 64 (1985)
(showing how continental European housing policy was less biased towards homeownership
than U.S. housing policy); see also Richard P. Applebaum, Swedish Housing in the Postwar Period:
Some Lessons for American Housing Policy, in Critical Perspectives, supra note 304, at 535-545
(showing the commitment of the United States to homeownership and the commitment to
apartment building in Europe).
315. George Sternlieb & James W. Hughes, Demographics and Housing in America, 4
Population Bull. 2, 5 (1986).
316. The mortgage interest deduction originated during the Civil War, but it gained
importance only when the rate of homeownership rose after World War II, and again with the
sharp inflation of housing prices after 1970. See Joan C. Williams, It's High Time to Get
Homeowners'Deductions Under Contro4 12 Tax Notes 963 (1981).
317. See Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 60.
318. Perin, supra note 311, at 64, 71-72 (discussing the social value of homeownership).
319. See Douglass S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass 9 (1993) (noting that "middle-class households always attempt to
segregate the poor" and, as a result, middle-class blacks and poor blacks lose compared to
their white counterparts).
320. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(NJ. 1975) (dealing with a township which used land regulations to prevent certain classes of
people from entering the community).
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bereft of men.32 In its default mode, the rhetoric of homeownership
reinscribes traditional white middle class gender roles. The question re-
mains whether this rhetoric can be used alternatively to achieve a broader
range of egalitarian goals.
2. The romance with homeownership in American law: Euclid as an
example
The obsession with ownership of the single-family house is not only
embedded in the American landscape, but also in American law. An
important example of its influence is the case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty,52 which helped create the legal infrastructure of the suburb by
upholding the constitutionality of zoning. A closer look at Euclid shows
egalitarian republicanism transmuted into the ideology of domesticity.
Paradoxically, in an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, one of the
"four horsemen" who struck down nineteenth century worker protective
legislation,ss Euclid upheld land-use regulation at the height of the
Lochner era. 24 This fact that has long perplexed commentators. Why did
the Supreme Court uphold zoning precisely during the period when it was
striking down state health and safety regulation?
The conventional explanation today is that Sutherland upheld zoning
out of self-interest, once he recognized it would protect the elite
neighborhoods he and most judges inhabited.ss2 I suspect this does not
321. See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier:. The Suburbanization of the United States
300 (1985) ("The dream house was designed around the needs of a bread-winning male and a
full-time housewife who would provide her prince with a haven from the cold outside
world... [A]lias, the American population no longer fits the stereotype of the nuclear
family."); Margaret Marsh, Suburban Lives (1990) (discussing popular television shows of the
1950s which portrayed a father's work as remote from the home); Elaine Tyler May,
Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War (1988) (noting that the home
provided a myth of security in the insecure world of the 1950s).
322. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
323. See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 108-14 (1928) (invalidating
Pennsylvania restrictions on corporate ownership of pharmacies); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co.,
270 U.S. 402, 408-15 (1926) (invalidating state prohibition of "shoddy" in manufacture of
bedding materials where other means of protecting health and preventing deception were
available); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 527 (1924) (invalidating Nebraska law
requiring standardized weights for loaves of bread and finding it "not necessary for the pro-
tection of purchases against ... fraud by short weights"); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525, 546-48 (1923) (striking down minimum wage laws for women on basis that government
wage regulation was needed only within limited categories of activity); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 52-65 (1905) (striking down minimum work weeks for bakers on the basis that
government regulation unduly interfered with baker's right to contract); see also Tribe, supra
note 281, § 8-3, at 568-70; id. § 8-4, at 570-73.
324. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45. I use the term "Lochner era" to refer to a period in the
early twentieth century (roughly from 1905 to the late 1930s) during which the Supreme
Court invalidated various federal and state statutes on the theory they violated the liberty of
contract. See Tribe, supra note 281, § 8-4, at 570-73.
325. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Proces4 40 Stan. L
Rev. 379 (1988). But see Samuel Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty, 6 Win. &
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do justice to the complexity of Sutherland's motivations. Something
convinced Sutherland of the need to consider parcels of land as
neighborhoods, rather than the free-standing monads envisioned by Locke.
What was it?
One hint is the Euclid Court's statement that "the crux of the more
recent zoning legislation" is the segregation of residential uses.3 '2 In the
Court's search for policy reasons to allow the unfolding of the suburban
form, it relied on precisely the kind of Progressive-era reports it had so
often ignored in liberty of contracts cases.
These reports, which bear every evidence of painstaking
consideration, concur in the view that segregation of residential,
business, and iridustrial buildings will make it easier to provide
fire apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the
development in each section; that it will increase the safety and
security of home life; greatly tend to prevent street accidents,
especially to children, etc. With particular reference to apartment
houses... [which] interfer[e] by their height and bulk with the
free circulation of air and monopoliz[e] the rays of the sun which
would otherwise fall upon the smaller homes and bring[] as their
necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to
increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of
moving and parked automobiles, of larger portions of the street,
thus detracting from their safety and depriving children of the
privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in
the more favored localities ...."'
Is it fair to read this passage as upholding the constitutionality of
zoning because a key goal of property law is to protect the residential
havens where the next generation of citizens are raised?328 Gone is the
republican commitment to property rights designed to protect
participation in civic life; in its place is a sense that property rights should
protect the neighborhoods where people can create the best society by
nurturing virtue in the home. The standard interpretation is that Suther-
land was motivated by a desire to protect rich people's neighborhoods.
This may well be true, but it overlooks Sutherland's belief in zoning's
potential to bring "the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play" to "less
favored localities," to bring to ordinary people what wealth delivers to the
rich. Sutherland's rhetoric recalls the political dimension of the ideology
of domesticity, sometimes expressed as the need for stable homes that will
produce responsible citizens (imagery very much at the center of the
current debate over "family values").32
Mary Bill Rts.J. 1 (1997).
326. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390.
327. Id. at 394.
328. Feminists have noted that the typical analysis of Euclid ignores the significance of its
focus on raising children. See Marsha Ritzdorf, Whose American Dream? The Euclid Legacy and
Cultural Change, 56J. Am. Plan. Ass'n 386 (1990).
329. For a study of the way republicanism transmuted into domesticity that emphasizes the
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This meld of classical republicanism and domesticity proves a
powerful combination in many areas of American property law. While its
preeminent influence is in the law of zoning, it also structures the law of
covenants,3 0 although in a far less straightforward way. In the remainder
of this Subsection, I will argue that through the law of covenants, U.S.
courts have upheld a sweeping system of "dead hand control"3 ' that
courts are unwilling or unable to articulate as "law" their reasons for doing
so, and that these reasons stem from republicanism transmuted into
domesticity.
3. The law of covenants
The law [of covenants] is an unspeakable quagmire. 2
American courts have upheld a sweeping system of "dead hand
control" through their expansive reading of the law of covenants. Unlike
English courts, American courts have enforced covenants at law against
successive landowners.3 Whereas English courts were unwilling to
enforce affirmative obligations as equitable servitudes, most American
courts were.33 Moreover, many American courts have even been willing
to make up out of thin air residential-only restrictions against owners with
no written restrictions whatsoever in their chain of title.3 ' American
courts' willingness to enforce covenants against successors is all the more
mother's political role, see Linda K. Kerber, The Republican Mother. Female Political Imagination
in the Early Republi4 in Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary
America 283-88 (1980). On family values, see, for example, Ronald Brownstein, Clinton, Bush
Step Up Debate on Family Values Politics, LA. Times, May 22, 1992, at A22 (outlining proposed
programs by Bush and Clinton to bolster family values); Beth Frerking, Advocates Say the Debate
on Family Issues Is Long Overdue, Houston Chron., May 23, 1992, at 3 (discussing differing views
by Republicans and Democrats on strengthening families);Judy Keen, Family Values: A Familiar
Ring USA Today, Aug. 19, 1992, at 5A (discussing the Republicans' attempt to gain votes by
calling for family values); Clay Robison, Broaden the Debate on Family Values, Houston Chron.,
Aug. 16, 1992, at 2; Kevin Sack, The 1992 Campaign: The Vice President, Quayle Tries to Separate
Family Values and Murphy Brown, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1992, at A20.
330. I use "covenants" to refer to implied as well as written covenants, in contradistinction
to easements.
331. The metaphor of "dead hand control" was coined in the context of estates in land
and future interests. In using that term here, I am rejecting the assumption (common within
law-and-economics) that covenants represent the intent both of the original parties to the
covenant and of the subsequent owners of the burdened property. The notion that people
buy a house or apartment because of a given covenant seems a fiction. Often people buy
burdened land in spite of the covenant, or because they have not read the documents and do
not know about the covenant, or they have no realistic choice because all suitable or
affordable housing in the area they want or need to live is burdened by similar covenants.
332. See Rabin, supra note 39, at 489 (introducing equitable servitudes).
333. In England, covenants at law are enforced only against successive tenants. Curtis J.
Berger, Land Ownership and Use 576 (3d ed. 1983).
334. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 39, at 879-89 (applying private nuisance law where
a neighbor's home limited the amount of sunlight available to the homeowner).
335. See Uriel Reichman, Towards a Unified Concept of Servitude; 55 S. Cal. L Rev. 1177,
1244 (1982) (discussing theories of informal creation of servitudes).
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dramatic because it is a striking instance of "dead hand control," in that
covenants running against successors limit future usage of land by up-
holding the will of a former owner. This tendency violates the truism that
Anglo-American courts refuse to enforce "dead hand control."116 A more
accurate statement is that they refuse to enforce it except if the control can
be successfully characterized as a covenant.
Our courts' expansive attitude is one striking characteristic of the
American law of covenants. Doctrinal chaos is a second. Commentators
commonly deride the law of covenants:
The intrepid soul who ventures into this formidable wilderness
never emerges unscarred. Some, the smarter ones, quickly turn
back and take up something easier like the income taxation of
trusts and estates. Others, having lost their way, plunge on and
after weeks of efforts emerge not far from where they began,
clearly the worse for wear. On looking back they see the trail they
thought they broke obscured with foul smelling waters and
noxious weeds. Few willingly take up the challenge again.""
One famous thicket is the horizontal privity requirement, which
mandates that the initial parties to a covenant at law must have a "mutual
simultaneous interest" running between them as either landlord and
tenant or grantor and grantee.3 8 Commentators have long pondered why
the enforceability of a covenant against successors should depend upon the
relationship of the original covenanting parties.3s 9
The horizontal privity requirement can only be explained in terms of
its usefulness in enabling courts to blur the difference between their novel
holding that covenants could bind successive owners and the traditional
English rule that covenants could bind only successive tenantss 0 This
blurring was accomplished through the assertion that covenants always had
bound parties in privity of estate, without mentioning that only landlords
and tenants traditionally had had privity of estate. American courts'
extension of privity of estate to include successive owners was a linguistic
dodge that got them off the hook from having to give reasons why they
were extending the traditional English concept of covenants to allow for
extensive dead hand control.
We see the same manhandling of technical terms in decisions
involving equitable servitudes. Just as courts misused the term "privity of
estate" to enforce covenants at law against successors, courts misused the
336. Property casebooks and commentators traditionally discuss the issue of dead hand
control in the context of future interests, where it is declared a sweeping goal of Anglo-
American property law to avoid it. The fact that American courts have upheld sweeping dead
hand control through the law of covenants is not mentioned. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra
note 39, at 299-318.
337. See Rabin, supra note 39, at 489.
338. Berger, supra note 333, at 572.
339. See id. at 595-96.
340. The horizontal privity requirement, which has been the target of reformers for over
half a century, will be omitted from the forthcoming Restatement.
HeinOnline -- 83 Iowa L. Rev. 332 1997-1998
RnETORC OF PROPERTY
term "easement" to enforce equitable servitudes.
American courts often justified their upholding of equitable servitudes
on the grounds that the agreements at issue created "mutual ease-
ments."341 In fact, they were not easements at common law because they
did not fit one of the four recognized negative easements. 2 American
courts nonetheless manipulated the "easement" language to offer legal
relief. Instead of saying "this is not one of the four recognized negative
easements and so is unenforceable," they said, "in this situation the
claimant has an interest in the nature of an easement, so he can
recover."m The beauty of this argument is that-like the extension of
privity of estate-it allows a court to change existing law without discussing
its reasons for doing so.
Both covenants at law and equitable servitudes address the
enforcement of written covenants against successors; the manipulation of
the term "easement" continues in the context of implied covenants. In the
typical implied covenant situation, a landowner is precluded from using
land in a residential subdivision for commercial uses, despite the absence
of any restrictions whatsoever in his chain of title. Some courts try to give
the proposed restriction solidity and legitimacy by associating it with the
word "easement" and uphold the implied covenant as an "implied
reciprocal easement." This "easement," according to one such court, "runs
with the land sold by virtue of express fastening and abides with the land
retained until loosened by expiration of its period of service or by events
working its destruction .... It originates for mutual benefit and exists with
sufficient vigor to work its ends."44
Note how the court uses easement language to make the proposed
restriction sound bulky and substantial. Again the court wants to sound like
it is giving reasons for its decision when it is not. But American courts can
not completely avoid giving reasons; when they do so, they compound the
confusion. For example, courts waffled for a long time in equitable
servitude cases between the "mutual easements" rationale and the contract
justification used in the landmark English case of Tulk v. Moxhay. 4
A final maneuver in implied covenants cases, which will be discussed
in greater detail below,36 is for courts to argue that they are merely
enforcing the intent of the parties (evidently including the intent of the
owner of the burdened parcel, who bought unrestricted land and now
finds himself unable to use it as he wishes!).
American courts' reliance on clearly fictional intent arguments, their
341. But see Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848) (upholding equitable servitudes
on a contract rationale).
342. See Berger, supra note 333, at 589.
343. Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877) (distinguishing between
equitable rights and legal covenants not running with the land).
344. Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496, 497 (Mich. 1925).
345. See Berger, supra note 333, at 596.
346. See infra Section V (discussing intent arguments in property law).
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manhandling of technical tests, and their wobbling amongst various
rationales suggest that courts feel unable to say out loud the actual reasons
behind their hell-bent determination to uphold these restrictions. Why?
This pattern of fictions and confusion is understandable because of
what is at stake. The question is whether future owners will be able to "do
what they want with their land"; American courts' answer is no. Courts'
willingness to uphold "dead hand control" in the context of written
covenants is bad enough; implied covenants go even further and allow
courts to redistribute the bundle of sticks, taking commercial development
rights away from the owner of the restricted parcel, and giving his
neighbors the right to restrict his land to residential use.
The law of covenants has rarely been analyzed as a dramatic exception
to the intuitive image of property that owners can "do what they want with
their land," but it is one. The classic explanation for covenants is that they
enhance the utility of land:
The continuous widespread use of servitudes indicates their
usefulness in efficiently allocating user rights between separately
held possessory estates. Buying limited user rights or rights to
have neighboring land used in a certain way enhances the utility
of one's own land .... The practice of allowing free market
transactions to allocate user's rights contributes to the overall
efficient utilization of land. Hence, servitudes tend to allocate
user rights efficiently. Because such land use adjustments "run
with the land," they provide the requisite degree of security to
encourage capital investments.
47
This argument is rarely questioned, which is odd in view of the fact that
American courts use utilitarian arguments to justify their enforcement of
covenants against successors, while British courts use utilitarian arguments
to justify their refusal to enforce covenants against successive owners."
The sharp contrast between English and American courts' assessments of
utility focuses attention on the importance of the cultural background
against which "utility" is judged. Clearly, American courts thought the
greatest good would emerge from a system that enforced substantial
restrictions on the use of land, while English courts did not. Why the
difference?
Conventional legal analysis, content with pronouncements about
"public policy" or "social utility," rarely delves deep enough to illuminate
the cultural background behind "commonsense" pronouncements. To
understand why American courts were willing "to enforce virtually any
form of restriction at equity," 49 their expansive attitude must be placed
in cultural context.
347. Reichman, supra note 335, at 1184.
348. See id. at 1184-90 (discussing the contrast between British and American courts in the
enforcement of covenants against successive owners).
349. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The DefeasibLe Fee and the Birth of the Modern Residential
Subdivision, 49 Mo. L Rev. 695, 707 (1984).
HeinOnline -- 83 Iowa L. Rev. 334 1997-1998
RHETORIC OF PROPERTY
A textual hint of courts' motivation emerges in a case involving not
the creation of restrictive covenants, but their proposed termination. Not
surprisingly, American courts have proved extraordinarily reluctant to lift
subdivision restrictions once they are imposed. The "doctrine of
neighborhood change" requires a challenger to prove that not one person in
the entire subdivision still benefits from a restriction before a court will lift
it.350 Most courts focus closely upon factual issues, but some take a
different tack. To quote the Oregon Supreme Court:
We are not prepared to say, in view of the evidence, that the
maintenance of this part of Laurelhurst as a residential district is
of no substantial benefit to the plaintiff. It is true that it might be
more valuable for business purposes, but there are some things in
this strenuous age of commercialism that count more than cash.
It is her home. 5
To unpack this statement requires an understanding of the
relationship of republicanism, liberalism, and domesticity. The adage that
"a man's home is his castle" starts off with republicanism; it captures both
the homestead's role in providing citizens with self-sufficiency and the
husband's role in ruling the "little commonwealth." 5 2 Yet the court says
not "his home is his castle," but "it is her home." This reflects the re-
gendering of political ideology reflected in the rise of domesticity.
3 3
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, liberalism
and domesticity emerged as twin images. Men left the home to become the
self-interested actors of liberalism, while women stayed behind, selflessly
devoting themselves to a domestic realm in the home sweet home. This
imagery underlies the court's unstated intimation that full commodification
of "her home""' would do violence to her life; the court also intimates
that "this age of strenuous commercialism" poses a threat to society as a
whole.
By no means is this republicanism pure and simple 55 American
courts' solicitude for residential subdivisions is resonant of both the
350. See Berger, supra note 333, at 652, 655-66 (sampling the case law and literature on the
doctrine of neighborhood change).
351. Ludgate v. Somerville, 256 P. 1043, 1046 (Or. 1927), quoted in Blair v. Edwards Realty
Co., 405 P.2d 538, 540 (Or. 1965).
352. This notion of the family as a little commonwealth dates back to Puritan society. See
generally John Demos, The Little Commonwealth (1970) (describing the daily life and
relationships of the typical family in Plymouth Colony).
353. This is the conventional dating of the emergence of the ideology of domesticity. See
Cott, supra note 301, at 201-04 (sketching the late eighteenth century development of early
feminist ideology, including the dominant notion of the "woman's sphere"). For an argument
that domesticity and liberalism must be understood simultaneously, as two sides of the same
coin, see Joan C. Williams, Domesticity as the Dangerous Supplement of Liberalism, 2 J. Women's
Hist. 69 (1991).
354. This is an expression of what Radin has called the "property as personhood" theme in
American property law. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 136; see supra Section II.B.
355. The property and personhood theme has elements of republicanism, the ideology of
domesticity, and the liberal dignity strain of property.
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Jeffersonian vision of citizens' property protecting them from vulnerability
and of the subsequent regendered imagery of the home as a refuge. This
intertwining of republican and domestic imagery crystallizes the worry that
rampant commodification will threaten independence-through-property (in
the republican version) or the home-as-sanctuary (in the domestic version).
The intertwining of republicanism and domesticity also holds
important messages for a pragmatic approach to legal theory. One of the
drawbacks of the canon-based approach-quite apart from its inability to
see alternatives to possessive individualism because of the intuitive image's
role in shaping the canon itself-is the rigid sense in legal and political
philosophy of clear-cut traditions that persist without effective intermin-
gling. We have seen the intermingling of Locke and Bentham in possessive
individualism and the intermingling of possessive individualism and
absolutist constitutional rhetoric in the intuitive image; now we see the
intermingling of domesticity and republicanism in the American obsession
with home ownership. An equally important point is that three different
variants-the "pure" tradition of republican egalitarianism, the "pure"
tradition of domesticity, and an intermixture of the two-all coexist
simultaneously in American political (including legal) rhetoric.
E. From the "Salus Populi" Theorists to the Contemporary Takings Muddle
We think it a well settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his tile, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that is shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property, not injurious to the
rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth...
is derived directly or indirectly from the government, and hold
subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the
common good and general welfare. Commonwealth v. Alger (1851f
1. "Salus populi" theorists
The third strain of republican rhetoric that plays an important role in
contemporary property law and rhetoric focuses not on the need for a
widespread distribution of property (or houses), but on the need to design
property rights in order to achieve the common good. Some historians
have argued that, even in the colonial era, property rights were limited by
the common good requirement. 57 As of the early nineteenth century,
according to legal historian William Novak, this tradition had transmuted
into what Novak calls the "salus populi" tradition, which carried on certain
356. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851).
357. William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 863 (1995). This contention has been challenged by William
Fisher. See Fisher, supra note 27, at 558, 562-63.
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elements of classical republicanism in combination with peculiarly
nineteenth century elements3 s  The group of thinkers Novak discusses
held a vision expressed by two common-law maxims: salus populi lex est
(the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut
alrenumnon laedas (use your land so as not to injure others). Novak
argues that these maxims expressed the vision of a well-regulated society in
which citizens were viewed as inherently social creatures whose self-
fulfillment lay in their shared common life. According to one such thinker,
William Sullivan, "Government is instituted for the common good; for the
protection of property and prosperity, and happiness of the people;-and
not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any man, family or class of
men." 59 Regulation, Novak asserts, was at the center of this vision: "Only
through... regulation... could man's social nature, his tendency toward
society and the public good, be realized."s
The tradition Novak describes combined rhetoric from civic
republicanism with that from other traditions, notably evangelical
Protestantism and Scottish moral philosophy. The tradition's notions of
virtue were drawn more from sources in the Protestant tradition and and
Scottish moral philosophy than from the manly, militaristic virtue of
Harrington.3 6' Novak stresses that "the salus populi tradition was not so
much a product of formal political philosophizing.., as a product of
governance." 6 2 While the vision of a well-regulated society differed in
many ways from classical republicanism, notable resonances include the
notions that property rights are socially created, that men become fully
human only through their shared political and social life as citizens,33
and that property rights are inherently limited if necessary to achieve the
common good.3 G The sense of government as a positive force was re-
flected in the broad definition of the police power as necessary to achieve
358. Novak, People's Welfare, supra note 18, at 2 ("The republican synthesis is thus only
the latest scholarly attempt to collar that elusive associational, corporative, governmental, and
public-spirited strand in early American life that has captivated political commentators since
Alexis de Tocqueville and James Bryce.") (citations omitted). See generally Novak, Well-Ordered
Market; supra note 243; Novak, Salus Populi, supra note 243.
359. Novak, Salus Populi, supra note 243, at 22 (quoting William Sullivan's The Political
Class Book (Boston, Richardson, Lord & Holbrook 1831)).
360. Id. at 23.
361. See Wood, supra note 235.
362. Novak, Well-Ordered Market, supra note 243, at 6, 10.
363. Novak, People's Welfare, supra note 18, at 12 ("Their reference point was the
relationship of a citizen to a republic.").
364. While Novak acknowledges the resonances between the salus populi tradition and
republican rhetoric, he warns that the salus populi tradition was "a fuzzy intellectual matrix
not quite captured by the prevailing models of intellectual and legal history." Id. at 26. For
Novak's purpose as an historian "to reconstruct an older world of meaning," this is certainly
true, as is the linkage of his topic and Progressive notions of state regulatory power. Id. at 21.
But if our goal, as here, is to bring to consciousness a resonant strain of American property
rhetoric, then the linkage of the salus populi tradition with earlier republican rhetoric is
useful.
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the health, safety, and welfare of the public, which Novak found in
nineteenth century cases.
Said one thinker, Thomas Cooper, "'The great object of all laws is the
general welfare-public utility. There can be no rights inconsistent with
this.' ''ss The sic utere maxim was viewed as a specific example of "the
more general rule, which require[d] that all the actions of individuals be
so directed as to promote the good of the whole."3 6 From this general
principle flowed myriad restrictions on social and economic life. These
thinkers defined the right of property as a social right which "'ought to be
regulated and restrained, to extract from it the benefits it can produce,
and to counteract the evils it can inflict.'"3 67 An early nineteenth century
Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion by Lemuel Shaw summarizes this
view:
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal
right to the enjoyment of their property nor injurious to the
rights of the community. All property in the commonwealth... is
derived directly or indirectly from the government... [and is]
subject to such reasonable limitations ... as the legislature...
may think necessary and expedient.m
This view of property was reinforced by the view of law as "a moral exercise
for the promotion of public happiness in the good society."30 From these
roots emerged the broad police power that we find, to this day, in many
state court takings opinions.
2. State court takings cases
For fifty years after the 1926 case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,370 the
United States Supreme Court heard no land use takings cases. But the
state courts heard thousands37' and gradually developed a test that
reflected the belief that states have broad police powers that enable them
to pass an extensive range of land use regulations, as long as the
365. Id. at 268-69 n.130 (quoting Thomas Cooper, M.D., Two Essays: 1. On the
Foundation of Civil Government, 2. On the Constitution of the United States 15 (Columbia,
S.C. 1826)).
366. Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government 164-65 (Rutland Vt.,J.
Lyon 1793), quoted in Novak, People's Welfare, supra note 18, at 45.
367. Novak, People's Welfare, supra note 18, at 25-26 (quotingJohn Taylor, Construction
Construed and Constitutions Vindicated (Richmond, Shepherd & Pollard 1820)).
368. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851). Note Shaw's use of
republican rhetoric ("commonwealth").
369. Novak, People's Welfare, supra note 18, at 20.
370. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
371. See Norman Williams Jr. et al., The White RiverJunction Manifesto, 9 Vt. L. Rev. 193, 199
(1984) [hereinafter Williams et al., Manifesto] (explaining that since Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928), state courts have heard thousands of takings cases).
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landowner is left with some reasonable use of his land. This state court test
lives on in cases such as Just v. Marinette County,3s 2 which cited the
relevant takings test as one of whether "the restriction practically and
substantially renders the land useless for all reasonable purposes;"3 3 in
Kaiser v. City of Honolulu, 374 a federal case applying Hawaii law and
holding that there is no taking unless "no economically viable use" exists
for the restricted land; and in Norbeck Village v. Montgomery County
Counci3 75 a Maryland case that rejected a takings challenge on the
grounds that "he who claims confiscatory action must show that the
protested zoning precludes use of his property for any purpose for which it
is reasonably adapted."0
76
These state courts carry on the salus populi tradition, which advocates
a broad police power that enables the legislature to regulate landowners'
rights to the extent that they harm the rights of the public. In the words of
the South Carolina Supreme Court, the state "may properly regulate the
use of property where uncontrolled use would be harmful to the public
interest."77 Here the state court has translated the republican language
of the common good into Progressive language of the public interest; for
all the differences between classical republicanism and Progressivism,
property rights were limited in both to the extent they interfered with the
paramount rights of the public.
Once again, I am not unmindful of the significant differences
between the republicanism of the Founders, the salus populi thinkers, and
the Progressives, but in this context it is the continuities that are
important. The key continuity is from the vision of property rights limited
to the extent they do not serve the common good, to property rights
regulated to protect the paramount rights of the public, to property rights
regulated in the public interest. This continuity provides a new perspective
on Justice Brandeis's famous dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon,378 the takings case that first crystallized the battle lines that
remain to this day. "The State merely prevents the owner from making a
use that interferes with paramount rights of the public,"37 Brandeis says,
using salus populi language. From this principle Brandeis derives the tenet
that "[i]f the public safety is imperiled, surely neither grant, nor contract,
can prevail against an exercise of the police power."ss Nearly seventy
years later, the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated this truism, which
fit naturally into state courts' vision of a sweeping police power and a
372. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
373. Id. at 767.
374. 913 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1990).
375. 254 A.2d 700 (Md. 1972).
376. Id. at 706.
377. Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984).
378. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
379. Id. at 417.
380. Id. at 420.
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stringent "confiscation" test for takings ss After citing the sic utere max-
im beloved of the salus populi thinkers, the South Carolina Supreme Court
concludes that "[f]inding that the regulation under attack prevented a use
seriously harming the public, we have concluded that no regulatory taking
has occurred.3 8 2
The U.S. Supreme Court, intent since 1978 upon wresting the takings
case law away from the state courts and away from the republican vision,
rejected the long-established notion that no taking exists where a
regulation simply protects the "paramount rights of the public." Indeed, in
the majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci4 the
Supreme Court cleverly used the intuitive image of property to undercut
the salus populi tradition. Striking down South Carolina's coastal zoning,
the Supreme Court noted that "our 'takings' jurisprudence... has
traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding
the context of the State's power over the 'bundle of rights' that they
acquire when they obtain title to property."3 4 In effect, the Court argues
that because 'citizens have traditionally expected that if they own
beachfront land they can build a house on it, their expectation is entitled
to constitutional protection. As Carol Rose saw long ago, takings law is still
a muddle because it represents a clash between the republican and liberal
vision of property38  Novak's work shows the particular strain of
republicanism involved.s 6
F. The Redistributive Strain of Radin's Property and Personhood Analysis
as Republican Rhetoric
Margaret Jane Radin's goal was to identify our "intuitions" about the
special status of homeownership; 3 8 7 now we can link those intuitions to
the strain of republicanism transmuted into domesticity. In fact, one of the
two cases that cites the redistributive strain of Radin's personhood analysis
links Property and Personhood with the statement (quoted as the epigram to
this Section) about our republic's tradition of the sanctity of the home."
The other case, Dawson v. Higgins,8 9 links a cite to Radin with a
381. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991).
382. Id. at 899.
383. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
384. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
385. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle 57 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 561, 587-97 (1984). Since Rose has been cited as an exemplar of law and economics,
some further explanation may be in order. Rose has a Ph.D. in history; her specialty has been
to use her historical imagination to build a bridge between the law and economics and its
critics. Mahon Reconstructed provides one example; another is her use of the work of Albert
Hirschman.
386. See, e.g., Novak, People's Welfare, supra note 18, at 19-26 (outlining the common-law
vision of property rights as fundamentally social and political).
387. See supra Section II.B.
388. Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
389. 588 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1992).
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republican stress on the importance of stability.
Radin has come under attack because of her unself-conscious embrace
of Americans' romance with homeownership. Radin critic Stephen
Schnably argues that she should "begin by unpacking the home as an
ideal."3 90 Schnably argues that "[the] suburban home represents ...
rejection of public spaces"39" ' and is closely linked with women's role as
homemakers and with the exclusion from residential neighborhoods of any
people of color and low-income people.392 Schnably is right to protest
that Radin seems unaware of the darker, exclusionary sides of America's
romance with the single-family house. This is a liability of her attempt to
study our intuitions by reference to the canon of European philosophers.
But Schnably may well overstate his case, for he ignores the fact that
Radin's goal is to expand the ideal of homeownership to include tenants
who traditionally have been excluded from the stability and quality control
traditionally available only to those people wealthy enough to buy a house.
Radin's work has only scratched the surface of an important question: how
to transmute America's romance with homeownership to reawaken its
redistributive potential. In the last twenty years, homeownership has fallen
out of reach not only of many poor people, but also of many moder-
ate-and some middle-income people. Homeownership has always been
far less accessible to blacks than to whites,3 3 and this is particularly
alarming given the felt linkage between homeownership and citizenship.
Once we link our special sense about homeownership with the intellectual
tradition from which it springs, we can begin to consider how to tap the
true potential of the personhood element of property.
G. Conclusion
Most republican revivalists have focused on either the salus populi or
the egalitarian strain. 4 This approach misses a basic point: republican-
ism is not one thing. Instead, it is a loose collection of keywords with
Protean potential to transmute from one form to another. It can be, and
has been, taken in very different directions.
The challenge is how to frame a description of republican rhetorics
with the potential to create a conversation in which the booming voice of
the intuitive image does not drown out the other meanings that property
has had in our traditions.
390. See Schnably, supra note 155, at 364.
391. Id. at 365.
392. Id. at 365-67.
393. See Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 60-63 (discussing homeownership in the
United States).
394. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 279, at 37 (discussing the egalitarian strain); Sunstein,
Interest Groups, supra note 193 (discussing the salus populi strain). Frank Michelman is virtually
the only commentator to discuss both strains. Michelman, Political Markets, supra note 194
(discussing the salus populi strain); Michelman, supra note 277 (discussing the egalitarian
strain).
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The republican egalitarian tradition raises the issue of whether a
democracy can survive with an increasingly unequal distribution of wealth.
The foothold of the egalitarian strain in American law is far more
precarious, however, than that of the other major republican strains. By far
the strongest and most commanding strain is the mystique of the single-
family house-although it also has the most exclusionary potential. The
salus populi strain offers a direct language in which to speak about
designing property to achieve the common good, yet for precisely that
reason it is not useful (as Sunstein and Michelman initially tried to use it)
as a way to justify specific substantive decisions. In our diverse and
pluralistic society, we cannot assume a consensus on the common good.
Instead, the salus populi strain is useful as a way to defend the
legitimacy of redesigning property rights if that is necessary to achieve the
common good: the key point is that disagreements over what constitutes
the common good are a legitimate part of our property traditions. The
core message is that property rights involve political, not only economic,
issues; or, perhaps more to the point, that economic issues are inseparable
from the political question of what kind of a society we want to have.
Focusing attention on republican rhetorics of property sets up a
dynamic quite different from the standard approach, which posits the
intuitive image as the accepted wisdom, challenged by a more modem
understanding of property rights as relative and socially constructed. The
accepted formulation plays directly into the hands of those who claim the
intuitive image as "Our Tradition," from which we modems have fallen
away to our detriment. This pits the reformer against the intuitive image of
property. What republican rhetorics offer is an alternative formulation,
which mobilizes the intuitive image in favor of reform.
Republican rhetorics allow critics of the absolutist image to protest
that they are not opposing property rights. Instead, they are as concerned
as their opponents with protecting property rights: they just disagree about
the goals and the purpose of the property system. Republican rhetorics
allow critics to argue that 'You love property, I love property, we all love
property": we don't disagree about the importance of property rights, only
about who should have them, and what they should entail. The issue
becomes not one of traditional absolute property rights versus modem
relative ones. Instead, the issue becomes what we want property rights to
achieve-in a context where not only economics, but all of politics is on
the table.
The following Section examines resources offered critics by liberal
rhetorics of property. To do so requires looking beyond the common
picture of liberal individualism, to uncover the virtues of liberalism. s 5
395. See Kloppenberg, supra note 4.
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IV. LIBERAL RHETORICS OF PROPERTY: LET A THOUSAND DEALS BLOOM?
Schematized descriptions of a dichotomy between liberal and
republican rhetorics of property tend to recover only the strain of the
liberal tradition we have called "possessive individualism." This Section
focuses on an alternative strain, which is aimed at limiting property rights
in the name of human dignity. My analysis is part of.a larger attempt to
recover versions of liberalism other than possessive individualism, a project
that begins a reexamination of the relationship of religious and secular
variants of certain strains of political rhetoric.
A. The Liberal Dignity Strain
Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that
end, and limited by it. State v. Shack 96
Possessive individualism is not the only strain of liberal rhetoric; an
alternative strain emerges clearly every year when I teach a unit on
commodification in my property course. I begin with the question of
whether people should be property-including whether babies, kidneys,
and other organs should be for sale-and then proceed to landlord/tenant
law and the question of whether housing is or should be fully
commodified.
My goal in these discussions is, first, to bring to the surface the
general sense that property rhetoric is inappropriate in contexts involving
slavery and babies. 97 This sense is not universal among my students, but
it has predominated in every class with which I have had these discussions
over a period of a decade, and reflects the wince reaction that even many
law-and-economics scholars have to the proposals of Posner and others for
a market in babies.3 s My second goal is to require students to articulate
why they feel that full commodification is inappropriate in these contexts.
Typically they have trouble providing reasons. Instead, they tend to blurt
out that "the idea of selling babies is repulsive."3 9 The perceived bound-
aries of the market seem to be policed less by formal arguments than by an
intuitive sense I call "commodification revulsion."
When pressed, students tend to say that slavery and baby-selling are an
affront to human dignity. Courts and commentators attempting to
articulate dissatisfaction with commodification also sometimes find
themselves turning to "dignity" language. A New Jersey court in a
homelessness case asserted that the "dignity of every human being
396. 277 A.2d 369 (NJ. 1971).
397. 1 have found no consensus among law students on the issue of whether organs should
be commodified.
398. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
Legal Stud. 323 (1978) (criticizing the nonmarket regulation of the sale of newborn babies);
J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. Toronto I.J. 341 (1984) (opposing a market
mechanism for allocating newborn babies).
399. Harvard Law School student, fall 1993.
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demands a right to be housed. It is an affront to the dignity of that human
to provide indecent housing even for a short spell."4°° Another example
is J. Robert Prichard's discussion of babyselling, which notes that "certain
things should be above the hustle and bustle of the market-place so as to
preserve their dignity,"40' and that babyseUing schemes "would deprive
participants of their dignity."
40 2
Prichard's first formulation is religious: he argues against babyselling
on the grounds that "life is infinitely valuable-a pearl without price."4°3
Religious imagery also emerges in my law school classroom. For a long
while, religious formulations never entered my classroom when I discussed
commodification. Then I became interested in religion as a rhetoric of
intuitive limits on property and began to eliminate certain subtle and
barely conscious signals that religious rhetoric was off limits. Since then, in
the unit on commodification, religious language emerges regularly in the
articulation of the widely held intuition that property rights should be
limited to the extent they threaten human dignity.114 The most striking
example of religious imagery in my property classroom occurred when I
was teaching at Harvard Law School and asked: "Why can't you sell your
body?" "Because you don't own it," replied a young man from Indiana.
When I asked "Who does?," he silently pointed up.
This experience raises several points. The first is that religious
rhetoric in law school is risky. Several students after class told me they were
thinking the same thing but would never have used religious rhetoric for
fear of looking silly before their classmates. Note that even the student in
question could not bring himself to use religious terminology out loud (al-
though other students have done so outside the pressure-cooker
atmosphere of Harvard Law School). 40 5 The second two points are
questions: why are the boundaries of the market policed less by arguments
than by intuitions? And why do some students turn to religious language to
articulate those intuitions?
400. Apartment House Council v. Mayor of Ridgefield 301 A.2d 484, 488 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1973), quoted in Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, 524 A.2d 416, 425 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987).
401. Prichard, supra note 398, at 351.
402. Id. at 353.
403. The "pearl without price" comes from Matthew 13:46.
404. I am not saying that people agree on what constitutes an affront to human dignity;
they don't. But they tend to agree in principle with the notion that property rights should be
limited to the extent they constitute an affront to human dignity. The only true consensus I
have found is that allowing slavery is inappropriate because treating people as property is an
affront to human dignity.
405. Other colleagues have noted that religious rhetoric does not emerge in their classes
on commodification. Conversation with Iowa law professor, Lea Vander Velde, Aug. 1997. Nor
did it arise in mine for years, until I grew impatient with my students' inarticulateness and
began to suspect that it stemmed from their inability to use religious rhetoric, so I pressed
them harder to articulate their reasons in a context in which I had said in the introductory
materials that limits on property rights were sometimes articulated in religious rhetoric. See
Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 93-95.
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A hint comes in the widely cited case of State v. ShaCk,4 6 in which
the NewJersey Supreme Court held that a farmer had to allow government
workers access to his property so they could deliver social services to
migrant farmworkers living there in "camps." From within the traditional
frame, this seems a strange decision. The right to exclude, which has been
touted as the sine qua non of ownership at least since Blackstone,0 7 was
denied to this owner by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The opinion
begins with high rhetorical flourish:
Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that
end, and are limited by it. Title to real property cannot include
dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come
upon the premises. Their well-being must remain the paramount
concern of a system of law. Indeed .. . the law wil deny the
occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to
their health, welfare, or dignity.
48
The court's commitment is to limit any property rights that (in its
judgment) threaten human dignity. This passage highlights the rhetorical
difficulties of the liberal dignity strain. "Property rights serve human
values" is a stirring sentence, but what on earth does it mean? What, for
that matter, are "human values"? The New Jersey Supreme Court, famous
for its property opinions, sounds strangely inarticulate.
The opinion continues with the policy argument that government
programs will be ineffective if government officials cannot gain access to
migrant farmworkers who reside on their employers' property.0 But the
court faces the challenge ofjustifying its decision as one involving "law, not
politics.""
The court rises to the occasion with an assault on the intuitive image
of property, beginning with an ancient maxim beloved of the salus populi
theorists: "One should so use his property as not to injure the rights of
others."4 ' From this launchpad, the court uses legal realist arguments,
asserting that property rights are relative and challenging the intuition of
absoluteness. Characterizing property rights as a set of constantly shifting
"adjustments betveen individualism and social interests,n M the court
challenges both the sense that property rights are stable and the intuitive
sense that property belongs to the realm of economics, not politics.
406. 277 A.2d 369 (NJ. 1971).
407. Ehrlich's Blackstone 575-76 (J.W. Ehrlich ed., 1959).
408. Shack, 277 A.2d at 372.
409. See id. at 372 (referring to the benefits of government programs, the court states that
"[t]hese ends would not be gained if the intended beneficiaries could be insulated from
efforts to reach them").
410. The issue of whether law is, in fact, politics is complex; here, again, I am talking
about self-image, not the actual practice.
411. Shack, 277 A.2d at 373. Note that this is one of the two maxims that, according to
Novak, played a central role in justifying extensive regulation of private property in the
nineteenth century. See Novak, Sals Populi, supra note 243, at 39.
412. Shack, 277 A.2d at 373 (quoting 5 Powell, Real Property § 746, at 494-96 (1970)).
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This deconstruction of the intuitive image, however, proves only what
property is not. When the court attempts to say what property is, its
opinion takes an unpredictable turn:
"As one looks back along the historic road traversed by the law of
land in England and in America, one sees a change from the
viewpoint that he who owns may do as he pleases with what he
owns, to a position which hesitatingly embodies an ingredient of
stewardship .... To one seeing history through the glasses of reli-
gion, these changes may seem to evidence increasing em-
bodiments of the golden rule. To one thinking in terms of
political and economic ideologies, they are likely to be labeled
evidences of 'social enlightenment,' or of 'creeping socialism' or
even of 'communistic infiltration'....
Note, first, the distancing mechanism in this striking passage: the court
appeals not through its own direct voice, but through that of Professor
Powell on Property. Because the only alternative "political" languages it saw
were socialism and communism, which are clearly outside the scope of
mainstream political discourse, the court ultimately turned to religious
language to justify its intuition about the limits of commodification. In
short, the Shack court was in much the same situation as my students. Like
them, it was faced with the need to articulate its intuitions in a context
where the only clear vernacular articulation stemmed from religion.
Another example of a court using religious language to articulate
limits on property rights is in the 1984 West Virginia case of Harris v.
Crowder414 which involved an attempt by a creditor of the husband to
partition a joint tenancy in the family home of Marvin and Mary Ann
Crowder. The common- law rule allows partition for any or no reason, but
Justice Richard Neely, well known for his populist anticorporate rhetoric in
products liability cases, refused to allow the creditor to partition. In his
typically free-wheeling fashion, Neely explained:
Under the free enterprise system our economy is regulated
through recurring cycles of human suffering .... There is little
question that the free enterprise system has produced a higher
rate of economic growth, a faster pace of job creation, and a
substantially higher standard of living for the average person in
the United States than any alternative system elsewhere. But it is
important to recognize that the inability to pay debts in a free
enterprise economy is randomly distributed as an inherent part of
the market mechanism that controls resource allocation.
Although some debtors are besieged by their creditors because of
conduct that is morally blameworthy, the great majority are not.
One of the functions of the law is to distribute the costs of
operating this society in an equitable way: when loss is inevitable,
it should fall on the strong and not upon the weak.3
413. Id. (quoting 5 Powell, supra note 412, § 746, at 494-96).
414. 322 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1984).
415, Crowder, 322 S.E.2d at 860.
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Once again the court turns to religious language to argue that property
rights should be limited to the extent they threaten human dignity.
Current interpretations of liberalism often overlook the liberal
languages available to articulate limits on property rights based on human
dignity. To find one, we need only return to Locke. Thus far, I have
focused on what is today the dominant interpretation of Locke, of
liberalism as possessive individualism. Recent scholarship, however, has
pointed out that possessive individualism offers only one possible interpre-
tation of Locke; others stress not the nature narrative but Locke's proviso
and his intellectual commitment to religion. 6
"[L] abour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man
but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there
is enough and as good left in common for others."417 The "enough and
as good" language is referred to as Locke's proviso. In his original text,
Locke tied his proviso to his principle of equality.
It will perhaps be objected... that if gathering the acorns, or
other fruits of the earth, etc., makes a right to them, then any
one may engross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so.
The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property,
does also bound that property too. God has given us all things
richly, I Tim. vi. 12.418
In addition to this citation to the Biblical book of Timothy, Locke ties this
"Law of Nature" even more explicitly to religion in another passage.
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license
.... The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which
obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all
mankind.., that, being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.
For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and
infinitely wise Maker-all the servants of one sovereign Master...
there cannot be supposed any such subordination among
us. . .419
All men are equal, according to Locke, because they are equal in the eyes
of the Lord; property rights are limited to the extent that they threaten
this God-given dignity. Once we take Locke on his own terms, instead of
imposing on him "meanings gathered from the social consequences of
capitalism,"42 we see that his concept of property was bounded by a
divinely established natural law.
Historian James Kloppenberg points out that religion has long been
416. Dunn, supra note 55, at 21-26.
417. Locke, supra note 43, § 27.
418. Id. § 31.
419. Id. § 6.
420. Kloppenberg, supra note 4, at 16.
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one of the rhetorics defining the virtues of liberalism. 42' The cases cited
above suggest it still is. Three principles are commonly used as limitations
on property rights. The principle of equality is the only one for which
there exists a thoroughly secularized vernacular rhetoric; indeed, it would
be hard to imagine a law student at a loss for a secular language of
equality. The same is not true of the language of human dignity. Although
the language of human dignity today exists simultaneously in religious and
secular variants, the most common secular variant-Kantian liberal-
ism-has a highly intellectual air, unlike the religious version, which has
widespread vernacular appeal. The third principle mentioned in the case
law-the Golden Rule-also exists simultaneously in religious and secular
variants. Note the parallels between Kant's categorical imperative and the
Golden Rule.4 2 Christ said to treat your neighbor as yourself; Kant said
to adopt only rules that you can apply both to yourself and to others or
(another formulation of the categorical imperative) to treat others as ends,
not means. The categorical imperative is not identical to the original
religious injunction, to be sure. It is more rationalist and secular and
differs in other ways whose importance I am not trying to minimize. But
Kant's central metaphor-defining ethical behavior by treating others as if
they were yourself-is the same as the Christian image. John Rawls's veil of
ignorance embeds the same heuristic. Rawls proposes a thought
experiment in which one designs a society without knowing where one will
end up-presumably on the theory that this method will encourage the
designer to treat one's neighbor as oneself.
423
All this highlights that "the moral intuitions of those who are not
religiously committed have been influenced by centuries of Christiani-
ty."4 4 Judges in a secular society should be wary of open reliance on
religious authority. They should heed the suggestion that "many elements
and aspects of a religious ethic... can be presented in public discussion
in ways that do not presume assent to them on the specific premises of a
faith grounded in revelation.",425 (Perry calls this the test of "public
421. Md
422. See Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law. Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
91 (H.J. Paton trans., 1967). The accompanying focus on the inherent dignity of every human
being is a central thrust in the African-American church. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical
Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theory of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., 103 Harv. L Rev. 985, 986
(1990) (stating one of the article's goal as follows: "by focusing on the African-American
church and its role in the struggle for African-Americans, I hope to foster a greater knowl-
edge of and appreciation for the concrete experiences of the powerless and oppressed"). This
commitment to radical equality has, of course, been honored in the breach-and yet it gives
Christianity its basic structure of overweening moral ambition. See Joan C. Williams, Rorty,
Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 131 (1992) (discussing
Richard Rorty's explorations of nonfoundationalism).
423. See Rawls, supra note 203, at 136-42 (discussing the "veil of ignorance").
424. Basil Mitchell, Should Law Be Christian?, 96/97 Law &Just. 12, 21 (1988), quoted in
Michael Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 60 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 599, 605 (1992).
425. John A. Coleman, An American Strategic Theology 196 (1982).
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accessibility".) 2 8
Lawyers have greater leeway than judges in the use of religious
imagery. According to the prominent death penalty litigator Kevin Doyle:
"Most Americans... define life's ultimate moral questions in
religious terms and in terms of virtue and personal moral
responsibility ... For those of you who have yet to locate the gift
of faith, I am not suggesting you have to return to your church or
synagogue. I am suggesting that you cheat your client when you
kid yourself about the moral language your jurors speak or refuse
to learn it yourself. So go out and study a children's Bible or try
to remember what your parents taught you as a kid. But meet the
jury in the moral world it occupies." 27
Following Perry's principle of "public accessibility," the most effective
approach to religious rhetoric inside the courtroom is to use it in a way
that resonates with believers but does not exclude those for whom it does
not resonate. The same is also true of much, though not all, of lawyers'
work outside the courtroom that involves wide audiences, such as work in
politics, direct action, and media work. In situations where the audience is
more limited-lobbying, counseling, alternative dispute resolution, and
negotiation-the principle of public accessibility may be less important. A
lawyer needs to think carefully in these less public contexts about whether
secular variants are always preferable or whether religious rhetoric works
better for a particular purpose.
Note that religious rhetoric can be used respectfully even by those
who are not believers. As Doyle suggests, in certain contexts its use can
signal "respect for the world [your audience] occupies," rather than
personal revelation. Or, to quote a theorist rather than a practicing lawyer,
"the lawyer, like any rhetorician, must always start by speaking the language
of his or her audience."428
Although the liberal dignity strain offers an attractive alternative to
other republican and liberal theories, it also presents particular challenges.
In many contexts, using religious language can be a risky and unconven-
tional move, yet at times the risks may be worth it if alternative secular
formulations sound rarified and lack "public accessibility." Moreover, in
many contexts, neither religious nor philosophical formulations sound
much like law. In some contexts-international human rights law comes
readily to mind-the Kantian language of inviolable human dignity sounds
respectably "legal"'4 -- but not in property.
This analysis offers insight into State v. Shack where the court was
struggling with the awkvardness of trying to articulate the "equal dignity"
426. Perry, supra note 424, at 604.
427. Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 94 (quoting Kevin Doyle).
428. White, Law as Rhetori supra note 5, at 688; see also Singer, Persuasion, supra note 107,
at 2444.
429. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary 17-55 (Asbjorn Eide
et al. eds., 1992).
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tradition in a way that sounded suitably "legal."'o We see another court
struggling with this challenge in the landmark implied warranty of
habitability decision, Javins v. First National Realty.45' The Javins court, in
overturning a rule settled as of 1485432 that tenants have the duty to keep
premises in good repair, devotes the majority of its opinion to making an
argument that it is just updating the common law as common-law courts
have always done, calling upon analogies to products liability law. In a
crucial paragraph, however, the Javins court discusses "further compelling
reasons" for protecting tenants:
The inequality of bargaining power between landlord and
tenant... [leaves tenants with] very little leverage to enforce
demands for better housing. Various impediments to competition
in the rental housing market, such as racial and class discrimina-
tion and standardized lease forms, mean that landlords place
tenants in a take it or leave it situation. The increasingly severe
shortage of adequate housing further increases the landlord's
bargaining power and escalates the need for maintaining and
improving the existing stock. Finally, the findings by various
studies of the social impact of bad housing has led to the
realization that poor housing is detrimental to the whole society,
not merely to the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily
indignity of living in a slum."
Here the court starts with market failure arguments ("inequality of
bargaining power"), then throws in common good arguments
("detrimental to the whole society"), and wraps up with an argument that
frames the issue as one of human dignity. In my experience, the Javins
court's approach convinces students far less effectively than a Vermont
430. Courts also encounter difficulties with finding a suitable language in surrogacy cases.
In Yates v. Keene, 14 Fam. L Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1987), the trial judge stated: "1
think it goes without saying that surrogacy denigrates human dignity." Id. Several other courts
express commodification revulsion, notably the well-known Baby M case. See In re Baby M, 537
A.2d 1227, 1249 (NJ. 1988) ("[T]here are, in a civilized society, some things in life that
money cannot buy."); see also In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1990) (adopting
generally the findings and conclusions of the Baby M court). But when appellate courts write
formal opinions, even those that disapprove of surrogacy, they tend to rely on statutes to
make their commodification revulsion sound suitably "legal." See In re TNF, 781 P.2d 973
(Alaska 1989) (relying on Indian Child Welfare Act); In re Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218
(1994) (relying on parentage statute); see also In re Matthew B, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1274
(1991) (deciding on the basis of the best interest of the child). Moreover, many courts
considering surrogacy contracts explicitly state that the issues surrounding their enforceability
are not "legal" ones suitable for a court, but "policy" issues better left to the legislature. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 788 (Cal. 1993) (finding that the proper forum for
resolution of this issue is the legislature); In re Baby Girl UJ., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (1986)
(leaving the decision concerning adoption to the legislature). Some courts decline to express
any opinion regarding the social ramifications of surrogacy. See Anna J. v. Mark C., 12 Cal.
App. 4th 977 (1991).
431. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
432. Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 295 n.30.
433. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079-80.
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implied warranty of habitability case, Hilder v. St. Peter,434 which can stand
as a model for persuasive use of the human dignity strain.
The core of the Hilder court's argument is in its description of the
facts. For that reason, I will quote at length:
The facts are uncontested. In October, 1974, plaintiff began
occupying an apartment at defendants' 10-12 Church Street
apartment building in Rutland with her three children and new-
born grandson. Plaintiff orally agreed to pay defendant Stuart St.
Peter [rent and a deposit] .... Plaintiff has paid all rent due
under her tenancy. Because the previous tenants had left behind
garbage and items of personal belongings, defendant offered to
refund plaintiffs damage deposit if she would clean the
apartment herself prior to taking possession. Plaintiff did clean
the apartment, but never received her deposit back because the
defendant denied ever receiving it. Upon moving into the apart-
ment, plaintiff discovered a broken kitchen window. Defendant
promised to repair it, but after waiting a week and fearing that
her two year old child might cut herself on the shards of glass,
plaintiff repaired the window at her own expense. Although
defendant promised to provide a front door key, he never did.
For a period of time, whenever plaintiff left the apartment, a
member of her family would remain behind for security reasons.
Eventually, plaintiff purchased and installed a padlock, again at
her own expense. After moving in, plaintiff discovered that the
bathroom toilet was clogged with paper and feces and would flush
only by dumping pails of water into it. Although plaintiff re-
peatedily complained about the toilet, and defendant promised to
have it repaired, the toilet remained clogged and mechanically
inoperable throughout the period of plaintiffs tenancy ....
Plaintiff also discovered that water leaked from the water pipes of
the upstairs apartment down the ceilings and walls of both her
kitchen and back bedroom. Again, defendant promised to fix the
leakage, but never did. As a result of this leakage, a large section
of plaster fell from the back bedroom ceiling onto her bed and
her grandson's crib. Other sections of plaster remained dangling
from the ceiling. This condition was brought to the attention of
the defendant, but he never corrected it. Fearing that the
remaining plaster might fall when the room was occupied,
plaintiff moved her and her grandson's bedroom furniture into
the living room and ceased using the back bedroom. During the
summer months an odor of raw sewage permeated plaintiffs
apartment. The odor was so strong that the plaintiff was ashamed
to have company in her apartment. Responding to plaintiffs
complaints, Rutland City workers unearthed a broken sewage~ipe
in the basement... but defendant failed to clean it up ....
When I discuss this case in class, I begin by asking how it "smells."
434. 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984).
435. Id. at 205-06 (footnote omitted).
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The pervasive fecal odor, particularly in combination with the tenant's
"shame," works with admirable economy to convey the message that human
dignity has been affronted. Note the imagery of children in danger- of
plaster falling into cribs, of jagged windows slicing little hands. The
underlying message is that, even if rental contracts generally should be
enforced, this one should not be enforced because it places blameless
children at risk. The subtext is that we do not want to live in a society
where property rights are extolled above the crushed heads of innocents.
The Hilder opinion intimates that this case only requires us to sign on
to the conclusion that irresponsible, deceptive people like Mr. St. Peter
should not be able to abuse model tenants like Mrs. Hilder. Surely
whatever disagreements we might have about the limits of
commodification, it argues, the Hilder case is beyond the pale.
In fact, Mr. St. Peter may not have been so evil, nor Mrs. Hilder such
a model tenant.43 If they were not, this highlights the power of the
court's rhetoric. For Hilder's insistence on personalizing the situa-
tion-characterizing Mrs. Hilder as virtuous and Mr. St. Peter as
irresponsible-served an important rhetorical function. In contrast to
Javins sweeping attack on the market's ability to provide low-income
housing, Hilder keeps things simple, intuitive, and (to my students' view)
nonpolitical. I often summarize Hilder as follows: scoundrels lose; girl
scouts win. A very broad range of students are willing to sign on to this





Hilders brilliance lies in its ability to take this particular case out of the
general run of cases (where, it implies, contracts should be enforced). Its
forcefulness also stems from its smooth, untheoretical surface. Written by
an accomplished trial lawyerj the opinion conveys the liberal dignity
theme in an intuitive way, without stumbling over "inappropriate" religious
language or vague phrases like "human values." In property law, where the
dignity theme can so easily sound like mush or socialism, Hilder evades
explicit political judgments. All the reader has to sign on to is that
landlords should not be able to require tenants to live in excrement.
436. At the Society of American Law Teachers (SALT) conference in 1995 in New York
City on incorporating novel perspectives in mainstream courses, Professor Linda McClain
reported that a student of hers knew the landlord in Hil&r. Mr. St. Peter had told him that
the Vermont Supreme Court had gotten it all wrong and that Mrs. Hilder was a problem
tenant.
437. Characterization of Javins by one of my American University-Washington College of
Law students in the Fall of 1992. For another housing case that uses the language of human
dignity, see Maticka v. City of Atlantic City, 524 A.2d 416, 425 (N.J. 1987) ("The dignity of
every human being demands a right to be housed. It is an affront to the dignity of that
human to provide indecent housing even for a short spell.").
438. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note thatJustice Billings (author of Hilder)
is a family friend.
HeinOnline -- 83 Iowa L. Rev. 352 1997-1998
RHETORIC OF PROPERTY
B. The Virtues of Liberalism
My analysis is part of a larger attempt to resurrect a richer version of
liberalism. 4' 9 For our purposes, the most useful synthesis of this trend is
James Kloppenberg's 1987 article on The Virtues of Liberalism4
Kloppenberg points out that, as of the late eighteenth century, most liberal
thinkers (including Locke) assumed that self-interest would be pursued
within the bounds of virtue, as defined by religion, republicanism, and
other traditions.4" Locke's liberalism, Kloppenberg argues, "dissolves if it
is removed from the context of divinely established natural law, which
encumbers the freedom of individuals at every turn with the powerful
commands of duty.""
2
Kloppenberg's synthesis places the liberal dignity strain in historical
context. It is one of the limits set by religious and other "intuitions" on the
model of freestanding actors with rights making choices. Until the
nineteenth century, these limits were easy to spot because Americans felt
comfortable using religion as a language of social ethics. My analysis
suggests that the contemporary taboo against religious language in many
intellectual circles often leaves lawyers-from my students to the New
Jersey Supreme Court-at a loss for words when they are called upon to
defend the "intuitions" reflected in the liberal dignity strain.
C. Radin's Commodification Analysis and the Liberal Dignity Strain
Margaret Jane Radin's analysis of market inalienability taps the liberal
dignity strain of property rhetoric. "By making something nonsalable, we
proclaim that it should not be conceived of or treated as a commodi-
ty.-"M Radin's focus on "deeply contested issues of commodification "
4
signals a shift from the focus of her earlier work on articulating the limits
439. See also William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes, Good Virtues and Diversity in the
Liberal State (1991) (outlining the relationship between liberal political institutions and the
liberal moral culture); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community
in Liberal Constitutionalism (1990) (illustrating the ideals and demands of a liberal society).
440. Kloppenberg, supra note 4; see also James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism
(forthcoming 1998).
441. In The Virtues of Liberalism, Kloppenberg suggests that liberalism was "flattened out" to
possessive individualism in the nineteenth century. See Koppenberg, supra note 4, at 29. For
Dorothy Ross's subtle exploration of the persistence of republican themes in the nineteenth
century and beyond, see Ross, supra note 90, at 33-34; Dorothy Ross, The Liberal Tradition
Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed, in New Directions in American Intellectual
History 116 (John Higham & Paul Conkin eds., 1979). Harry Scheiber is another person who
has found, in eminent domain law, "the tension between economic individualism and
community values." Harry N. Scheiber, The Jurisprudence-and Mytholog,-of Eminent Domain in
American Legal Histoy, in Liberty, Property, and Government: Constitutional Interpretation
Before the New Deal 217, 231 (Ellen F. Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989). Yloppenberg
himself stresses the persistence of republican themes in James T. Kloppenberg, Book Review,
97 Am. Hist. Rev. 919, 919-21 (1992) (reviewing Westbrook, supra note 9).
442. See Kloppenberg, supra note 4, at 16.
443. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 156, at 1855.
444. Id. at 1856.
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of traditional property rights, to her commodification analysis which
explores whether to extend the property system to areas of life not
traditionally conceptualized in market terms.
The most interesting passages in Radin's analysis of market
inalienability are where she teases out the nonmarket elements of
relationships we ordinarily describe in market terms. Of course, once we
think about it, work and housing are examples of incomplete
commodification:" ' "work is not only the way we make our living, but
also part of ourselves.""146 One suspects that the same is true of many
relations we assume are fully commodified: think of long-term business
relationships and of the doux commerce theorists (up to and including
Carol Rose)." 4  An important strength of Radin's commodification
analysis is her uncanny ability to make us aware of the nonmarket elements
of market interactions.448
Less satisfying is Radin's attempt to articulate why we resist universal
commodification. In her attempt to explain our "intuitions," Radin relies
on a concept of human flourishing that remains full of good intentions but
vague in content.49  "[W]e must reject universal commodification,
because to see the rhetoric of the market.., as the sole rhetoric of
human affairs is to foster an inferior conception of human flourish-
ing. "'  Radin protests that she is "not seeking to elaborate a complete
view of personhood,"45 ' but she identifies three elements. The first
element is to have the power "to act for ourselves through free will in
relation to the environment of things and other people."5 2 The second
"identity aspect of personhood" requires us to "have selves that are
integrated and continuous over time."4 3 The third "contextuality" aspect
focuses on the "necessity of self-constitution in relation to the environment
of things and other people."4
Radin's personhood analysis helps explain why "we feel discomfort, or
even insult, and... degradation"45 when we think, for example, of rape
445. Id. at 1918.
446. Id.
447. See Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for
Capitalism Before Its Triumph (1977); Carol M. Rose, "Enough And As Good" of What?, 81 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 417, 439 (1987); Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance. A Comment on Spouses and
Strangers, 82 Geo. LJ. 2409, 2419 (1994) (departing perhaps for a moment in this piece to
discuss marriage and divorce as somehow outside of mere business or property right terms to
also include terms of relationship, needs, giving, nurturing, and caring in those intimate
associations between people).
448. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 156, at 1918-20.
449. Id. at 1884.
450. Id. at 1886.
451. Id. at 1903-06.
452. Id. at 1904.
453. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 156, at 1904.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 1881.
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in terms of market rhetoric. Yet the language of human flourishing seems
to promise philosophical precision where our traditions hand us only a
vague sense of commodification revulsion that rests on an equally vague
sense of the inherent dignity of human beings. These traditions can be
stated in Kantian terms, as the need to treat others as ends not means; in
Christian terms, as the need to love your neighbor as yourself;45 or in
Jewish terms-for Hillel articulated what we now know as the Golden Rule
long before Jesus did-"Do not unto others that which is hateful unto
thee."157 The Buddhist doctrine of reincarnation is another heuristic for
encouraging people to treat their neighbors-from people to flies-as they
would like to be treated themselves.4 s These themes can also be treated
in the language of human flourishing, although it has never been clear to
me what this adds, other than a promise (inevitably unfulfilled) to capture
our elusive commitment to human dignity in a rigorous and comprehen-
sive description of what it should mean to be human.
While philosophical commentators often prefer the language of
human flourishing, many courts and legal commentators prefer vernacular
dignity language. For example, though Radin buries Christian dignity
language in a "see also" reference in a footnote, a California court citing
Radin in a surrogacy case brought the Christian dignity language out of
the footnote and quoted in full the Magisterium (Catholic teaching) at
issue.49
The key methodological question is whether the language of human
flourishing promises more precision than it can deliver. From our
viewpoint as lawyers and persuaders, we may need to translate the
commodification branch of Radin's personhood analysis back into the
language of human dignity, either directly (as in Javins), or indirectly (as
in Hilder).
D. Conclusion
Our examination of liberal rhetorics of property has taken us far
beyond Louis Hartz's imagery of an unbroken and unrelenting stream of
possessive individualism. 4W Modern property law embeds two district
strands of liberal thought. One, possessive individualism, dominates the
self-image of American property law (much more than it dominates other
areas of the law, notably torts, as will be discussed in the following
456. Matthew 22:39.
457. The Jewish Encyclopedia (Isidore Singer ed., 1962) (quoting Hillel).
458. Dalai Lama of Tibet, My Land and My People: The Autobiography of His Holiness
the Dalai Lama of Tibet 29 (1997) ("Belief in rebirth should engender a universal love, for all
living beings and creatures, in the course of their numberless lives and our own, have been
our beloved parents, children, brothers, sisters, friends.").
459. Compare Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 156, at 1928 n.271, with Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 792-93 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Radin's footnote extensively).
460. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American
Political Thought Since the Revolution 7-11 (1955).
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Section). The other, the liberal dignity strain, coexists with possessive
individualism and serves to limit the acceptable scope of the pursuit of self-
interest.
V. THE INTUITIVE IMAGE REVISITED: INTENT ARGUMENTS AS EXPRESSION OF
THE INTuITIVE IMAGE OF PROPERTY
In this Section, I will discuss one small part of a much larger topic:
given (as argued in Section I) that property rights never have been
absolute, how does the rhetoric of absolutism retain its hold in the face of
the gap between rhetoric and institutional practice? This Section shows
how the language of intent serves to deflect the clash between absolutist
imagery and the practice of malleable property rights.
As has been noted, in a variety of contexts in contemporary property
law, the fee owner starts with the fullest bundle of sticks allowable at
common law, and then, suddenly, loses part of her bundle when the court
implies a right-of-way or a land use restriction on her property.46' In the
well-known case of Sanborn v. McLean,462 the plaintiff landowners bought
a parcel of land with no deed restriction in their chain of title, started to
build a gas station, and were told by the court they could not build,
despite the fact that their purchase price presumably reflected the value of
an unrestricted parcel.4s In another case, a developer bought a parcel
only to find its development potential limited by the neighbor's right to
haul fruit over a dirt track. 6 In other cases, someone pays good money
for a deed only to find that she owns less than she thought (or owns
nothing at all) because of adverse possession, a prescriptive easement,
nuisance, or the doctrine of agreed boundaries.
Courts often (although not always)4ss justify these unpleasant
surprises on the grounds they are enforcing the preexisting intent of the
parties. The doctrine of agreed boundaries provides a good example.4
This doctrine requires three elements to be met: (1) uncertainty as to the
boundary line; (2) an agreement; and (3) acceptance and acquiescence in
461. In the case of adverse possession, a landowner may lose all of her bundle due to
court action.
462. 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925).
463. Id. at 497.
464. Berkeley Dev. Corp. v. Hutzler, 299 S.E.2d 732 (W. Va. 1976).
465. Prescriptive easement cases and nuisance cases are the primary exceptions. In those
contexts, courts generally do not claim to be enforcing a preexisting agreement of the parties.
466. In implied easement cases, the intent theory is buried deeper in the tests, under the
requirement of a common owner. The common-law test for an easement by necessity, for
example, requires strict necessity to exist at the time the common owner severed the
dominant and servient estates. See Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1950). The implicit
theory is that, if necessity existed then, the common owner must have intended to create an
easement to allow the landlocked grantee a right of way. The requirement of a quasi-
easement in the context of an easement implied from prior use performs much the same
function. See Van Sandt v. Royster, 83 P.2d 698 (Kan. 1938).
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the new boundary.0 7 Although in theory courts merely enforce preex-
isting intent, in practice, "[a] longstanding acceptance of a fence as a
boundary line gives rise to an inference that there was, in fact, a boundary
agreement between coterminous owners."461 In other words, although the
doctrine in theory enforces a preexisting agreement; in practice, the court
often makes up the agreement out of thin air.
In implied covenants law we see the same gap between theory and
practice. In Sanborn v. McLean,469 for example, the court upheld the
residential-only restriction against owners with no such restriction in their
chain of title on the theory that an "implied reciprocal easement" had
arisen. When the developer granted out each parcel, the court intimates,
he intended to burden each parcel with a residential-only restriction and
to give each person in the subdivision a cause of action to enforce it
against anyone else in the subdivision.470
The obvious question is why, if the developer truly intended to burden
each parcel with the restriction, did he not follow the simple expedient of
including a written restriction in the deed? Why did he write restrictions
into some deeds but not others? Presumably he had a hard time selling
some lots subject to the restriction, so he sold them without it. Conse-
quently, when the court imposes the restriction on the owners of
unrestricted lots, it is not merely enforcing preexisting intent, but rather
redistributing the bundle of sticks between the defendants and their
neighbors. Yet courts deciding property cases strain hard to maintain the
transparent fiction that they are enforcing preexisting intent. In tort cases,
modem courts have openly admitted that they are engaging in social
planning to achieve social goals ,47 but not so in property cases. While in
tort cases, courts openly use normative language, in property cases this
would violate the "commonsense" notion that property is about economics,
not cultural values.4n
Returning to Sanborn v. McLean,47 we see the court arguing that the
defendant took his property with notice of the restriction because the
residential character of the neighborhood imposed a duty to inquire into
whether a residential-only covenant burdened his land. 74 What the court
really means is that it is imposing such a duty on the defendant, as part of
the process of defining what ownership means in this society. Again, note
467. SeeJoaquin v. Shiloh Orchards, 84 Cal. App. 3d 192 (1978).
468. Id.
469. 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925).
470. Id. at 497.
471. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (concurring
opinion by Justice Traynor); see also G. Edward White, Tort Law in America 208 (1980)
(noting that torts judges often act as "activist policy makers").
472. See supra Section III.D. (discussing the trance of the single-family house); see also supra
Section 11A . (discussing of liberal dignity strain).
473. 206 N.W. 496.
474. Id. at 498.
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the court's determination to avoid resorting to the language of normativity.
The law of adverse possession provides a final and dramatic example
of courts' use of fictional intent arguments. According to legal historian
William W. Fisher III, English courts traditionally ignored intent in adverse
possession cases.47 American courts, in sharp contrast, developed rules
that focus persistently on the parties' intent. Early American cases painted
the adverse possessor as either a knowing wrongdoer or a beleaguered
rightful owner who had lost the documentation for his title. In time, these
scenarios gave way to the image of the adverse possessor as one who found
the premises unoccupied and undeveloped, erroneously assumed that he
himself had title to it (or that no one did), and began to cultivate and im-
prove the land in good faith. By 1830, this imagery of a more or less inno-
cent adverse possessor who made productive use of the land had displaced
the earlier scenarios. This progression fits the pattern of American courts
willingness to fictionalize intent (in this case, the supposed "good faith" of
the adverse possessor) in order to avoid language of normaivity.
46
Possessive individualism so thoroughly dominates the self-image of
American property law that intent is stretched to a rococo degree. Highly
fictionalized intent arguments allow American courts to preserve the
intuitive image of property as eternal, absolute, and unchangeable, even
while they regularly redistribute property rights in the context of adverse
possession cases, doctrine of agreed boundary cases, and implied easement
and covenant cases. In summary, one way American courts deflect the clash
between the intuitive image of stable and unchanging property rights and
the practice of considerable redistribution is through the language of
intent.
VI. CONCLUSION: USING THE RHETORIC OF PROPERTY
The past is never dead. It's not even past.
William Faulkner"
What kind of property theory is good for lawyers? For much of this
century, most legal theory has focused on finding objective foundations for
legal decisionmaking. "Once legal realists had questioned the existence of
principled decision making," according to legal historian Laura Kalman,
"academic lawyers spent the rest of the twentieth century searching for
criteria that would enable them to identify objectivity in judicial
decisions. 4 7 William Fisher fleshes out this picture with brief descrip-
tions of the key mainstream currents in legal theory. Legal process
theorists argue that "if conducted in conformity with certain guidelines
475. See Fisher, supra note 243, quoted in Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 526-27.
476. Note that the "tacking" requirement, which exists in the United States but not in
England, also serves to sustain the fiction of a good faith adverse possessor (or, to be more
precise, a series of them). Berger & Williams, supra note 39, at 438.
477. William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun 92 (1951).
478. Kalman, supra note 179, at 5.
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and confined to certain sorts of disputes, adjudication should be
reasonably disciplined, constrained, and determinate."7 Law and
economics theorists argue that legal rules should be designed and
interpreted to achieve a different kind of objectivity: the ideal of allocative
efficiency.480  Kantian liberalism offered its adherents (including the
young Frank Michelman) "a set of firm, seemingly well-grounded
principles that enabled them to criticize and reform legal doc-
trine ... ."'8' Radin and Singer, along with Ronald Dworkin, Charles
Fried, and the neo-republicans, offer theories of the good "in various
shapes and sizes."8 2
What all these approaches have in common, Fisher concludes, is that
they "seek to supply judges with... a principle or vision that, conscien-
tiously applied, would lend coherence and predictability to judges'
rulings. "4ss As Kalman notes, mainstream theorists remain committed to a
search for objective foundations. Today, such theorists often turn to Jfirgen
Habermas, whose work sustains the promise of agreement while avoiding
foundationalist claims by focusing on the social conditions necessary to
create consensus. 4" The property scholar who best summarizes this
continuing search for objective foundations is Frank Michelman, who
began by using Rawls's Kantian liberalism to anchor his theory of 'just
wants," then turned to republicanism in search of a common good, and
most recently has turned to Habermas in search of the conditions that
would produce an agreement not distorted by power differentials.415
Even legal theorists who do not seek out some supposed objectivity or
consensus4.6 often seek to persuade by relying on pure logic. Thus much
of Joseph Singer's work seeks to undermine the intuitive image by using
realist techniques that highlight the circularity and other logical limitations
of legal opinions.4 7 Singer also presents logical arguments in favor of his
alternative, social relations approach.4ss
479. William W. Fisher III, The Development of Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial
Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in Philosophy,
Politics, & Law 266, 297 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
480. Id. at 303.
481. Id. at 308.
482. Id. at 310. Fisher also mentions the fact that an increasing number of outsider-
scholars have begun to offer new varieties of legal theory. Id. at 313.
483. Id. at 313.
484. Jfirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy (1996).
485. Fisher, supra note 479, at 308, 312.
486. Singer, Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 107, at 627 ("[T]he kind of social vision
I have in mind assumes contradiction rather than consensus.").
487. See, e.g., Singer, Legal Rights Debate, supra note 107, at 975 (critiquing liberal legal
theory and its conceptions); Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 107, at 1450-73 (discussing
the history of political accommodations law and family squabbles over private property);
Singer, Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 107, at 663-74 (analyzing the role of legal
doctrine in protecting reliance interests).
488. See e.g., Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 107, at 1446-48.
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Singer's work represents an important shift away from the mainstream
search for objective foundations. Most significant is his linkage of legal
theory with persuasion.4 9 However, a persuasive approach that relies
primarily on logic does not draw on what trial lawyers know about
persuasion; rational arguments do not hurt one's case, but neither, in
many cases, do they win it.
What does? To answer this question, one has to shift away from an
image of law as logical argument towards an image of law as a "rhetorical
and literary activity." "9 As every trial lawyer knows, persuasion is about
painting a picture of the facts that resonates with the jury's prior
perceptions of the world. And those perceptions reflect less a picture of
reality than "embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so for-
gotten as history."49" ' To put it differently, persuasion "must act through
the materials it is given-an inherited language, an established culture,
and existing community-which in using it transforms." 92 James Boyd
White stresses that persuasion reflects not only "a set of special-sounding
words, but a set of intellectual and social activities, and these constitute
both a culture-a set of resources for future speech and action, a set of
ways of claiming meaning for experience-and a community, a set of
relations among actual human beings." 93
Rhetoric in this sense refers not only to the art of persuasion but also
to "that art by which culture and community and character are constituted
and transformed." 94 At an instrumental level, this approach to legal
theory is beckoning to students because it teaches them how to be better
advocates by adding to the traditional focus on logic a sustained examina-
tion of chaos, inarticulateness, inconsistency, and silences within the law.
In this study we have seen plenty of chaos. Why is covenants law such
"an unspeakable quagmire"? I have argued that the doctrinal chaos of the
law of covenants reflects a clash between the intuitive image of
absoluteness and American courts' unspoken commitment to protect
single-family neighborhoods. Why is takings law still a muddle? I have
argued that it reflects a clash between the intuitive image of and state
courts' traditional sense that property can be extensively regulated if
necessary to achieve the common good. Nuisance is the third arena where
property law remains an eternal thicket-again it involves a clash between
the intuitive image of absoluteness and a legal tradition of limited
ownership. This same clash explains judges' frequent, if threadbare, claims
to be enforcing the parties' intent in property cases where they clearly are
redistributing the bundle of sticks.
489. See Singer, Persuasion, supra note 107, at 2445-48 (discussing the importance of
persuasion in the legal realm).
490. White, Heracles' Bow, supra note 5, at x.
491. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 56 (1990).
492. White, Heracles' Bow, supra note 5, at x-xi.
493. Id. at xi.
494. Id.
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In addition to chaos, we have seen plenty of inarticulateness and
inconsistency. Why does the famously brainy New Jersey Supreme Court
suddenly sound vague, sentimental, and religious in State v. Shack? I have
linked this with the rhetorical challenges presented by the liberal dignity
strain. Why did the Lochner Court uphold local zoning regulation in an era
when it was striking down most other regulation in the public interest?
This inconsistency, which has long puzzled commentators, is explained by
the American obsession with home ownership. The final inconsistency is
the most pervasive: why does the self-description of absolute ownership
coexist with the practice of limited property rights? Many commentators
have noted this inconsistency, but few have linked the intuitive image with
a tradition of constitutional rhetoric of limited government which is at
odds with the liberal dignity strain and various strains of republican
rhetoric.
Finally, this Article explores the silences in American property law.
Why does the egalitarian strain of republicanism have such a substantial
presence in American property rhetoric outside the law but so little
influence within it? This is perhaps the most sobering message of this study
for those whose goal is to destabilize the intuitive image. Other than in
Charles Reich's The New Property-which only served to give stability to
those who already had a stake in society (and then only for a very short
period)-republican egalitarian rhetoric has not emerged as a major force
in American property law. A key challenge is how to breathe new life into
both this strain of republican rhetoric and the salus populi strain, and
make them a live force within the law.
495
Thus, a pragmatic approach to property rhetoric can help train better
lawyers by awakening students to the full "cupboard" of resources available
to them as advocates in property cases. Even more important, it can help
create better citizens, both within the classroom and outside of it.
Pragmatic legal theory seeks not to discover preexisting truths but to
"treat[]' knowledge as the method of active control of nature and of
experience.""4 Its goal is to create a democratic conversation in which
the intuitive image is demoted from its received status as common sense.
Only then can we begin to improvise a future in which alternative visions
of property regain a central role.
495. As noted above, I will further explore this theme in a future article on takings law.
496. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, supra note 7, at 122.
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